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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report was requested by California Attorney General Bill Lockyer and provides an 
overview of gambling in California since 1998, * including its social and economic 
impacts. The report considers each segment of the gambling industry in a separate 
chapter: Indian casinos, the state lottery, horse racing, card rooms and Internet gambling. 
The final two chapters broadly examine the literature on the social and economic impact 
of the gambling industry. 
A FAST GROWING AND PROFITABLE INDUSTRY 
Gambling is a major and fast-growing industry. Industry revenues in the United States 
grew from $30.4 billion in 1992 to $68.7 billion in 2002, and increased from 0.48 to 0.66 
percent of gross domestic product. 1 
Gambling is a large industry in California, with about $13 billion in gross gaming 
revenues in 2004. Indian casino gross gaming revenues were an estimated $5.78 billion, 
card clubs took in about $655 million, the state lottery's sales were nearly $3 billion, and 
over $4 billion was wagered on horse races. Net revenues after prizes and operational 
expenses are deducted were considerably less. Racetracks and horsemen kept about eight 
percent ($302 million) and the state lottery's net revenues were $1.09 billion; card club 
and Indian casino net revenue figures are generally proprietary. 
What is the potential of the gambling market in California? We know of no way to 
produce a credible estimate. We simply have no experience with the phenomenon of 
readily available and skillfully packaged gambling opportunities located relatively near to 
California's large population centers. We do know that gambling is growing very rapidly 
in the state and that knowledgeable observers of the industry expect it to continue to 
expand. 
Indian casino gaming in particular has the potential to expand considerably in California. 
Sixty-six of California's 108 federally recognized tribes have tribal-state compacts to 
operate gambling facilities, and 61 have gambling facilities. Another 67 California tribal 
groups are petitioning the Bureau of Indian Affairs for recognition. As tribes gain federal 
recognition, they have the right to establish reservation lands with federal approval, and 
the potential to operate gaming facilities on those and other non-ancestral trust lands. 
California tribal casinos earn the most revenue of tribal casinos in any state-an 
estimated $5.78 billion in 2004, up from $3.67 billion in 2002. In 2004, the state's 56 
Indian gaming facilities had an estimated 58,100 gaming machines, 1,820 non-house 
banked table games, and large bingo operations. Non-gaming revenues at California 
Indian gaming facilities (hotels, restaurants, retail shops, etc.) in 2004, earned an 
estimated $544.6 million, a seven percent increase from the previous year.2 
• See Roger Dunstan, "Gambling in California," California Research Bureau, 1997, and Roger Dunstan, 
"Indian Casinos in California," California Research Bureau, 1998, for our earlier analyses. 
California State Library, California Research Bureau 
Federally recognized California tribes which had tribal-state gaming compacts as of 
October 2005, had 31,623 enrolled members in 2001 (the most recent data available from 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs), about nine percent of all American Indians residing in 
California. Indian gross gaming revenues averaged about $188,000 per gaming tribal 
member in 2004. 
STATE REGULATION 
Gambling is government-regulated. Governments determine which kinds of gambling 
are permitted, where gambling establishments may locate, their size, who may own them, 
who may work for them, who may sell them supplies and what games they can offer. In 
effect, governrnents grant monopolies to themselves (state lotteries) and limit other 
gambling operations through regulation (Indian casinos, race tracks, card clubs), 
providing a valuable asset to a relatively few enterprises. 
Governments regulate gambling in part to reduce its negative impacts on society. In 
order for a regulatory scheme to be effective, it must have the resources and structure to 
effectively monitor and investigate potential problems. California's regulatory structure 
mixes responsibilities among a number of entities-the Lottery Commission, the 
California Horse Racing Board, the California Gambling Control Commission, the 
Division of Gambling Control in the Department of Justice, the Office of Problem 
Gambling in the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs, and the Governor. This 
divided structure makes it hard for the state to develop and implement a unified 
regulatory policy. Equally important, the state's regulatory agencies do not have 
sufficient resources to fully staff their responsibilities. 
Technology is producing new and different forms of gambling, confounding old divisions 
between industry sectors and challenging regulatory schemes based on those divisions. 
In California, Indian casinos have bingo machines that look and operate like slot 
machines. Racetracks take wagers from bettors around the world over the Internet. Card 
clubs host poker tournaments and advocate for slot machines. The state lottery joins a 
multi-state lottery that offers larger jackpots. Internet gambling, which only the federal 
government can regulate, offers gambling at home without any intermediate provider. 
This reality suggests that the state should regularly review its entire approach to gambling 
regulation to ensure that it is as effective as it could be. 
ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND SOCIAL COSTS 
California's gambling industry provides economic and employment benefits to many 
Californians. Rural areas benefit economically when casinos attract gamblers from other 
places and some of their money is spent outside the casino. In California, Indian casinos 
also provide a new source of employment for residents in rural areas, since up to 90 
percent of casino employees are non-Indians.3 Casinos may purchase a variety of goods 
and services from local firms. 
2 California State Library, California Research Bureau 
A 2003 study by San Diego County estimated the following economic impacts from 
tribal gaming in the county. 4 
• Creation of about 12,000 jobs, primarily for non-Indians, with an annual payroll 
of $270 million. 
• Purchases of $263 million in goods and services in 2001, including contracts with 
over 2,000 vendors, most in the county. 
• Contributions of over $7 million to community organizations. 
A 2004 study of the impact of California Indian casinos by researchers at California State 
University, Sacramento (CSUS), based on county-level data, found" ... a modest 
correlation between Indian casinos and [higher] county employment 
rates ... [and] ... somewhat higher crime and higher rates of personal bankruptcy." 
Aggravated assault and violent crimes were correlated with a greater casino presence, as 
were increased public expenditures (as additional $15.33 per capita) for law enforcement. 
The study also found somewhat higher tax revenues, primarily generated by room 
occupancy taxes and tobacco taxes. Since local jurisdictions cannot impose a room 
occupancy tax on hotels located on an Indian reservation, the increased tax revenues were 
most likely generated by hotels in surrounding communities.5 
These findings run parallel to a 2002 National Bureau of Economic Research study using 
county-level data, which found that after the opening of a Native American casino 
employment increased by about five percent in nearby communities, while crime and 
bankruptcy rates increased by about ten percent. 6 
Problem and Pathological Gambling 
Most people gamble responsibly for recreation, but a certain number gamble excessively 
and become problem and pathological gamblers, harming themselves, their families, and 
their communities. As access to gambling--either state-promoted or authorized--
increases, the prevalence of problem and pathological gambling is also increasing. This 
addiction creates social costs analogous to the impact of excessive alcohol or drug 
consumption. 7 
Problem gambling refers to gambling that significantly interferes with a person's basic 
occupational, interpersonal, and financial functioning. Pathological gambling is the most 
severe form and is classified as a mental disorder with similarities to drug abuse 
including" ... features of tolerance, withdrawal, diminished control, and relinquishing of 
important activities. "8 
Casino gambling generates 82.5 percent of all problem gambling help line calls to the 
California Council on Problem Gambling. Over three quarters ofthe callers give 
California Indian casinos as their primary gambling preference, and five percent cite 
Nevada casinos. Casino gambling is thus the predominant venue for problem gambling 
in California.9 
California State Library, California Research Bureau 3 
We use national prevalence figures to estimate that there are 589,000 adult problem 
gamblers and an additional333,000 adult pathological gamblers in California--nearly a 
million people with a serious gambling problem. 
Adolescents who gamble are more likely to develop problem and pathological gambling 
behaviors, with lotteries and Internet poker as gateway games. Adolescent excessive 
gambling can result in a number of long-term negative consequences including truancy, 
dropping out of school, severed relationships with family and friends, and mental health 
and behavioral problems including illegal behavior to finance gambling. If we apply 
Oregon's adolescent gambling problem/disorder prevalence percentages to California, we 
find that 436,800 youth are problem gamblers and 159,900 youth have gambling-related 
disorders with impairment--nearly 600,000 California youth have a serious gambling 
problem. 
High-risk groups, in addition to adolescents, include adults in mental health and 
substance abuse treatment, who have rates of problem and pathological gambling four to 
ten times higher than the general population. 10 Men have a prevalence rate two to three 
times higher than women. Some ethnic groups are especially vulnerable to problem 
gambling. For example, in California the Commission on Asian & Pacific Islander 
American Affairs has identified problem gambling as a serious community concern. 
• Prevalence increases considerably among adult casino gambling patrons--4.6 
percent are problem gamblers and 5.4 percent are pathological gamblers. A study 
by the National Opinion Research Center found that adults living within 50 miles 
of a casino had double the probability of pathological or problem gambling. 11 
• A study in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that 3.6 
percent of lottery patrons were problem gamblers and 5.2 percent were 
pathological gamblers. 12 Lotteries are a key entry point into this disorder, given 
their widespread and ready availability and state-sponsored legitimacy. Underage 
youth have little difficulty in purchasing lottery tickets. 
• Studies find that adults who bet on horse racing (both on and off-track) have the 
highest incidence of problem and pathological gambling of any gambling patrons. 
Fourteen percent are estimated to be problem gamblers and 25 percent are 
pathological gamblers. 13 The California Horse Racing Board offers direct access 
to companies that facilitate betting on horse races through its state website. 
• Internet poker gambling among young males is extremely popular, and becoming 
a problem. As an example, the president of the sophomore class at Lehigh 
University robbed a bank in an attempt to pay off$5,000 in Internet gambling 
debts. 14 Prohibitions against gambling by minors in California card clubs appear 
to not be not well enforced. 
• A study by the State of Oregon of gambling treatment and prevention programs 
found that the primary gambling activity of gamblers enrolled in treatment was 
video poker (74.5 percent), followed by slot machines (10 percent), cards (5.2 
4 California State Library, California Research Bureau 
percent), betting on animals (1.6 percent), Keno (1.5 percent), and bingo (1.4 
percent). 15 
Based on national estimates, the annual cost of adult pathological gamblers in California 
is an estimated $489 million, and the annual cost of adult problem gamblers is an 
estimated $509 million--nearly one billion dollars in total. These costs derive from a 
number of social and personal problems that correlate with problem gambling including 
crime, unpaid debts and bankruptcy, mental illness, substance abuse, unemployment and 
public assistance. 
California state prevention programs for problem and pathological gambling are just 
getting underway, and there are no state-funded treatment programs. The state's Office 
of Problem Gambling in the Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs has a budget of 
about $3 million. Based on an estimate provided by the California Council on Problem 
Gambling, it would cost around $280 million to offer all ofthe state's adult problem and 
pathological gamblers a six-week intensive treatment course, with follow-up at 
Gamblers' Anonymous. There currently are a very limited number of certified therapists, 
so there would need to be investment in capacity-building first. 
Crime 
Research suggests that crime rises as casinos attract visitors who either commit or are the 
victims of crime. This phenomenon may also occur in other attractions with cash-bearing 
participants. 16 In addition, problem and pathological gambling increases among local 
residents and is associated with crimes that generate money to gamble and/or pay off 
gambling debts. 
A study using data from every U.S. county between 1977 and 1996, found that casinos 
(including Indian casinos and riverboat casinos) are associated with increased crime 
(defined as FBI Index 1 Offenses: aggravated assault, rape, murder, robbery, larceny, 
burglary, and auto theft) after a lag of three or four years. Prior to the opening of a 
casino, casino, and noncasino counties had similar crime rates, but six years after casino 
openings, property crimes were eight percent higher and violent crimes were ten percent 
higher in casino counties. 
Should casinos help pay for the public costs of these crimes? The authors of one study 
estimate that taxes compensating for the casino-induced increase in FBI Index 1 crimes 
would represent about 25-30 percent of casino revenues. 17 Casinos could plausibly also 
be asked to address problem and pathological gambling. The authors of a Wisconsin 
study made the following recommendations to the state as it renegotiated its tribal-state 
gaming compacts: 18 
• The tribes should fund enhanced law-enforcement activities in casino and 
adjacent counties, including road patrols, especially in areas around bars. 
• The tribes should fund community assistance, such as creating and activating 
neighborhood-watch programs. 
California State Library, California Research Bureau 5 
• Tribes should not sell alcoholic beverages in their casinos. 
• Drug-detection units of state police should be enhanced and made available to 
sheriffs and police. 
• Police officers and prosecutors in all counties should include gambling screening 
questions in all arrest reports and crime reports. 
Public Revenues 
The gambling industry provides relatively modest revenues to state and local 
governments. 
• Under the 1999 tribal-state compacts, California gaming tribes make payments to 
a Revenue Sharing Trust Fund for non-gaming tribes. Twenty eight tribes with 
1999 compacts also contribute to a Special Distribution Fund that backfills 
shortages in payments to non-gaming tribes, with the remainder appropriated by 
the legislature. Under 2004 amended compacts, six tribes make payments to the 
General Fund. Five years of all these payments (2000-2005) are the equivalent of 
about nine percent of the Indian gaming revenues earned in four years (estimated 
gaming revenues for 2000 are not available). 
• Net lottery revenue contributed about one percent of total California state 
revenues in FY 2004-05, and about three percent of the amount that the state 
spent on public education. 
• In 2004, the state received $39.5 million in licensing fees and breakage* (1.03 
percent) from California horse races and local governments retained more than $7 
million (0.19 percent). 
• Fees paid by card clubs to the state have held steady over the last eight years and 
have declined when inflation is taken into account; in contrast, revenues have 
increased by 7 5 percent. 
AN EVOLVING INDUSTRY 
Although we have made every effort to review recent data on gambling in California and 
the nation, the industry is constantly evolving. Thus the reader is advised to check recent 
news articles and state reports for updated information. 
• "Breakage" is the odd cents not paid to winning ticket holders. 
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THE GAMING INDUSTRY 
BACKGROUND 
Gambling has a long history in human affairs--at times associated with sin and corruption 
and at other times considered a form of entertainment. Societal responses have ranged 
from strict prohibition to legal acceptance. 19 Various groups and individuals hold the full 
range of those views today, so controversy will certainly continue. Nonetheless, 
gambling revenues are a major source of funds for governments, charities and businesses 
throughout the world, gambling is a major industry that employs thousands of people, 
and it is an enjoyable entertainment for many people. 
Studies in the United States suggest that religious differences and the availability of 
gambling in neighboring jurisdictions affect the permissiveness of state gambling laws. 20 
All states except Hawaii and Utah have authorized at least one form of gambling, as 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Number of State Permitting 21 Different Forms of Gambling (2003) 
#States #States 
Permitting Permitting 
Charitable Bingo 46 Indian Casinos 22* 
Thoroughbred Wagering 43 Greyhound Racing 19 
Inter-Track Wagering 42 Telephone Wagering 17 
Charitable Games 41 Keno Style Games 15 
Instant Pulltabs 40 Casinos and Gaming 14 
Lotto Games 40 Card Rooms 13 
Quarter Horse Wagering 37 Non-Casino Devices 6 
Numbers Games 36 Video Lottery 6 
Harness Racing 34 Jai Alai 4 
Indian Bingo 30 Sports Betting 4 
Off-Track Wagering 25 
* 30 as of2005. 
Sources: Taggart and Wilks, Gaming Law Review, November 2005, drawn from McQueen, 
International Gaming & Wagering Business, 2003, and Alan Meister, Indian Gaming Industry Report, 
2005-06 edition. 
Gambling revenues in the United States grew from $30.4 billion in 1992 to $68.7 billion 
in 2002, and as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 0.48 to 
0.66 percent over that period.21 State governments have benefited from gambling 
revenues, which in 2000 transferred $26.8 billion to state coffers (although the net effect 
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is likely less due to displaced spending from other taxable sales, as discussed).22 Even 
charities increasingly rely on poker tournaments and casino gaming as fundraisers, which 
pending legislation in California would legalize.23 
Over a ten-year period, from 1994 to 2004, the gross gambling revenue earned by the 
legal gambling industry doubled in the United States.* In 2004, consumer spending 
increased by seven percent from the previous year to $78.6 billion. This was more than 
consumers spent on movie tickets, recorded music, theme parks, spectator sports, and 

























Total Legal* Gross Gambling Revenue in the U.S. 
1994-2004 (in $billions) 
I 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: American Gaming Association Year 
\ *Includes horse racing, lotteries, commercial & Indian casinos, bingo, card rooms, legal bookmaking, charitable I 
Indian gaming is the most important growth sector of the U.S. gambling economy, with 
gross revenues doubling from $9.6 billion in 1999 to $19.4 billion in 2004. California's 
Indian casinos accounted for about half of that increase, generating more revenue than 
gaming tribes in any other state. Experts predict that there is room for substantial growth 
in the future. Indian gambling enterprises are rapidly expanding into related businesses, 
such as hotels and restaurants that attract gamblers and keep them playing. 
Table 2 shows that the gambling industry in the United States grew considerably from 
1999 to 2003. Indian casino gaming revenues increased by 75 percent. Estimated global 
Internet gambling revenues increased by an amazing 487 percent from 1999 to 2003t. 
Decreased horse racing and card room revenues were due in part to competition from 
casinos and Internet gambling, although card room revenues increased again in 2004, 
according to the American Gaming Association, driven by the popularity of poker. Card 
room revenues in California were an exception to the national trend, increasing by nearly 
60 percent from 1999 through 2004 (see Figure 17, page 111 ). 
• Gross gambling revenue is the amount wagered minus the winnings returned to players. 
t The most recent estimate (2006) estimate by the American Gaming Association is that Internet gambling 
is a $7 billion to $9 billion market in the United States, and growing. 
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Table 2 
1999, 2002 and 2003 Gross Revenues by Gambling Industry (U.S.) (in$ millions) 
1999 Gross 2002 Gross 2003 Gross %Change 
Revenues Revenues Revenues 1999-2003 
Horse Racing $3,382.9 $3,445.5 $3,362.4 -1% 
Lotteries (except 
$14,952.8 $16,237.7 $17,351.2 16% Video) 
Casinos (Land & 
$24,888.4 $27,858.6 $28,689.4 15% Water)+ 
Class II $1,149.8 Class II $1,753.9 Class II $2,018.5 
Indian Casinos* Class III $8,454.9 Class III $12,718.4 Class III $14,802.6 75% 
Total $9,614.7 Total $14,472.3 Total $16,821.2 
Card Rooms $909.3 $973.3 $851.3 -6% 
Charitable Games $1,417.7 $1,508.4 $1,559.7 10% 
Internet Gambling 
$1,167 $4,007 $5,691.4 487% 
(Global) 
+Except for commercial casinos, the industries presented are legal in California. 
*Indian gaming revenues in 2004 were $19.4 billion, according to the National Commission on Indian 
Gaming. 
Source: International Gaming & Wagering Business, August 2001 and September 2004. 
Table 2 shows gross revenues, which is the total amount wagered minus money returned 
to players. In competitive gaming markets, more revenues must go into prizes, limiting 
the industry's revenues. The amount of money actually earned by a gambling enterprise 
(the "take-out rate") is gross revenues minus operational expenses. 
In some states, gambling businesses operate in a variety of markets. For example, casino 
companies and Native American tribes own and operate racetracks, casinos, and lotteries 
and offer keno and table games, including poker, as well as slot and video gaming 
machines. There are casinos on cruise ships and soon will be on airplanes.24 
PARTICIPATION IN GAMBLING ACTIVITIES 
A December 2003 Gallup Lifestyle Poll found that two-thirds of Americans had gambled 
in the previous 12 months. State lotteries were the most common form of gambling:25 
• 49 percent had purchased a lottery ticket 
• 30 percent had visited a casino 
• 15 percent had participated in an office pool 
• 14 percent had played a video poker machine 
• Five percent had played bingo for money 
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• Four percent had bet on the horse races 
• One percent had gambled for money on the Internet (a number that has 
undoubtedly increased since 2003). 
Figure 2 
Participation in Gambling Activities Over Previous 12 












As Figure 2 shows, national participation in casino gambling increased from 20 percent 
in 1989 to 30 percent in 2003, while participation in other types of gambling decreased. 
A study by Harrah's Entertainment found that more than a quarter of Americans over age 
21 gambled at a casino in 2002, on average once every two months. The same survey 
found that California's 2002 casino participation rate was 38.3 percent, with 5.4 average 
trips per year. Indian casinos in Southern California were the top destination (33 percent 
oftrips), followed by Las Vegas (21 percent oftrips).26 
Half the people who gamble do so to win money, and as many gamble for entertainment 
and excitement.27 Nevertheless, the gambling industry as a whole suffers from a negative 
public image, according to a 2004 survey, which found that "trustworthiness" and a 
negative public image were the biggest challenges facing the industry. In comparison, 
gambling companies identified their biggest challenge as offering a broad range of secure 
payment methods.28 
A poll by Harrah's Entertainment in 2002 found that casinos are" ... perceived as a sin 
industry with deep pockets-much like tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceutical 
corporations---and therefore an attractive source of increased taxes." Only 23 percent of 
those polled had a positive perception of the casino industry and 99 percent said they 
would target casinos as a source for additional tax revenue.29 
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WHO GAMBLES? 
According to a recent article in The Atlantic Monthly, a record 73 million Americans 
visited one of 1,200 gambling businesses in the last year, a 40 percent increase from five 
years ago, and a quarter of American adults list gambling as their first entertainment 
choice. 30 A 2004 Los Angeles Times poll found that 40 percent of Californians said that 
they or a family member had visited an Indian casino in the past year. 31 
The data presented in the following figures is drawn from a March 24, 2004, Gallup Poll 
and from a survey conducted by Harrah's Entertainment.32 Gallup found that nearly 
seven out often American adults and 26 percent of teenagers took part in some form of 
gambling in 2003 (in most states it is not legal for teenagers to gamble). 
Figure 3 
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Source: Gallup Poll, 2004. 
Men Women 
More men than women gamble. Older Americans are more likely to gamble than young 
adults. The median age of all U.S. adult gamblers is 45 years old. A 1995 Las Vegas 
Visitor Profile Study found that nearly half of casino patrons were 50 years or older; 30 
percent were over 60.33 
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Figure 4 
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College-educated adults are more likely to gamble than adults who completed high 
school or have less than a high school education. The Harrah's survey found that the 
typical casino customer is slightly more likely to have attended college than the average 
American (55 percent versus 53 percent). However the relative amount gambled by these 
groups varies. For example, a 1999 study found that while high school dropouts and 
college graduates participated equally in lotteries, the dropouts spent $334 per capita 





















High school or less College 
Source: Poll, 2004. 
People who earn more money are more likely to gamble. According to the Harrah's 
survey, the median 2004 household income of U.S. casino customers was $55,322. 
However most economic studies have found that gambling expenditures are regressive 
12 California State Library, California Research Bureau 
because the poor spend a higher proportion of their income on gambling than do the rich. 
In general the poor, racial minorities and less educated Americans spend considerably 
more per capita on gambling. In the 1999 study cited above, households with incomes in 
the $50,000 to $99,000 range participated in lotteries at a higher rate (61.2 percent) than 
poor households with less than $10,000 in income (48.5 percent). However the poorer 
households spent $520 on lotteries in a year compared to $301 for the richer households. 
Figure 6 
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Earned less than $30,000 
Source: Gallup Poll, 2004. 
Earned more than $70,000 
Americans have mixed opinions about gambling. According to a 1999 Gallup Poll, 56 
percent agreed that casinos have a negative impact on family and community life in the 
cities in which they operate, even though two-thirds agreed that gambling had helped the 
local economy. Only 22 percent of Americans said that gambling should be expanded, 
nearly half ( 4 7 percent) wanted it to stay at current levels and 29 percent believed it 
should be reduced or banned.35 
Although the national gambling polls cited above do not present information about the 
ethnicity of gamblers, in California Asian-Americans are highly represented among 
recreational gamblers: "Asian Americans make up some 50 percent ofthe clientele at 
Pechanga Resort & Casino and a large part of the clientele at other casinos. These 
casinos are seeking to attract ... coveted Asian-American customers ... and are doing 
everything from advertising in ethnic publications and hiring multilingual hosts, to 
offering Asian-American entertainment and in one case redesigning parts of the casino 
with Asian themes."36 
REGULATION 
Whether to allow gambling, what types of games, and in what locations--these are 
contentious issues in many states. The gaming industry is highly regulated as to where 
and how it can operate and what games it can offer. Gaming enterprises aggressively 
seek to increase their market share by lobbying political jurisdictions to expand into new 
locations, discourage competition, and extend regulatory boundaries to offer newer and 
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more profitable games. For example, horse racing tracks and cardrooms have been 
urging states to allow them to install slot machines in their facilities, with some success 
(although not in California) 
According to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, state and federal 
gambling laws and regulations support the following common goals:37 
• Ensure the integrity of the games 
• Prevent links with criminal activity 
• Limit the size and scope of gambling 
The extent to which gambling can expand in a relatively unregulated market may be seen 
in Russia, which after years of prohibition now has few regulatory restrictions, cheap 
licensing and low tax rates ($150 to $250 a month per slot machine). Moscow has one 
slot machine for every 290 inhabitants housed in more than 53 gambling halls and 2,000 
arcades. 38 
Electronic Technology is Morphing Gambling 
Electronic gaming and new communication technologies are rapidly erasing the divisions 
between games and locations on which many state and federal gambling laws and 
regulations are based. The challenges to regulators to define gaming limits are 
continuous given the pace of technological innovation. Large potential profits encourage 
gaming enterprises to push at the laws' limits. For example: 
• Rapid Roulette uses a physical wheel and live dealer but touch screen technology 
that allows players to place bets via a video screen from remote locations. 
• In video poker games based on blackjack, the most popular American table game, 
each player has a video screen and there is often a live dealer, using real chips, 
running the game. 
• Electronic bingo is virtually indistinguishable from a slot machine from a player's 
perspective, the difference being that multiple players are linked electronically. 
Examples of recent advisory opinions issued by the California Department of Justice's 
Division of Gambling Control include: 
"Ultimate Bingo Game System Considered to be a Slot Machine"39 
"Volcanic Bingo Advisory"40 
"California Roulette and California Craps as House-Banked Card Games"41 
Electronic gaming technologies have led to controversies involving multiplayer 
electronic units modeled on table games. Several California Indian tribes counted 
multiplayer units tied to a single server as one "slot machine," placing more terminals in 
their casinos than allowed under their tribal-state compact. A survey by the Division of 
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Gambling Control and the California Gambling Control Commission found nearly 300 
terminals attached to multiplayer games in casinos around the state. The Attorney 
General defined each terminal as a gaming device and the tribes had to remove the extra 
machines after the federal district court agreed. 42 
Internet and wireless communications technologies challenge existing gambling markets 
and state and federal regulatory schemes. For example, bettors can play poker and wager 
on horses online, bypassing traditional card rooms and the pari mutuel wagering that 
supports horse racing. These communication technologies support multistate lotteries 
and allow bingo games to be hosted at multiple sites, creating larger prizes and more 
competitive games. International gambling companies headquartered in other countries 
compete in the American gambling market via the Internet, even though it is illegal. 
Some analysts contend that the gambling industry is facing a shake-up similar to the 
challenge that Napster and other file-sharing programs have posed for the music and 
movie industries. 
Charitable Games 
Even nonprofit organizations are pushing at the edges oflegal gambling in California.43 
Some organizations recently received notice from the California Division of Gambling 
Control that poker tournaments and casino gambling nights are illegal fundraisers. 
Organizers could face up to a year in jail or a fine of$5,000. This is because only 
licensed card rooms or tribal casinos with state-tribal compacts are permitted to host 
games such as poker or Monte Carlo-style gambling in California. Pending legislation 
may legalize a limited number of casino-themed fundraisers for nonprofit organizations.* 
Currently, non-profit organizations in California may host bingo games and raffles. 
Charities must register with the Attorney General's Registry of Charitable Trusts prior to 
conducting a raffle, and report afterwards. Charities operating bingo games must comply 
with local ordinances regulating days, locations, and hours of operation. Local 
governments may charge a licensing fee for bingo games. 
Charitable bingo can be a big business, as in the case ofthe Hawaiian Gardens Bingo 
Club, which is the largest non-tribal bingo parlor in the state, operating seven days a 
week. Between 1997 and 2003, the club brought in more than $200 million in revenue 
and paid out almost $37 million in charitable giving. Some of the proceeds have gone to 
local charities, but considerable controversy has accompanied many of the grants to 
groups in Israel. Under California law, bingo halls must be staffed by volunteer workers, 
so the bingo hall's workers rely on tips from players. Next door to the bingo hall, and 
under the same management, is Hawaiian Gardens Casino, the state's largest card room, 
* AB 839 (Torrico) would allow registered charitable organizations to hold one casino-night fundraiser a 
year, including poker and pai gow games, with at least 90 percent of the gross revenues going to the 
charity. Players must be over 21, and cash prizes are prohibited. Any single prize could not exceed $500 
in value, or total prizes exceed $5,000. In addition, no more than four events could be held in any one 
location a year. The nonprofit organization would need to register with the Division of Gambling Control 
in the Department of Justice and pay a fee, and vendors would need to be licensed by the California 
Gambling Control Commission. (2/2/06 version). 
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with 1,675 employees, 180 tables, and expected revenues of$85 million this year. 
According to press accounts, the club plans to expand to 300 tables by the end of the 
year. The club provides nearly 80 percent of the city's general fund budget (almost $10 
million a year).44 
The flow of revenue to some nonprofit organizations from bingo games has shrunk since 
casino gambling on Indian lands became widespread in California. For example, 
Sacramento County charity bingo hall revenues have dropped by nearly one third in the 
last 12 years. Ride to Walk, a Placer county charity that at one time earned $150,000 a 
year from its weekly bingo night, lost $6,600 last year, reportedly due to competition 
from nearby Thunder Valley Casino.45 
CALIFORNIA'S GAMBLING INDUSTRY 
Gambling was limited to card rooms, racetracks and charitable bingo for most of the 
state's history. Now the state has a lottery and allows slot machines and Nevada-style 
house-banked card games in Indian casinos. The state's voters approved a casino 
gambling monopoly for California's federally recognized Indian tribes in March 2000, 
and validated that decision again in 2004, when they defeated an effort to expand slot 
machines and other casino games to card rooms and race tracks. Californians also 
participate in charitable gambling, including raffles and bingo. Cruise ships with casinos 
sail from Los Angeles and San Diego on short trips to Baja California and back. There is 
considerable illegal gambling, including cockfighting, and betting on sports games. In 
short, gambling is a major industry and activity in California. 
California's gambling industry earned over $13 billion in gross gaming revenues in 2004. 
Indian casino gross gaming revenues were an estimated $5.78 billion, card clubs took in 
about $655 million, the state lottery's sales were nearly $3 billion, and over $4 billion 
was wagered on horse races. Net revenues after prizes and operational expenses are 
deducted were considerably less. Racetracks and horsemen kept about eight percent 
($302 million) and the state lottery's net revenues were $1.09 billion. 
What is the potential ofthe gambling market in California? We know of no way to 
produce a credible estimate. We simply have no experience with the phenomenon of 
readily available and skillfully packaged gambling opportunities located relatively near to 
California's large population. We do know that gambling is growing very rapidly in this 
state, and that knowledgeable observers expect it to continue to expand. 
This report is divided into sections, each of which focuses on a different segment of 
California's gambling industry, principally since 1999.* Whenever possible we provide 
state-level data along with comparative national information. The report also examines 
research findings about the economic and social impact of gambling in California and 
other political jurisdictions. 
• See California Research Bureau reports by Roger Dunstan and the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission for more detailed earlier data. 
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INDIAN CASINOS IN CALIFORNIA 
THE BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Several key principles underlie the special legal status that American Indian tribes enjoy 
in the United States. Most importantly, tribes are sovereign political entities with 
"inherent" rights that preceded European colonization, were recognized in treaties with 
the colonies and then the federal government, and continue today. The tribes are 
" ... distinct political entities both protected by and subject to the laws and policies of the 
national government." 46 
Article I, Section 8 (3) of the U.S. Constitution reserves the power to regulate commerce 
with Indian tribes to the Congress. Thus tribal status can be modified by Congress but 
state laws do not apply to the tribes unless Congress consents. 
Tribal Gaming 
Tribal gaming as an economic development tool began with high-stakes bingo games 
offered by the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes in Florida in the 1970s. In California, the 
Cabazon and Morongo Bands ofMission Indians launched card games and bingo in their 
casinos approximately 25 years ago, leading to a dispute with county and state authorities 
and threatened criminal action. The legal basis of the dispute was anchored in Article N, 
Section 19 (e) of California's Constitution, which prohibits casino operations: 
The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of the type 
currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey (adopted by initiative, 1984). 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court found in California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians (480 U.S. 202, 1987) that federal law authorized gaming on federally 
recognized tribal lands and that the state did not have civil regulatory authority to 
proscribe gaming on those lands. The court further reasoned that since the state already 
allowed local communities to authorize card rooms and charity bingo games, these games 
did not violate the general public policy ofthe state and were therefore allowed on tribal 
lands. Indian gaming is conducted by tribal governments as an exercise of their 
sovereign rights. 
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon, Congress enacted the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming 
by Indian tribes on Indian lands, " ... as a means of promoting tribal economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments ... "47 IGRA created a 
comprehensive regulatory framework, dividing Native American gaming into three 
categories or classes, each of which differs as to the extent of federal, tribal and state 
oversight. IGRA also established the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) to 
exercise general regulatory oversight. 
While class I traditional and social games are subject only to tribal government 
regulation, and class II games such as bingo are subject to tribal and federal oversight, 
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class III casino-type gaming is regulated by the tribes, states and the federal government. 
In order for tribes to operate casino-type class III games, IGRA requires that a tribal-state 
compact be adopted. A tribe that wants to conduct class III gaming must formally 
request that the state enter into compact negotiations. Once approved by the state, the 
compact must be submitted to the Department of the Interior, which has 45 days to 
approve (sign or take no action) or disapprove it. NIGC approval is also required for 
tribal gaming ordinances and casino management contracts. 
CLASS Ill INDIAN GAMING IN CALIFORNIA 
Between 1990 and 1992, the State of California, through the California Horse Racing 
Board, entered into four compacts with federally recognized tribes to allow off-site 
betting on horse races on their lands. (The Board no longer has statutory authority to 
negotiate with tribes on behalf of the State.) 
Then-Governor Wilson was resistant to expanding casino gambling to tribal lands. 
Nonetheless, some tribes installed a variety of video pull-tab games (under the legal 
theory, since disproved by the courts, that they were class II games) and nonbanked 
versions ofNevada casino games, leading to numerous legal actions. 
In 1996, some California tribes had an estimated 496 table games and 14,407 video slot 
machines in their casinos, taking in more than $652 million.48 Thus there was large-scale 
class III gaming but no tribal-state compact as required by federal law, a violation of 
IGRA and the federal Johnson Act. 
Also in 1996, in Seminole vs. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a provision in IGRA that permitted tribes to sue a state for failure to 
negotiate a compact in good faith. This decision increased states' negotiating leverage 
with tribes desiring to establish and/or expand gambling operations on their lands, and 
" ... set the stage for highly politicized compact negotiations."49 It is not clear, outside 
California, that a tribe has an effective legal remedy should a state refuse to negotiate a 
* compact. 
California State-Tribal Compacts for Class III Gaming 
In 1998, Governor Wilson entered into a compact with the Pala Band ofMission Indians, 
a non-gaming tribe, after 17 months of negotiations, permitting specific types of class III 
gaming on tribal lands. Ten other tribes subsequently signed similar agreements, which 
were approved by the legislature in August 1998. However other tribes found the 
compacts' provisions to be intrusive into traditional Indian sovereignty and circulated an 
initiative to essentially overturn the Pala compact. Concurrently the U.S. Department of 
• Department oflnterior regulations establish a mediation process, but whether a compact could be 
imposed on a state is open to constitutional challenge under the Tenth Amendment. However California 
has waived its immunity to suit under IGRA (Gov. Code §98005; H.E.R.E. v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 
615-616.) 
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Justice had forfeiture and injunction actions underway to seize tribal slot machines from 
gaming tribes operating without tribal-state compacts. 
In November 1998, California voters approved Proposition 5, the "Tribal Government 
Gaming, and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998," by 63 percent. The initiative 
sponsored by the tribes authorized the full range of gambling on Indian lands in the state. 
At that time, this was the most expensive initiative campaign in U.S. history, with the 
tribes investing nearly $70 million in support and Nevada casinos $26 million in 
opposition. However since Proposition 5 was a statutory initiative, and the prohibition 
against casino gambling was in the state's Constitution, the state Supreme Court found 
the initiative to be unconstitutional in a 1999 decision. 
Nonetheless, a number of tribes continued to operate an estimated 20,000 slot machines 
in about 40 casinos. Christiansen Capital Advisors estimated that California tribal 
casinos generated between $800 million and $1 billion in gross gambling revenues in 
1999, while operating in a questionable legal environment that impeded ready access to 
capital for facilities. 5° Many of the slot machines were supplied by companies under 
revenue-sharing agreements. 
In March 2000, two-thirds of the state's voters voted in favor ofProposition 1A, which 
was placed on the ballot by the governor and the legislature and supported by more than 
80 of the state's 108 federally recognized tribes.51 Proposition 1A authorized the 
governor, with the approval of the legislature, to negotiate and conclude compacts for the 
operation of slot machines, lottery games and banking and percentage card games by 
federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. Proposition 17, passed in the same 
election, enabled the legislature to authorize private, nonprofit organizations to conduct 
raffles [California Constitution, Article IV, Section 19(f)]. The adoption ofProposition 
1A provided a legal basis for tribal gaming in California. 
In anticipation of the passage of Proposition 1A, in September 1999, Governor Davis and 
58 of the state's 108 federally recognized tribes signed 20 year compacts giving the tribes 
a monopoly on slot machines and house-banked card games in the state. Sixty-one tribes 
ultimately signed the compacts, which were ratified by the legislature. In 2003, the Ninth 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found Proposition 1A to be constitutional. 
In 2004, an initiative sponsored by card rooms and horse tracks (Proposition 68) to allow 
card rooms and five tracks to have slot machines was defeated, receiving only 16.3 
percent of the vote after the sponsors spent $27 million. Proposition 70, sponsored by the 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians and several other Southern California tribes to 
expand Indian gaming, was also defeated in that election. Sponsors spent $30.6 million. 
The Proposition I A Compact 
The 37 page tribal-state gaming compact negotiated by Governor Davis and tribal leaders 
in September 1999, was hastily drafted over a 16 day period, with no public hearings or 
review. The compacts authorized the tribes to use up to 350 slot machines each, or more 
if they had more in operation as of September 1, 1999. Tribes could also purchase 
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licenses to use as many as 2,000 machines. They could establish and operate up to two 
gaming facilities, offering slot machines and house banked card games. In addition, the 
tribes could offer class II games (bingo etc.), which the state does not regulate. The 
compacts were among the first in the nation to contain payments for non-gaming tribes, 
and to allow collective bargaining among casino employees. 
The compact, signed by 61 tribes, has been subject to varying interpretations, sometimes 
resulting in litigation. Key terms are vague, leading to disputes such as over the number 
of slot machines allowed, which ranged from Governor Davis' figure of 45,000 to the 
Legislative Analyst Office's estimate of 113,000. The California Gambling Control 
Commission eventually placed the number of authorized slot machines at 61,957. As 
shown in Figure 7, the state's Indian casinos currently have around 58,100 slot machines 
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Source: Alan Meister, Casino City's Indian Gaming Industry Report, 2005-2006 Updated Edition. 
The compacts established a Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF), which is funded by 
fees paid by gaming tribes with licensed slot machines for distribution to non-compact 
tribes (defined as tribes with less than 350 slot machines). The compacts provide that 
non-gaming tribes are to receive $1.1 million annually. As of September 2005,$148 
million had been distributed to eligible tribes. Including interest, payments to the fund 
totaled $154.6 million. 
Tribal contributions do not generate sufficient revenue to allow the RSTF to provide $1.1 
million annually to all non-gaming tribes, resulting in an aggregate shortfall to all eligible 
recipient Indian tribes in fiscal year (FY) 2004-05, of$48,483,757, or $692,625 per 
tribe. 52 Government Code §12012.90 provides that the shortfall is to be paid from the 
Special Distribution Fund (SDF) through the state budget process. 
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The 1999 compacts provide that up to 13 percent of net win* from slot machines in 
operation on September 1, 1999, is contributed to the SDF. Tribes that did not have these 
gaming devices in operation prior to September 1, 1999, are not obligated to pay into the 
SDF. The funds can be appropriated by the legislature through the budget process for 
any purpose including, but not limited to, gambling addiction programs, reimbursement 
of regulatory costs, grants to state and local governments impacted by gaming, and to 
cover shortfalls in the RSTF. Payments to the SDF began in 2003, and totaled $368.7 
million (including interest) through September 2005. The fund has a balance of about 
$92.9 million for FY 2005-06. 
The 1999 compacts will expire at the beginning of 2021. However they provide for 
renegotiation at the request of either tribal leaders or the governor under specific 
circumstances. These include unresolved environmental issues in the development of a 
gaming facility, and/or a tribe's desire to operate more than the 2,000 gaming devices 
allowed by the compact. The compacts were opened for renegotiation over 
environmental issues in 2003, but Governor Davis sent a letter to tribes rescinding his 
formal request to renegotiate before he left office later that year. 
In 2003, three tribes, the La Posta Band ofMission Indians, the Santa Ysabel Band of 
Mission Indians and the Torres-Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians negotiated tribal-state 
gaming compacts with the Davis Administration that introduced revenue-sharing with the 
state (payments to the General Fund) for the first time. These compacts also contain 
stronger environmental language, requiring tribes to reach agreements with local 
governments on off-reservation impacts. 
The La Posta and Santa Ysabel compacts provide that five percent of the net win from up 
to 350 gaming devices will go to the state, and that the tribes will enter into memoranda 
of understanding with local governments to mitigate the impact of their casinos. The 
Torres-Martinez compact creates a sliding scale beginning with three percent of net win 
the first year and topping at five percent the third year. These tribes do not currently have 
operating casinos. 
The Schwarzenegger Compacts 
Thirteen new or amended compacts have been negotiated between tribes and Governor 
Schwarzenegger, of which eight have been ratified by the legislature. These compacts 
build on the Davis Administration compacts and contain provisions providing for greater 
revenue sharing with the state, enhanced patron protections, stronger environmental, 
labor and building safety provisions, and most recently a problem gambling program. 
They also require agreements with local governments. These compacts are likely to be 
seen as models in future compact negotiations, a possibility opposed by some tribes. 
(Table 8 provides information about all tribes with tribal-state gaming compacts.) 
• According to the California Gambling Control Commission, net win is " ... the difference between gaming 
wins and loses before deducting costs and expenses." (CGCC Publication I, Feb. 16, 2005, p. 5). 
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• In January 2004, the governor successfully entered into negotiations with nine 
tribes; six were parties to the 1999 tribal-state compact and sought to offer more 
gaming devices, and three sought to enter into compacts for the first time. One of 
the new compacts, with the Lytton Rancheria of California, was not ratified by the 
legislature due to controversy over its proposed location and size. The other new 
and amended compacts were ratified, resulting in a total of 66 tribes with tribal-
state gaming compacts in California (four of those tribes do not have casinos). 
• In 2005, the governor negotiated four compacts (one amended, three new) that 
have not yet been ratified by the legislature. Compacts with the Yurok, Quechan, 
Big Lagoon Rancheria and Los Coyotes Band tribes were opposed by "smaller, 
powerful tribes with big casinos" who do not support some of the new provisions 
in the compacts, according to press accounts.53 
Table 3 
California Indian Tribes With Unratified Compacts, October 2005 
Tribe, Location,# 
Business 
Proposed Number and Payments to state 
Members reported 
Partners 
State Compact casino Types of and local 
to BIA (200 1) location Games jurisdictions 
Big Lagoon 
Bar West Negotiated in Up to 2,250 slot Would pay state Rancheria, 
Humboldt Co., 18 
Gaming LLC 2005, land not in Barstow machines, card 16-25% annual net 
members 
(Detroit) trust games Will 
Los Coyotes Band 
of Cahuilla and Bar West Negotiated in Up to 2,250 slot Would pay state 
Cupefio Indians, GamingLLC 2005, land not in Barstow machines, card 16-25% annual net 
San Diego, 286 (Detroit) trust games Will 
members 
Compact provides 
Compact would 25% net win to 
Lytton Rancheria of Rumsey and 
allow 2,500 state minus local 
Negotiated in gaming devices; payments; city California,* 246 Pala tribes, G. 
2004 
San Pablo 
tribe has 800 earned $9 million 
members Maloof class II games in FY 05-06 (7 .5% 
and card room; revenues) from 
class II games 
Quechan Indian 
Amended 1999 One casino, up 
10% net win up to 
Nation, Imperial Imperial 25% based on 
County, 2,668 compact County 
to 1,100 slots, tribal emollment 
members in Ca. 
negotiated in 2005 card games 
and revenues 
Yurok Tribe of the 
Up to 350 
Sliding scale 
Yurok Reservation, Negotiated in beginning with 
Klamath, 4,466 2005 
Klamath gaming devices, I 0% net win, up to 
members 
card games 25% 
* The Lytton Rancheria makes per capita payments to its members that total 49% of revenues. Payments to the city 
of San Pablo amount to over half the city's annual budget. 
Source: California Research Bureau, California State Library, 2006. 
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The casinos proposed in the Los Coyotes and Big Lagoon tribal-state compacts would be 
located in Barstow, where neither tribe has federal trust land. The tribes would have to 
secure federal and state approval and demonstrate local community support in order to 
gain federal trust land for gambling purposes, a long and uncertain process. 
The Quechan tribe has sued the state in federal court alleging bad-faith by virtue of the 
Legislature's failure to ratify the negotiated compact amendment, requesting that a 
mediator be empowered to choose the "last best offer" as a compact binding between the 
tribe and the state. If successful, this suit could obviate legislative ratification of the 
amended compact. 54 The tribe wants to build a larger facility with up to 1,100 slot 
machines in a better location than its existing casino. According to court filings 
submitted by the tribe, 67 percent of its members are unemployed. 55 
The new and amended 2004-05 tribal state compacts strengthen Indian gaming 
exclusivity and in some cases allow more than 2,000 gaming devices per casino. Gaming 
devices are defined to include instant lottery game devices and video poker as well as slot 
machines, expanding the range of games that can be offered. 
Tribal parties to the 2004 amended compacts agreed to fund a $1 billion state 
transportation bond and share revenues with the state. These tribes make payments into 
three accounts: the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, the state General Fund (based on the 
number of slot machines added since the amended compacts took effect), and a 
transportation bond fund. 56 
All the recent compacts contain increased revenue sharing provisions with the state from 
ten to 25 percent of annual net win. However, the definition of annual net win is 
different from that typically used by the gaming industry and in the 1999 compacts. It 
allows deduction of limited operational expenses, including leasing fees for gaming 
devices, thereby decreasing the revenue base on which payments to the state are 
calculated. As of September 2005, $20 million had been contributed to the state's 
General Fund. 
Unlike the 1999 compacts, the Schwarzenegger compacts require tribes to reach 
Memoranda ofUnderstanding (MOUs) with local governments. The MOUs are to 
address local land use, environmental and public safety issues, as well as mitigate local 
impacts, such as increased traffic, that require infrastructure investments and increased 
police and fire services. These MOUs are enforceable in state superior court under a 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity. 
The Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians recently agreed to pay San Diego County more 
than $1.2 million for road improvements to address impacts of a planned $18 million 
casino expansion, the first agreement reached in the county under the compacts 
negotiated by Governor Schwarzenegger. The tribe's expanded casino will have 2,500 
slot machines, 68 table games, a 900-seat bingo hall and off-track betting. In addition, 
the neighboring Ewiiaapaayp Band plans to develop a second casino on Viejas land, 
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pending federal approval, a plan endorsed by county supervisors as a means of 
concentrating the casinos' impact. 57 
According to news accounts, the California Nations Indian Gaming Association, an 
association of 63 tribes, is developing guidelines for future compacts, " ... driven by 
gaming tribes who fear that the Schwarzenegger administration is piecing together a 
tough template for the compacts."58 The tribes reportedly want to limit the amount of 
revenue the state can seek and to avoid other concessions such as collective bargaining 
and local impact agreements. 
Where Indian Gaming Can be Located-the "Indian Lands" Requirement 
Under IGRA, Indian gaming must take place on "Indian lands" or the gaming is subject 
to state laws. For historical reasons, the location of Indian lands is not always clear. This 
is because at various times in the nation's history the federal government has taken away 
Indian land by treaty or by force. At other times it has tried to force assimilation, for 
example by allowing reservation land to be sold, resulting in a checkerboard pattern of 
land ownership on some reservations.* 
Approximately 473,000 acres of California are under tribal control, compared to the nine 
million acres (about seven percent of the state) that would have been retained under 18 
federal treaties negotiated in 1851, but never ratified by the U.S. Senate. 59 During the 
early 20th century, the federal government purchased land in rural areas for homeless 
California Indians, leading to the eventual creation or purchase of 82 rancherias. 
Tribal Restoration 
For the purposes of this report, the 1950's and 1960's "termination era" is particularly 
important. Congress passed the California Rancheria Act of 1958, leading to the 
termination of the federal trust relationship with 38 California rancherias and of the tribes 
that lived on them.t Of the Indian groups that lost their federally recognized tribal status 
at that time, 17 were reinstated in the Tillie Hardwick decision in 1983, and ten other 
tribes have since been restored by the federal courts. 
Three California tribes have been recognized by acts of Congress. The Federated Indians 
of Graton Rancheria was restored by Congressional action in 2000. The legislation 
placed a mandatory duty on the Secretary of the Interior to acquire land for the benefit of 
the tribe. The tribe has purchased land in Rohnert Park on which it hopes to build a 2,000 
slot machine casino. The Paskenta Band ofNomlaki Indians and the United Auburn 
Indian Community were restored by Congressional actions in 1994, and authorized to 
establish reservations in Tehama and Placer Counties, respectively. Both tribes operate 
·One important question is whether states have jurisdiction over non-Indian member fee land located 
within a reservation. In March 2005, the NIGC opined that they do not. 
t A more complete discussion of federal law would include the General Allotment Act of 1887 that led to a 
significant reduction in tribal lands, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which provides for, among 
other things, the acquisition of additional trust land for tribes, and other developments beyond the scope of 
this report. 
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casinos. Legislation to facilitate recognition of other tribes is pending, such as HR 3475 
(D-Honda), which would require the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to expedite 
recognition of the Amah Mutsun, a tribe of 500 members located south of Gilroy.* 
Gaining federal recognition through administrative action is a lengthy process. The 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) must find that a tribe was functioning before the arrival of 
Europeans, has maintained political influence over its members to the present, and is not 
an offshoot of an already recognized tribe. 60 Of the 302 tribes seeking federal recognition 
nationally, 67 are from California (Appendix A lists California tribal groups petitioning 
for recognition as of February, 2005). 
Restoration and Acquisition of Indian Lands 
As tribes are restored to federal recognition, they have the right to acquire land for a 
reservation with federal approval. The Secretary of the Interior is empowered under the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, at his/her discretion, to acquire lands in trust t for a 
tribe "within or without existing reservations." This is a lengthy process, overseen by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, which has been called "cumbersome" and lacking "sufficient 
clarity over the standards applied."61 Decisions are subject to judicial appeal in federal 
courts. 
The Secretary must consider the following criteria in evaluating requests for the 
acquisition of trust land, under regulations adopted by the Department:62 
• The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition. 
• The need of the individual Indian or tribe for additional land and the amount of 
land already owned. 
• The purposes for which the land will be used. 
• The extent to which the tribe has complied with the National Environmental 
Protection Act. 
• Whether the tribe owns an interest in the land and whether adverse legal claims 
exist on the property, including potential environmental liability. 
• The impact on state and local governments resulting from the removal ofthe land 
from the tax rolls. 
• Whether the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-
determination, economic development, or Indian housing. 
In evaluating off-reservation land acquisitions, the Secretary of the Interior must also 
consider the distance of the land from the boundaries of the tribe's reservation. The 
• Two rival groups claim leadership of the tribe, a complicated but not unique situation. 
t Placing tribal lands "into trust" is a process whereby the Secretary of the Interior acquires title to a 
property and holds it in trust for the benefit of a Native American tribe or tribal members. The use of trust 
lands is governed by the tribes with some federal restrictions, and is not generally subject to state laws. 
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greater the distance, the more scrutiny is to be given to the tribe's justification and the 
greater weight given to state and local concerns. If the land is being acquired for 
business purposes, the tribe must provide a plan specifying the anticipated economic 
benefits. 
Land Acquisition for Indian Gaming 
The IGRA provides that an Indian tribe has the right to locate gaming facilities on land 
that was within or contiguous to a reservation in 1988, at the time of the Act's passage. 
The ability of tribes to offer gaming on off-reservation lands that were not part of a 
reservation or held in trust at that time is limited and the process is of obtaining approval 
is complex. After a review process conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the 
Secretary of the Interior must find, after consultation with state and local officials, that 
(1) the gaming is in the best interest of the tribe and (2) is not detrimental to the local 
community (defined as all units oflocal government within ten miles of the site and all 
Indian tribes within 50 miles). Although there is no requirement that the land be located 
with the tribe's ancestral area, the further the land is from the tribe's original lands, the 
greater the weight given to local concerns. Finally, the state's governor must concur (a 
"Section 20 concurrence"). 
However tribes may conduct gaming on after-acquired lands (post IGRA, 1988) without 
the governor's concurrence if the lands: 
• Are taken into trust due to a court decision or settlement. 
• Are acknowledged to have been part of an initial reservation by the Secretary of 
the Interior. 
• Or have been restored to a landless tribe that was restored to federal recognition. 
To qualify under the "restoration of lands" exception, a tribe must have been previously 
recognized, terminated, and subsequently restored by Congressional, judicial, or 
administrative action. The land must be identified in the restoration legislation or the 
tribe must establish a strong historical and geographical relation to the land within a 
reasonable period oftime after restoration. 63 
In 2005, former Secretary Norton declared in a letter to the Governor of Oregon that the 
Department of Interior would no longer consider gambling agreements for sites that are 
not already Indian lands held in trust for a tribe by the federal government. The new 
policy requires an extensive environmental review and support from surrounding 
communities. 
Governor Schwarzenegger negotiated state-tribal compacts in 2005 with the Los Coyotes 
and Big Lagoon tribes to build casinos in Barstow. Neither tribe is from the area or has 
land in trust there. Former Secretary Norton's policy of not considering compacts when 
the land is not already Indian land held in trust and eligible for gaming purposes appears 
to be in conflict with these compacts. 
26 California State Library, California Research Bureau 
Previously two California gaming tribes gained state approval for a gaming compact 
before they had land in federal trust, although the United Auburn Indian Community and 
the Paskenta Band ofNomelaki Indians had received federal permission through 
Congressional action to re-establish a land base in their home counties. 
So far no California tribes have been authorized to conduct gaming on after-acquired 
lands by the Secretary of the Interior, although a number are in the process of seeking 
local and state support for their efforts to do so (see Table 4). 
Table 4 
Pending Land-Into-Trust Applications for Gaming in California (May 2006) 
Tribe Location Section 20 Exception* 
Big Lagoon Rancheria 23 .I 0 Acres - Barstow, San Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A)** 
677 miles from reservation Bernardino County Application dated 3/27/06 
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe 40 Acres - Barstow, San Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A) 
160 miles from reservation Bernardino County Application dated 2/14/06 
Colorado River Indian Tribes of 75 Acres- Blythe, Riverside Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A) 
Arizona County Application dated 2/14/06 
10 miles from reservation 
Fort Mohave Tribe of Arizona 300 Acres -Needles, San Off-Reservation §2719(b )(I )(A) 
2.5 miles from reservation Bernardino County Application dated 10/2/03 
Land is in trust 
Karuk Tribe 34 Acres- Yreka, Siskiyou Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A) 
County Application dated 4/11106 
Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla 20 Acres Barstow, San Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A) 
& Cupefio Indians Bernardino County Application dated 3/27/06 
115 miles from reservation 
Manzanita Band of the 60 Acres - Calexico, Imperial Off-Reservation §2719(b )( 1 )(AO 
Kumeyaay Nation County Application dated 4/14/06 
60 miles from reservation 
Ramona Band of Cahuilla Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A) 
Indians Application dated 4/14/06 
Tule River Indian Tribe 39.9 Acres, Tulare County Off-Reservation §2719(b )(1 )(A) 
Land is in trust, 1994 
Elk Valley Rancheria 203 Acres, Del Norte County Restored Tribe exception+ 
Off-Reservation §2719(b)(1)(A) 
Application dated 4/13/01 
Enterprise Rancheria ofMaidu 40 Acres, Olivehurst, Yuba Restored Tribe exception 
Indians County Off-Reservation §2719(b)(1)(A) 
Application dated 8/13/02 
Greenville Rancheria of Maidu 333.66 Acres - Red Bluff, Restored Tribe exception 
Indians Tehema County Off-Reservation §2719(b)(I)(A) 
NOA for EIS published 8/22/05++ 
Greenville Rancheria ofMaidu 18.40 Acres- Chester, Plumas Restored Tribe exception 
Indians County Off-Reservation §2719(b)(1)(A) 
Application dated 4/14/06 
North Fork Rancheria of Mono 305 Acres, Madera County Restored Tribe exception 
Indians Off-Reservation §2719(b)(1)(A) 
NOA for EIS published 10/27/05 
Quartz Valley Indian 74 Acres- Siskiyou County Restored Tribe exception 
Community Off-Reservation §2719(b)(l)(A) 
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Table 4 
Pending Land-Into-Trust Applications for Gaming in California (May 2006) 
Tribe Location Section 20 Exception* 
A_rplication dated 4/13/06 
Cloverdale Rancheria of Porno 13.04 Acres- Cloverdale, Restored Tribe exception 
Indians Sonoma County Application dated 417/06 
Graton Rancheria 360 Acres, Rohnert Park, Restored Tribe exception 
Sonoma County Application dated 4/14/06 
Guidiville Band of Porno 375 Acres, Richmond, Contra Restored Tribe exception 
Indians Costa County Ajp_lication dated 4/13/06 
lone Band ofMiwok Indians 224 Acres, Plymouth, Amador Restored Tribe exception 
County NOA for EIS published 1117/03 
Mechoopda Indian Tribe of 650 Acres, Chico, Butte County Restored Tribe exception 
Chico Rancheria . (Tillie Hardwick) Application dated 1/10/03 
Scotts Valley Band of Porno 29.87 Acres, City of Richmond, Restored Tribe 2719(b)(l)(B)(iii) 
Indians Contra Costa County NOA for EIS published 7/20/04 
Upper Lake Porno Tribe 27 Acres- Upper Lake, Lake Restored Tribe 2719(b)(l)(B)(iii) 
County A0Jlication dated April 10, 06 
Timbisha Shoshone 58 Acres, City of Hesperia, San Settlement of a Land Claim IGRA 
100 miles from reservation Bernardino County exception §2719(b)(l)(B)(i) 
NOA for EIS published 417/04 
Source: California Tribal Business Alliance, May 2006. 
*Section 20 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq 
**Section 2719 (b)(l)(A) of the IGRA provides that the Secretary of the Interior may determine that a gaming 
establishment on newly acquired lands may be in the best interest of a tribe, and would not be detrimental to the 
surrounding community, but only if the governor of the state concurs. 
+Section 2719(bXl)(B)(iii) of the IGRA provides that lands restored to a tribe that is restored to federal recognition 
are excepted from the October 17, 1988 deadline for gaming on trust lands. 
++Notice of Availability (NO A) for Environmental Impact Statement 
Separately, the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) must determine whether the 
proposed gaming will occur on Indian lands, or whether lands taken into trust for non-
gaming purposes can be redefined as "Indian lands" for gaming purposes. A number of 
Indian tribes are seeking this determination. NIGC regulations provide that "Indian 
lands" are those located within the limits of an Indian reservation, or held in trust by the 
United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe or individual, over which an Indian tribe 
exercises governmental power. 
In at least one instance, Congress has enacted legislation backdating a post-1988 land 
acquisition so that it falls within the provisions ofiGRA. The Lytton Band ofPomo 
Indian's acquisition of a card room in San Pablo, California, about 40 miles south of its 
ancestral homeland, is the notable and controversial example. The tribe does not have a 
ratified state-tribal gaming compact (see Table 3). 
As noted above, Indian land may also be restored as the result of a lawsuit settlement. 
For example, the Torres-Martinez tribe entered into a settlement with the United States 
government in response to the inundation of reservation lands by the Salton Sea. 
Congress enacted the settlement agreement, providing for additional land near the 
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reservation and in a secondary acquisition area, not to exceed 640 acres, in Riverside 
County. The tribe is planning to build gaming facilities in both locations. 
A recent review by the Inspector General of the Department of the Interior found ten 
instances in which tribes had converted trust land from non-gaming to gaming purposes 
without the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or of the NIGC, and that 
neither agency had a process for identifying those converted lands. 64 As a result, the 
National Indian Gaming Commission is reviewing Indian casino sites around the country 
to ensure that they are located on federally approved lands. Title searches underway in 
California involve the Smith River Casino and the Mooretown Casino near Oroville. 65 
Reservation Shopping 
Most tribal lands are located in rural areas, but the most successful casinos are located 
near urban areas. This reality provides important motivation for some tribes and their 
financial backers to seek land closer to the state's urban areas. In some cases landless 
restored tribes are seeking a favorable land base on which to reestablish their 
communities. In other cases cities and counties are seeking the revenue a casino might 
produce. For example, the city of Garden Grove has authorized city staff to negotiate 
with Indian tribes and developers to build a casino near Disneyland on city-owned 
redevelopment land.66 The Scotts Valley Band ofPomo Indians and the Guidiville Band 
of Porno Indians have proposed building casinos in the city ofRichmond. 
The more marketable locations for casinos may be outside areas over which tribes 
historically exercised their sovereignty. As U.S. Attorney Thomas Heffelfinger 
cautioned: 
This is an industry where location, location, location are the three rules and all the 
good locations are taken .. .I think the future holds a whole bunch of cooperation 
agreements between Indian and non-Indian entities in an attempt to develop land 
which can be taken into trust for purposes of gaming. 67 
"Reservation shopping," as this process is sometimes characterized, is creating 
considerable controversy in California. This is because placing land under Indian 
sovereignty can allow large scale gambling-related development that may be exempt 
from city and county zoning laws and state laws designed to protect workers, consumers 
and the environment. Local opposition can be intense. For example, the proposal by the 
landless lone Band of Miwok Indians and its partner, a Mississippi casino developer, to 
acquire property near Plymouth in Amador County to build a $250 million casino and 
hotel complex* led to the recall of the city council after it signed a municipal services 
agreement with the tribe. The county subsequently sued the city. 68 More recently, 85 
percent of the voters in Amador County voted "no" to more casinos on an advisory 
measure. 
• The tribe lacks federal approval to take the land into trust and does not have a tribal-state compact. 
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Tribes that have invested in farther-out, less urban casinos sometimes oppose other tribal 
efforts to locate gaming facilities closer to urban areas. Opponents also include card 
rooms, racetracks, and community groups. 
There is concern that outside financial interests are funding some tribal recognition and 
land purchase efforts. The Inspector General of the U.S. Department of the Interior 
testified before Congress that the Department is " ... troubled by the invariable presence of 
wealthy individuals and companies invested heavily in the recognition outcome for 
seemingly one reason only, that is to ultimately fund and then reap the financial benefits 
of a new gaming operation." Subsequent testimony by the Tribal Treasurer of the 
Paskenta Band ofNomlaki Indians, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on Resources, expressed concern about" ... the inappropriate tribe-stalking role taken on 
by these wealthy investors ... Rather than reservation shopping, tribe shopping is the more 
appropriate term."69 
An analysis by Time magazine found that "The National Indian Gaming Commission ... 
knows little about most of the investors." These investors may pay the expenses of a 
tribal group applying to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for recognition and to place land in 
trust, including historical documentation, and fund environmental impact studies, casino 
construction, tribal government staff, public affairs, legal expenses and lobbyists. They 
also provide management services and gaming devices. Time reports that the potential 
profits of this investment are enormous. 70 
Congress has been considering this issue. The Senate Indian Affairs Committee reported 
out a bill by Senator Feinstein (S 113) that would delete the portion of the law that 
deemed the Casino San Pablo, purchased by the Lytton Band ofPomo Indians, to be 
Indian lands acquired before 1988 (pre-IGRA), and thus eligible for gaming. HR 4893 
by Representative Pombo, Chairman of the House Resources Committee, would limit the 
circumstances under which tribes could acquire lands for gaming. S 2078 by Senator 
McCain, Chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, would limit the lands that are 
eligible for Indian gaming. 
Senator McCain recently amended his legislation to tighten the ability of tribes to take 
new land into trust for gaming purposes under the exceptions currently allowed in the 
IGRA, Section 2719(b). He said he would "grandfather" tribal applications received by 
the Department ofthe Interior before Aprill5. This doubled the number of pending 
proposals in California to 24, as seen by the dates on the applications listed in Table 4 
above.71 
The following sample of selected newspaper headlines from one week in August 2005, 
suggests how common--and sometimes contentious--the issue of expanded Indian gaming 
has become in many California communities. For example, proposals from three tribes to 
build casinos in Barstow, near the interstate highway from Los Angeles to Las Vegas, 
have generated considerable controversy. None of those tribes has federal trust land 
approved for gambling in Barstow. One of the tribes is located 700 miles north in 
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Humboldt County. In another example, a tribe is seeking local support for its efforts to 
place land into trust for gambling purposes. 
"Tribe, County Must Negotiate a Better Plan," San Diego Union Tribune 
The announcement of the Jamul Indian Village that it plans to build a 30-story 
hotel and casino on the six acres it owns in semi-rural east county unleashed a 
firestorm of criticism. Parking, hotel, restaurants, and support facilities would be 
on 101 adjacent acres owned by the tribe's partner, Lakes Gaming of Minnesota. 
In 2004, the governor wrote a letter to the Bureau of Indian Affairs opposing the 
tribe's application to take the 101 acres into trust, citing traffic, water, and broader 
environmental concerns. 72 
"Governor, Two Tribes Reach Deal on Casinos," San Diego Union Tribune 
The Governor and two Indian tribes, the Los Coyotes band of San Diego County, 
and the Big Lagoon tribe of Humboldt County, have finalized agreements to build 
large, off-reservation casinos in Barstow, in Imperial County, along a heavily 
traveled route to Las Vegas. The 20-year deal offers up to 2,400 slot machines to 
each tribe. 73 
"Bill Targets New Casino in Madera," The Fresno Bee 
Senator Dean Florez introduced emergency legislation to require local public 
approval for off-reservation casinos, in response to the Madera County Board of 
Supervisor's vote last week in support of an off-reservation $250 million resort 
casino west ofHighway 99 at Avenue 17.74 
"California Tribe Accepts County, City Conditions," Merced Sun Star 
Stockton's California Valley Miwok tribe will have to pay for an expansion to the 
local hospital's emergency room, road improvements, and services for gambling 
addicts before it can get an approval from Los Banos and Merced County to build 
a Westside casino. The landless tribe has accepted these conditions.75 
"Legislators and Others Say it's Not What Voters Approved in a 2000 Ballot Measure," 
The Riverside Press Enterprise 
"Reservation shopping," whereby a tribe tries to win government approval to 
build a casino in an urban area far from its ancestral lands, is drawing increasing 
criticism. 76 
A 2002 survey of California local officials in communities located near Indian gaming 
facilities found that two-thirds of the respondents reported occasional or frequent local 
controversy associated with the gaming operation. 77 
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Governor Schwarzenegger has stated his policy to (1) oppose federal acquisition of trust 
land in any urban area for a casino; (2) decline to negotiate a compact with a tribe that 
does not have land eligible for class III gaming, and; (3) consider tribal requests to 
conduct class III gaming in non-urban areas only if they have local community support. 
The November 2005 ballot in two California counties contained advisory measures 
seeking local approval of tribal gaming (as now required by the Secretary of the Interior 
to bring land into trust for gaming and by the governor for a state-tribal compact for class 
III gaming on that land). Both lost. 
• Measure Gin Yuba County would have endorsed a proposal by a Butte County 
tribe and a Chicago developer (Forsythe Racing Inc.) to place 40 acres ofland in 
trust in order to build a $150 million casino, hotel, and convention center at a 
prime location, \Vith the promise of2,000 jobs. The Yuba County Board of 
Supervisors and Marysville City Council had signed agreements with the tribe in 
exchange for the promise of annual fees of$5 million to the county and $250,000 
to the city. The measure lost, 52 percent to 48 percent. 
• Amador County Measure 1 asked the voters if they approved of more casinos in 
Amador County (there is already one, the Jackson Rancheria). Two tribes (one 
with a state-tribal compact) want to develop casinos in the county. The measure 
lost by 85 percent of the vote. 
California casino gaming has considerable growth potential. According to some analysts, 
the state could accommodate more than 100,000 slot machines-many more than are 
allowed under existing tribal-state compacts. It seems clear that Indian gaming will be a 
contentious issue for some time to come. A 2003 analysis arrived at the following 
conclusion: 
Despite Congress' best intentions in enacting the IGRA, the law of Indian gaming 
remains unsettled in many important respects and the fundamental tension 
between federal, state and tribal sovereignty persists. Currently, these tensions 
are being resolved on a case-by-case basis often without uniform national rules. 
The result will almost certainly be additional litigation and a shifting legal 
landscape. 78 
THE GAMES 
Under federal law, Indian tribes may conduct class I games without outside regulation 
and class II games on tribal lands subject only to broad federal regulation. Tribes can 
conduct class III games only after concluding a compact with the state. So the definitions 
of these categories have considerable relevance. 
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Class I Games 
Class I games include traditional Native American" ... social games played in connection 
with 'tribal ceremonies or celebrations. "'79 Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate 
class I gaming. 
Class II Games 
Class II games as defined by IGRA include bingo (with or without "electronic, computer 
or other technologic aids"), and related games, including pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, 
tip jars, instant bingo, and non-banked card games such as poker.80 Tribes may offer 
class II games if a state permits gambling for any purpose. There are no restrictions on 
the number of class II machines a tribe may operate. 
An Unclear Distinction 
Class II games are regulated by the tribes and the National Indian Gaming Commission 
(NIGC). Determining whether a device is class II or class III is difficult, given rapidly 
evolving electronic technologies and the creativity of the manufacturers of gaming 
equipment. The federal courts, the NIGC and the Justice Department have all been 
involved in defining class II machines, but there is no clear "bright line test." The result 
is that each new class II gaming device is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, sometimes 
leading to litigation if a tribal casino proceeds with a questionable machine. 
In determining whether games are to be classified as class II, federal courts have relied 
upon an analysis of the specific nature of the device and the underlying game. Players 
must compete against each other and not against the house. For example, federal courts 
found that Lucky Tab II (with a paper pull tab) is a class II game that does not require a 
gaming compact with a state but that electronic pull-tab machines do.* In another set of 
decisions, the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the electronic 
bingo game MegaMania is a class II game. t The courts relied in part upon definitions set 
forth by the National Indian Gaming Commission, which allow jackpots and a house cut 
of the profits. 
Federal courts have upheld the right of tribes to offer bingo played on linked video 
machines, in which players play against a pool composed of other players. Even some 
house-banked games are allowed under certain conditions, such as a paper pull-table 
vending machine that plays like a slot machine but prints out a win/loss statement. 
The federal Johnson Act makes it a crime to possess, use, sell, or transport any "gambling 
device, both outside and in "Indian Country." The Act defines a "gambling device" as 
" ... any slot machine ... and other machine or mechanical device (including but not limited 
to roulette wheels and similar devices) designed and manufactured primarily for use in 
See U.S. v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices, 2000 and Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National 
Indian Gaming Commission, 1994. 
t U.S. v. 103 Electronic Gambling Devices, 2000 and U.S. v. 162 MegaMania Gambling Devices, 2000. 
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connection with gambling ... "81 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) provides that 
the Johnson Act does not apply to any gaming conducted under a tribal-state compact. 
Putting a class III gaming machine onto a reservation without a compact is a felony. For 
this reason, the unclear distinction between class II and class III games is " ... subject to 
considerable scrutiny from state officials, state and federal regulators, as well as 
opponents of tribal gaming."82 
Each regulatory agency applies its own standards for class II games and they do not 
always agree. 
• The NIGC issues game classification opinions that are advisory in nature and not 
binding upon a court of law. 
• At the state level, the Division of Gambling Control of the California Department 
of Justice has issued Tribal Gaming Advisories that caution against the use of 
certain games. 
According to Tom Heffelginger, U.S. Attorney in Minnesota and chairman of the Native 
American Issues Subcommittee of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee, "It is the 
[U.S.] Department of Justice's position ... that the Johnson Act prohibits gambling devices 
absent a State-tribal compact ... IGRA intended that there be a clear distinction between 
class III games that require a compact and class II games that do not."83 
At a recent hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, the Chairman ofthe 
NIGC conceded that " ... technology has now reached the point where if you look at one 
of these Class II devices or purportedly Class II devices, it looks a lot like a slot 
machine." He asserted that there are over 30,000 devices that go beyond the "pale" in 
play in the United States. According to his testimony, the Commission is trying to 
develop a standard for class II games based on player participation, but is receiving 
criticism from the tribes for being overly restrictive and from the U.S. Department of 
Justice for being overly broad. 84 
In September 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it was developing a 
legislative proposal to amend the Johnson Act in order to clarify the distinction between 
class II and class III games. In its most recent form, the department's proposal would 
leave the definition of what constitutes class II games to the NIGC. In March, the 
Chairman of the NIGC contended that "The need has never been greater to have a bright 
line that divides Class II and Class III gaming."85 
Bingosinos 
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) has authorized tribes without 
compacts with state governments to have an unlimited number of bingo slot machines. 
Since these devices are "virtually indistinguishable from video slots" with current 
technology, bingo halls increasingly look like casinos, hence "bingosinos."86 
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Class II machines are the exact duplicates of slot machines in more than just 
appearance. They play like slot machines. Players have to pay each time before 
they pull the handle or press the button starting that round of play. If they win an 
interim prize on that round the machine pays them instantly. The differences 
between Class II and III machines are usually minor, at least from the point of 
view of the patron. 87 
Progressive jackpots and satellite technology have had a large impact on tribal bingo 
halls, linking multiple bingo rooms and thereby creating the opportunity to win larger 
amounts on the games. The technology and larger jackpots draw more and younger 
customers, although most bingo players are older. As one commentator writes, "Class II 
gaming is booming. "88 
The Lytton Band ofPomo Indians' Casino San Pablo has 805 electronic bingo machines. 
The tribe originally proposed a 5,000 slot machine casino, but its tribal-state gaming 
compact allowing 2,500 slot machines was turned down by the state legislature. The 
Lytton tribe's bingo-casino in San Pablo is earning nearly $300,000 a day in gross 
gaming revenues on average, or about $2 million a week, most of it from local 
gamblers. 89 Twenty two other California gaming tribes offer bingo in their casinos in 
addition to the slot machines and table games allowed by the state, with the largest bingo 
halls seating over 1,000 people (see Table 8). 
According to press accounts, some gaming tribes that have been unwilling to accede to 
the governor's terms for new compacts allowing more class III machines have instead 
installed "hundreds of the [class II] machines that look and play like slots."90 The 
Morongo casino reportedly has 627 bingo devices, the San Manuel casino has 200, and 
the Pechanga casino has 1,034 bingo devices. All three tribes sought, but were unable to 
reach, agreements on revisions to their tribal-state compacts allowing more than 2,000 
slot machines.91 
The California Tribal Business Alliance, composed of five gaming tribes, has expressed 
the following concerns regarding class II gaming machines to the governor: 
We are aware of several thousand purported Class II machines being operated by 
tribes with compacts, which may, in fact, not be Class II electronically aided 
bingo games and which do not have the approval ofthe NIGC. We believe that 
tribes with compacts purporting to operate electronic Class II gaming devices 
should provide to the state a written determination by the NIGC that such games 
are Class II. In the absence of such written NIGC determination, such games 
should be considered Class III slot machines subject to the terms of the 
compacts.92 
Class III Games 
Class III games include all gaming activity other than class I and II gambling. Examples 
given in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) include, by virtue of their exclusion from 
class II games, banking card games such as blackjack or baccarat, electronic facsimiles of 
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any game of chance, or slot machines of any kind. However California law, and 
California tribal-state compacts, do not allow craps, roulette or dice games. 
Tribes hoping to offer casino-style class III games must pass an ordinance authorizing the 
gambling activities, execute a tribal-state compact, and secure approval of the compact by 
the Department of the Interior. The compacts are intended to contain all significant terms 
and conditions governing the proposed Indian gaming. 
Slot Machines 
Slot machines are " ... electronic gambling boxes with coin/token/bill validation and 
coin/token rewards for attaining certain combinations on the reels."93 They were invented 
by a San Franciscan, Charles August Fey, in 1899, but have been transformed by 
computer technology. 
Nowadays every machine on every casino floor in America is a sophisticated, 
powerful digital processor whose outcomes and paybacks are quite precisely 
determined long before any player walks up to play.94 
Playing the common bet of five dollars a spin, with a 90 percent payback, results in an 
average loss of $240 an hour.95 
Slot machines are by far the most profitable games offered by gambling establishments, 
earning 70 to 80 percent of gaming revenues. On a relatively modest investment of about 
$10,000 per machine, the most profitable Indian casinos in California can earn over $500 
a day in revenues. The machines pay for themselves in under a month. Since slot 
machines last about five years (although some games tum over more quickly), one of 
these machines could earn $912,500 during its lifetime. Earnings per machine are less in 
Las Vegas, where there is more competition. 
There are currently approximately 60,000 slot machines in Indian casinos in California. 
Their profitability provides significant motivation for tribes whose casinos already have 
the 2,000 machines allowed by their 1999 compacts to push at the definition of a slot 
machine. Nevada currently has about 200,000 slot machines and California is a much 
bigger market. This suggests that the state will be asked to negotiate or renegotiate many 
tribal-state compacts in the future. 
As noted above, some tribes installed multi-player gaming devices hooked to one central 
controller and counted them as one slot machine in order to expand the number of 
gaming devices in their facilities. The Division of Gambling Control has stated in an 
advisory that each terminal is an individual device; that interpretation was adopted by the 
California Gambling Control Commission in February 2005. 
Similarly some tribes installed video lottery terminals (VLTs) that mimic slot machines: 
Morongo installed 2,025 VLTs and Pechanga installed nearly 1,700.96 The governor's 
attorney declared the machines illegal and a "material breach" of the tribes' compacts. 
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The tribes subsequently agreed to remove the machines. As discussed in the Lottery 
Chapter, VLTs are major moneyrnakers for some state lotteries. 
Beginning in 2004, California's tribal-state gaming compacts expand the definition of a 
"gaming device" to include any slot machine, instant lottery game device or video poker 
machine (see, for example, the tribal-state gaming compact with the Coyote Valley Band 
ofPomo Indians at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts.html). 
Roulette and Games With Dice 
The California Department of Justice's Division of Gambling Control has advised that 
"any house-banked games played with dice" are not permitted in California as they are 
prohibited by the state's Constitution and are not authorized by tribal-state compacts.97 
Craps games in casinos operated by the Pala and Rumsey tribes, among others, use 
colored cubes with multiple numbers that do not fit the common definition of dice. The 
tribes reject the state's position that these are legally prohibited games.98 Some tribes 
also have electronic roulette games; roulette is prohibited by the state Constitution. The 
question is whether these electronic games are "roulette" or "slot machines." 
The tribes' ability to operate these games is under negotiation with the governor's office 
under the dispute resolution process provided for in the compacts. At some point the 
federal courts could become involved. In the meantime, the games continue in operation. 
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Tribal Regulation 
Tribal governments have the primary responsibility for the regulation of gaming activity 
conducted on their lands. They share aspects of this responsibility with the National 
Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) for class II games and, in California, with the 
Attorney General's Division of Gambling Control and the California Gambling Control 
Commission for class III games authorized by tribal-state compacts. The ability ofthe 
NIGC to regulate class III gaming is currently being challenged in the courts.99 
Tribal gaming ordinances must be approved by the NIGC and address a number of issues 
including use of gaming revenues, audits, vendor contracts, and background checks and 
licensing. Most tribes have created tribal gaming commissions to oversee gaming 
activities and ensure compliance with tribal, state and federal laws and regulations. 
Tribal gaming commissioners are either elected or appointed and typically serve as chief 
administrative and enforcement officers. According to the National Indian Gaming 
Commission, in 2004, 200 tribal gaming agencies employed 2,800 commissioners and 
regulatory staff at a cost of $150 million nationwide. 100 
As an example, the Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians adopted the "Viejas Tribal Gaming 
Ordinance and Tribal Gaming Regulations" in 1998. The tribe appropriates $3.9 million 
to operate an independent Gaming Commissioner's Office and a sophisticated 
surveillance system operated by 52 regulatory personnel. 101 A Gaming Review Board 
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reviews and approves regulations and hears appeals oflicensing actions and patron 
disputes. When regulatory personnel find improprieties such as theft and embezzlement, 
they generally call the county sheriff or the Division of Gambling Control in the 
Department of Justice.* As the Viejas Band points out, "No one has a greater interest in 
protecting the integrity of tribal government gaming than Indian governments." 102 
Not all tribal gaming commissions are equally effective. They require independence 
from casino management and tribal politics, unrestricted access to all areas and records of 
the gaming operation, clear authority to undertake enforcement actions, and a stable 
source of funding. A tribal gaming commissioner stresses the importance of avoiding 
serious conflicts of interest: "Commission members should not be employed by 
gambling operations or by the Management Company ... " or participate as a player. 103 
State Regulation 
Under California's tribal-state gaming compacts, state responsibility for regulating class 
III gaming conducted by tribes is shared by the Division of Gambling Control in the 
Department of Justice and the California Gambling Control Commission. However only 
the governor can determine whether provisions of a tribal-state compact have been 
breached and whether enforcement action is appropriate. Thus three entities share the 
state's regulatory enforcement responsibilities, an awkward arrangement. 
Recently the Office of the Governor demanded that the Alturas Indian Rancheria 
relinquish its unused gaming licenses to the state, and notified the tribe that should it 
commence with class III gaming on land that has not been placed in trust for gaming 
purposes, the state will immediately take steps to terminate the tribe's gaming compact. 104 
The Division of Gambling Control 
The state's 1999 tribal-state gaming compacts established a state certification process for 
determining the suitability of all gaming resource suppliers and financial sources as well 
as key tribal casino employees. The Gambling Control Act gives that responsibility to 
the Division of Gambling Control, which is charged with investigating the qualifications 
of individuals who apply for state gambling licenses and monitoring their conduct to 
ensure compliance with state law. The Division also investigates and monitors cardroom 
owners and key employees, and the manufacturers, sellers and distributors of gambling 
equipment. 
Gaming resource suppliers (such as slot machine vendors) and financial sources must 
request a finding of suitability from the Division and then submit an application to be 
certified as suitable by the California Gambling Control Commission (CGCC) in order to 
do business with the tribes. Some applicants withdraw during the Division's 
investigation before any formal finding is reached. To date, the Commission has found 
• California is a Public Law 280 state, meaning that Congress has provided the state with enforcement 
authority over criminal activity on tribal lands. 
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44 vendors and/or financial sources to be suitable and four have been found to be 
unsuitable. Eighteen final determinations are at the CSCC awaiting approval. 
Key employees go through a similar process, with some exceptions as specified in the 
compacts. To date, the Division has investigated 5,772 tribal key employee applications 
and recommended 11 denials to the CGCC. All ofthe state's gaming tribes have 
submitted information, covering the majority of their employees. 
Prior to 2004, the Division checked whether tribes had appropriate procedures in place 
but did not independently verify that they were actually conducting thorough background 
checks on their gaming commissioners. Under the terms of more recently negotiated 
compacts, the CGCC issues determinations on tribal gaming agency members' suitability 
to serve as gambling regulators. In part this policy resulted from allegations that seven 
members of the Chumash gaming commission had criminal records. The top casino 
regulator subsequently resigned following disclosure of a felony conviction. The casino 
is operated by the Santa Ynez Band ofChumash Indians in Santa Barbara County. 105 
The Division recently began monitoring gaming devices used in tribal casinos to ensure 
that they meet established technical standards. The Division also monitors tribal 
compliance with other compact provisions such as building codes, health, fire and safety 
codes and environmental standards. If an initial compliance inspection finds a problem, 
the Division will notify the tribe and follow-up with a report recommending an action. 
The next step is a formal letter sent by the special agent in charge to the tribe. If 
compliance is still not achieved, the Division generally sends the tribe another letter 
before turning the issue over to the governor's office, which may or may not initiate a 
formal dispute resolution process. If at the end of this process the governor feels the tribe 
is still out of compliance, the matter can be taken to federal court. This is a lengthy and 
cumbersome process. 
The Division has 134 employees and a budget of$13.4 million (FY 2005-06), funded 
:from fees paid by cardrooms and from the Special Distribution Fund established by some 
tribal-state compacts. The bulk of the Division's resources are directed towards its 
licensing responsibilities, leaving it short of investigative and enforcement staff. For 
example, under federal Public Law 280, the Division is responsible for investigating and 
prosecuting criminal violations such as theft and embezzlement in Indian gaming 
operations. 
The California Gambling Control Commission 
The California Gambling Control Commission, which is also funded by cardroom fees 
and gaming tribe payments to the Special Distribution Fund, is responsible for auditing 
the fund, establishing minimum regulatory standards, and ensuring that state gambling 
licenses are not held by unsuitable vendors or individuals and that games are fairly played 
(including hardware and software approvals, annual inspections). The Commission's 
semi-monthly agendas are filled with lists of individuals and suppliers applying for 
suitability determinations for the conduct of business with tribal casinos. 
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Recommendations to the Commission are based on findings made by both Division and 
Commission staff. 
The Commission is handicapped by a relatively small staff and by unclear language in the 
1999 compact regarding its authority to inspect and audit casinos. The commission has 
46 employees and a budget of $8.3 million (FY 2005-06) to monitor the state's $5.78 
billion Indian gaming industry and 86 card rooms.* It has fallen behind on audits of 
Indian casinos and has a backlog of casino employee and vendor license reviews. 
The state's Gambling Control Act declares in §19802(c) that the legislature should 
" ... sufficiently fund a full-time commission and law enforcement capability with 
responsibilities commensurate with the expanded scope of gambling." Interviews with 
officials in the state's regulatory bodies suggest that neither the Division nor the 
Commission have sufficient staff resources to fulfill their statutory obligations to 
regulate, investigate and enforce state gambling laws. Table 5 below provides 
comparative state regulatory information on staff and budgets that supports this view. 
Comparative State Regulatory Data 
California's agencies that regulate gambling have fewer resources relative to their 
responsibilities than those provided by other major gambling states. The following table 
provides information on regulatory functions and resources in states with commercial 
(non-Indian) casinos, compared to California. 
• The number oflicensed card rooms in California varies. It was over 100 in October 2005, and was 86 as 
of February 2006. See http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/cardroorns.htrnl for the most recent information. 
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Table 5 
California Compared to States with Commercial (non-Indian) Casinos-
Regulatory Statistics (2005-2006) 
State # #Gaming Regulatory Agency Regulatory Regulatory # Regulatory 
Casinos Devices Functions Agency Budget Personnel 
California 58 Indian 58,100 slots, Ca. Gaming Control Licensing, audits, $12.42 million Division-
casinos, 3,325 table Commission; game approval, fee (Division), $8.3 134 positions (32 
86 card games (1,820 Division of Gaming collection, law million sworn), 
clubs tribal, 1,505 in Control, AG enforcement, tribal (Commission) Commission-
cardrooms) compact compliance 46 positions 
Colorado 46 17,069 (slots Colorado Division of Licensing, audit, $9.4 million 72 positions (34 
and table) Gaming game approval, law sworn) 
enforcement 
Illinois 9 9,908 slot Illinois Gaming Licensing, audit, $14.2 million (not 75 agency 
machines, 227 Board game approval, tax including police) employees 
table games collection, Jaw 
enforcement, self 65 state police 
exclusion program 
Indiana+ 10 17,906 slots Indiana Gaming Licensing, law $3.3 million 149 positions; 
645 table games Commission enforcement 113 vacant 
Iowa* 13 17,307 slots, Iowa Racing and Licensing, law $4.2 million 58 positions 
438 table games Gaming Commission enforcement, self 
exclusion program, 
drug testing 
Louisiana* 18 22,145 slots, State Police, AG's Licensing, law $1.25 million 5 positions 
851 table games, Gaming Unit, enforcement (Board); $5.5 (Board), 58 
12,000 video Gaming Control million (AG), $23 positions (AG), 
poker/lottery Board million (Police) 285 State Police 
(140 sworn) 
Michigan 3 7,721 slots; 235 Michigan Gaming Licensing, audits, $15.7 million II 0 positions 
table games Control Board, gaming tests, law (Board, '04) (Board), 
Attorney General enforcement 35 positions (AG) 
Mississippi 29 4,719 slots; 380 Mississippi Gaming Licensing, law $10.7 million 150 positions 
table games Commission enforcement, audits, authorized (39 
game approval sworn) 
Missouri II 17,875 slot Missouri Gaming Licensing, audits, $15.35 million 74 positions 
machines; 547 Commission, enforcement, self (Commission) (Commission), 
table games Highway Patrol unit exclusion program 124 police 
Nevada** 258 200,000+ slot Nevada Gaming Licensing, game $37.53 million 439 positions 
machines; 5,260 Control Board and approval, audits, Jaw 
table games Commission enforcement, tax 
collection 
New Jersey 12 40,820 slot N.J. Casino Control Licensing, audits, law $29 million 350 positions 
machine; I ,578 Commission and enforcement, game (Commission), (Comm.), 360 
table games Division of Gaming approval, self $42 million positions (207 
Enforcement exclusion program (Division) sworn, Division) 
South 36 2,996 licensed South Dakota Licensing, audits, $9.6 million 14 positions (4 
Dakota devices (slots, Commission on game inspections, sworn) 
poker, Gaming investigations and 
blackjack) enforcement 
Source: state gambling regulator websites 
+Regulates riverboat gambling only 
*Locations include racetrack casinos 
**Locations with gross casino revenue of at least $1 million 
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Federal Regulation 
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) was created by IGRA to regulate 
Indian gaming. Tribal gaming ordinances must be approved by the NIGC, * which also 
must approve management contracts (such as the Rincon contract with Harrah's). The 
NIGC has the power to conduct background investigations and object to the persons hired 
and licensed by tribal governments to work in their casinos. However it lacks legal 
authority to enforce minimum background standards for tribal gaming commissioners. 
The U.S. Department of Justice also conducts background checks on key gaming 
employees and enforces criminal violations of federal gaming laws through the FBI and 
the U.S. Attorney. In addition, tribes work with the IRS to collect taxes and with the 
Secret Service to prevent counterfeiting. 
In reviewing tribal gaming management contracts, the NIGC staff conduct background 
investigations and seek to make sure that the tribe is the primary beneficiary of its 
gaming operations, with a maximum of 30 percent of revenues (how revenues are defined 
is unclear) going to the contactor. Since many of the contracts involve construction and 
development, the contract approval process requires compliance with the National 
Environmental Protection Act. However, according to the Inspector General of the 
Department of the Interior, "Some tribes have circumvented this [NIGC] review, 
approval and background process by entering into consultant agreements which ... do not 
significantly differ from management contracts."106 The NIGC has only approved 45 
management contracts nationwide, nine in California. 
The NIGC's primary role is to oversee tribal regulatory operations. Each tribe must 
submit an annual audit conducted byan independent outside auditing firm, including of 
all gaming-related contracts. The NIGC also directly audits tribal gaming operations, 
although its field operations are constrained by a relatively small budget and staff. 
The Commission is funded by fees paid by gaming tribes, about $11.2 million in 2005, 
and has 80 staff, of which 39 are auditor-investigators. This is to oversee more than 200 
tribes that operate more than 400 gaming operations nationwide. In contrast, the Nevada 
Gaming Commission has a budget of $37.5 million (FY 2006-07) with 439 positions 
allocated to oversee 365 gaming operations. The California Regional Office of the NIGC 
has four field investigators and two auditors to monitor a $5.78 billion industry. 
The NIGC has the primary responsibility, along with the tribes, for regulation of class II 
gaming. As noted above, NIGC advisory opinions have been significant in establishing 
that a wide array of electronic bingo games-that look like slot machines--can be 
classified as class II games and thus placed in tribal casinos without a tribal-state 
compact. 
• See for example the August 26, 2002, Federal Register (Vol. 67, No. 165, p. 54823) for a list of241 
tribes with approved Class III gaming ordinances. 
California Research Bureau, California State Library 
The NIGC may impose civil penalties and fines of up to $25,000 per day. For severe 
violations, it may close an establishment. 
The NIGC's role in regulating class III gaming is under challenge in the federal courts. 
N1GC regulations establishing minimum internal controls for class III gaming casinos 
were overturned by a U.S. District Court in a lawsuit brought by the Colorado River 
Indian Tribes. The case is under appeal. 
California Lobbying and Campaign Contributions 
Article 15 of the California Gambling Control Act recognizes that: 
In California, in other states, and in other countries, there is ample historical 
evidence of the potential for revenues derived from gambling to be used to 
corrupt political officials in the regulation or prosecution of crimes related to 
gambling activities, embezzlement, and money laundering. 
The Article prohibits members of the CGCC from soliciting campaign contributions, 
creates a three year "revolving door" period in which Commission and Division members 
and employees may not lobby on behalf of gambling interests before either body, and 
provides for the suspension or revocation of a gambling license if the licensee violates 
" ... any law or ordinance with respect to campaign finance disclosure or contribution 
limits ... " (Business & Professions Code §§ 19980-19983). 
Historically, racetracks and card rooms were the dominant gaming political donors in 
California. Given the importance of gambling to Indian tribes, and the impact of federal 
and state laws on their ability to pursue gaming enterprises, it is not surprising that the 
tribes have become the largest contributors to political campaigns. California Indian 
tribes became major players in the state's political process when they contributed $70 
million toward the passage of Proposition 5 in 1998, and $30 million to the Proposition 
lA campaign in 2000, legalizing gaming on tribal lands in the state. Nearly one fifth of 
the money spent in the 2003 gubernatorial recall came from gaming tribes. 
State law does not limit campaign contributions in initiative, referendum and recall 
campaigns, but it does require disclosure of contributions. In 2000, California Common 
Cause filed a complaint with the state's Fair Political Practices Commission alleging 
violations of the state's campaign contribution reporting laws. In early 2003, in a lawsuit 
brought by the state's Fair Political Practices Commission, a Superior Court judge found 
that the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians was subject to the same laws that apply 
to other political contributors with respect to disclosure requirements. The court rejected 
the assertion that the doctrine of tribal immunity applied. The Third District Court of 
Appeal subsequently denied the tribe's appeal. However a different Superior Court judge 
came to a different conclusion in a related case involving the Santa Rosa tribe. The case 
is under appeal to the California Supreme Court. It is likely that the issue will ultimately 
have to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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GAMING TRIBES AND REVENUES 
California has 108 federally recognized tribes and by far the most gaming tribes of any 
state, as shown in the following chart drawn from National Indian Gaming Commission 
data (states with fewer than seven gaming tribes are not represented). 
Figure 8 








Source: National Indian Gaming Commission, 2005. 
In 2004, there were 228 tribes in the United States operating 405 gaming facilities in 30 
states. According to the National Indian Gaming Commission, these gaming operations 
earned $19.4 billion in gross gaming revenues, a 15.3 percent increase over 2003. 
Region II (California and Northern Nevada) gross gaming revenues increased by 23.2 
percent over 2003, to $5,788,332. 107 
In comparison, commercial (non-Indian) casinos in 11 states earned $28.93 billion in 
gross gaming revenue in 2004. Comparative state information on gross revenues, gaming 
tax revenue and employees is shown in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6 
Commercial (non-Indian) Casinos-Gaming Statistics (2004) 
State # Gross revenues Gaming tax revenue Casino Casino employee 
Casinos (state and local) employees wages+ 
Colorado 46 $725.9 million $ 99.55 million 7,703 $210.4 million 
Illinois 9 $1.718 billion $801.72 million 8,628 $ 360.1 million 
Indiana 10 $2.369 billion $760.52 million 17,377 $ 589.5 million++ 
Iowa* 13 $1.064 billion $252.67 million 8,799 $ 272.3 million 
Louisiana* 18 $2.163 billion $436.9 million 20,048 $ 486.03 million 
Michigan 3 $1.189 billion $279.4 million 7,572 $ 366.2 million 
Mississippi 29 $2,781 billion $333.01 million 28,932 $1.009 billion 
Missouri 11 $1.4 73 billion $403.13 million 11,200 $ 284 million 
Nevada** 258 $10.652 billion $886.99 million 191,620 $7,287 billion 
New Jersey 12 $4.807 billion $470.67 million 45,501 $1.25 9 billion 
South Dakota 36 $78.02 million $ 11.93 million 1,830++ $ 36.4 million 
Total 445 $28.93 billion $4.74 billion 349,210 $12.16 billion 
Source: American Gaming Association, 2004 
+Includes benefits and tips 
++2003 data 
*Includes racetrack casinos 
**Locations with gross casino revenue of at least $1 million 
Indian gaming is two-thirds the size of commercial non-Indian gaming and growing 
faster. Revenues earned by Indian gaming in the United States grew by an astounding 
average yearly growth rate of 33.2 percent from 1988 to 2004, adjusted for inflation. 
Non-gaming revenues (hotels, restaurants, etc.) rose 16 percent, from $1.8 billion to $2.1 
billion. 108 According to a 2002 article in Time magazine, Indian gaming as a whole was 
among the top 20 most profitable U.S. corporations. However the profits were not evenly 
distributed. Thirteen percent of the casinos accounted for two thirds of the revenues. 109 
California and Connecticut gaming tribes earned about 40 percent of all Indian gaming 
revenues in the country in 2004, of which California tribes accounted for 28 percent of 
the total. 110 Two ofthe three highest revenue-producing casinos in the country are Indian 
casinos: Foxwoods (in Connecticut) and United Auburn Indian Community's Thunder 
Valley Casino in Lincoln, California. 
Indian gaming revenue figures are estimates derived from a variety of sources, as tribes 
are not subject to public information disclosure requirements. The Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act provides tribal gaming operations with an exemption from the Freedom 
oflnformation Act. Unless a tribe agrees, federal and state regulators cannot publicly 
release or disclose financial information, making it difficult to find out individual casino 
revenues. 
Tribes with locations near major metropolitan areas have the most successful casinos, but 
" ... very few tribes have really hit the jackpot" because many are located in remote areas. 
An analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis found that of the 42 
reservations for which 1998 casino revenues could be estimated in the Bank's district, the 
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top five accounted for 53 percent of all casino revenue but had just 5.5 percent of the 
reservation population; in contrast, ten reservations had one percent of casino revenue 
and 42 percent of the total reservation population. 111 
The following chart, based on 2004 data from the NIGC, shows that 55 Indian gaming 
operations earned over $100 million, compared to 151 operations that earned less than 
$10 million. The top 55 operations grossed nearly 70 percent of all tribal gaming 
revenues, but comprised only 16 percent of all gaming operations. The 151 tribal gaming 
operations earning less than $10 million comprised 41 percent of all gaming operations 
but earned only two percent of all revenues. 
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Source: National Indian Gamine: Commission. 
I 
_j 
California tribal casinos earn the most revenue of any state-an estimated $5.78 billion in 
2004, a 23 percent increase over the previous year. In 2004, the state's 56 class III Indian 
gaming facilities had 58,100 gaming machines (not including bingo) and 1,820 table 
games. 112 As previously discussed, and as indicated in Table 8, a number of tribal gaming 
casinos also have bingo halls and class II bingo machines. 
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Net Win Gaming Revenues at California 




Source: Alan Meister, Casino City's Indian Gaming Industry Report, 2005-2006 Updated Ed. 
Non-gaming revenues at California Indian gaming facilities (hotels, restaurants, retail 
shops, etc.) in 2004, were an estimated $544.6 million, nearly a seven percent increase 









Non-Gaming Revenue at California 
Indian Gaming Facilities ($ Millions) 
2002 2003 2004 
Source: Alan M<:_ister, Casino City's Indian Gaming Industry Report, 2005-2006 Updated Ed. 
There is some indication that the growth of Indian gaming in some areas in California is 
slowing down and that the industry is getting more competitive, particularly in San 
Diego, Riverside and San Bernardino counties. For example, the Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, which opened a $200 million resort in December 2004, near Indio, is in 
debt and has laid off workers, dissolved its police and fire departments and dismissed its 
top three tribal executives. 114 
San Diego County has the largest number of tribes and reservations of any county in the 
nation, with 18 federally recognized tribes, 18 reservations, and 17 tribal governments 
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serving about 5,900 enrolled tribal members. The county currently has nine Indian 
casinos, with more under development.* 
Restrictions on Expenditures 
IGRA restricts how Indian government can spend their gaming revenues. Tribes are 
allowed to use profits for governmental purposes including: 115 
1. Funding tribal government operations or programs. 
2. Providing for the general welfare of the tribe and its members. 
3. Promoting tribal economic development. 
4. Donating to charitable organizations. 
5. Helping fund operations of local government agencies. 
With the consent of the Secretary of the Interior, a tribe may allocate gaming revenue 
among all enrolled tribal members ("per capita payments"), conditioned on submitting a 
plan. The plan must address economic development and general welfare goals, as well as 
affirm the responsibility to report per capita payments and gaming winnings for income 
tax purposes. Tribes making per capita payments must establish a tribal dispute 
resolution process to challenge the distribution and allocation of gaming revenues. Forty-
two California gaming tribes make per capita payments to members, ranging from one 
percent to 80 percent of revenues (see Table 8). For example, according to press 
accounts, last year the Santa Ynez Band ofChumash Indians made per capita payments 
of$30,000 a month to its 153 members. 
The Internal Revenue Services (IRS) has an Office of Indian Tribal Governments, which 
deals with tax issues resulting from tribal gaming as well as issues involving tribal 
governments and enterprises. 
Bonds 
The Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act specifies that tribal governments should be 
treated as states for purposes of issuing tax -exempt bonds if their bond proceeds are used 
for an "essential governmental function." The IRS currently has 12 tribal bond audits 
open, six of tribes and six of issuers who sold bonds on behalf of tribes. At issue for the 
tribes and the IRS is whether casinos, golf courses, hotels, convention centers, and other 
facilities qualify as "essential governmental functions." 
The IRS has ordered the Seminole tribe in Florida to retire its casino construction bonds. 
In California, the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians issued $145 million in tax exempt 
casino-construction bonds for its Fantasy Spring resort that are under investigation. 116 
The bonds saved the tribe close to $25 million in state and local taxes. 
• See Update on Impacts of Tribal Economic Developm~nt Projects in San Diego County for more detailed 
information. (San Diego County: April2003). 
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Recently the IRS began investigating $51 million in bonds issued by the Morongo Band 
of Mission Indians to build a parking garage for its new casino as well as roads and a 
sewer system. After an initial review, the IRS determined that the Morongo Band of 
Mission Indians' bonds did not appear to be issued for an essential governmental 
function. The issue had originally been planned as a $145 million deal -- using the 
neighboring city of Banning as a conduit bond issuer-- to expand the tribe's casino and 
to construct a 23-story hotel. 117 
Non-Gambling Revenues 
Most tribes with casinos are reinvesting their gaming profits into business enterprises, as 
well as improving the social, educational, and health care infrastructures of their 
communities. For example, the Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians in San Diego County 
owns a shopping center, a bank and radio and television stations. The Rumsey Band of 
Wintun Indians in Yolo County is investing in real estate and owns a Ford dealership, 
while the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians owns a downtown shopping area and a 
community bank, among other investments. 118 The Paskenta Band ofNomlaki Indians 
plans to diversify over a ten-year period by creating an engineering company and 
investing in medical waste destruction and real estate. 
The trend toward diversification is also evident in Las Vegas. Gambling as a percentage 
of revenue for Las Vegas' hotel-casinos decreased from 55 percent in 1997 to 40 percent 
in 2000. The Las Vegas Strip has 2.1 million square feet of retail shops, over half of 
which was created in the last decade. 119 
TAXES AND REVENUE SHARING WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Commercial Casinos 
Casino gambling is a fast growing industry around the world. In the United States, 
commercial casino (non-Indian) revenues more than doubled from 1994 ($13.8 billion) to 
2004. The American Gaming Association reports that 445 commercial (non-Indian) 
casinos* in 11 states earned nearly $29 billion in gross revenues in 2004, from which state 
and local governments derived $4.74 billion in direct gaming taxes, about 16 percent of 
gross gaming revenue. 120 (California does not have commercial, non-Indian casinos.) 
Gambling tax rates vary considerably in states with commercial casinos, as the following 
data developed by the Indiana Gaming Commission indicates (the chart does not include 
Colorado, New Jersey or South Dakota, which also have commercial casino gambling). 
• Commercial casinos include land-based, riverboat, docked, and racetrack casinos operated for 
commercial purposes (and are not Indian casinos). 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Selected State Commercial Gambling Taxes 
Fiscal Year 2005 
State Total Taxes Adjusted Gross Effective Tax Rate 
Revenues* 
Nevada $904 million $10.61 billion 8.5% 
Illinois $797 million $ 1. 7 5 billion 45.5% 
Indiana $774 million $ 2.40 billion 32.2% 
New Jersey $398 million $ 4.80 billion 8.3% 
Missouri $410 million $ 1.50 billion 27.2% 
Louisiana $335 million $ 1.56 billion 21.4% 
· Mississippi $334.6 million $ 2. 79 billion 12.0% 
Iowa $161.8 million $ 745.9 million 21.7% 
Total $4.224 billion $25.15 billion 
Source: Indiana Gaming Commission, 2006 
* AGR includes adjustments such as chip and token float not included in win figures. 
Indian Casinos 
In 2004, there were 403 Indian gaming facilities in 30 states, which according to the 
National Indian Gaming Commission earned $19.4 billion in gross gaming revenues. 
Indian gaming tribes do not pay taxes on their gaming revenues to the state or federal 
government, but they are legally required to deduct and withhold state and federal income 
tax from non-Indian and nonresident tribal member employees, pay federal employment 
taxes, report payments to independent contractors, and report and withhold federal 
incomes taxes from gaming winnings and per capita payments to tribal members. 121 
The IGRA prohibits states from imposing taxes, fees, charges, or other assessments on 
Indian tribes as a condition of offering class III games. For this reason, revenue-sharing 
agreements have become a common part of the compact negotiation process. The 1996 
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Seminole vs. Florida, which struck down a provision in 
IGRA that permitted tribes to sue a state for failure to negotiate a compact in good faith, 
increased states' negotiating leverage. Since that decision, most state-tribal gaming 
compacts have involved revenue sharing. 
The Department of the Interior will approve revenue sharing payments only when a state 
has agreed to provide the valuable economic benefit of"substantial exclusivity" from 
non-Indian, and occasionally other Indian, gambling enterprises in exchange. The 
Department has refused to approve of compacts with revenue sharing provisions in states 
that did not offer this benefit. 
The most well-known compact in the country, signed in January 1993, between the state 
of Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot tribe, created the spectacularly successful 
Foxwoods casino, and called for the tribe to contribute 25 percent of slot machine 
revenues to the state in return for the exclusive right to operate slot machines. That 
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compact set a precedent that some states have tried to follow. California's former 
Governor Davis, for example, unsuccessfully proposed at one time that the tribes share 
25 percent of their revenues with the state. 
Alan Meister, in a recent analysis of Indian gaming, writes that seven factors can 
influence tribal revenue sharing: 
1. Economic climate--of the tribe, the state and the economy 
2. New versus existing gaming and the degree of expansion 
3. Profitability and its relation to tribal needs 
4. Degree of competition 
5. Type of gaming 
6. Revenue-sharing rate 
7. Revenue-sharing base (i.e. net win, net win after expenses, etc.)122 
Revenue sharing arrangements provide from eight percent (New Mexico) to 25 percent 
(Connecticut) of Indian gaming revenues to state and local governments in fifteen states. 
The three states receiving the largest aggregate contributions from tribal casinos in 2004 
were Connecticut ($411.4 million, two casinos), California ($153.2 million, 56 casinos) 
and Wisconsin ($68 million, 17 casinos and seven "ancillary sites"). 123 
According to one analyst: 
The fiscal aspects of these compacts appear to be completely ad hoc with no 
evidence of fundamental public finance principles being applied in their design by 
states and tribes, much less consideration being given to the design of optimal 
fiscal compacts in any sense. 124 
California 
Gaming revenue at California Indian gaming facilities over a four-year period, 2001-
2004, was an estimated $17 billion.125 Payments made by gaming tribes to the Revenue 
Sharing Trust Fund, the Special Distribution Fund and the state's General Fund from 
2000 to September 30, 2005, totaled $543.4 million. 126 The five years of payments made 
by gaming tribes to these funds was the equivalent of about nine one percent of the 
estimated Indian gaming revenues earned in four years. 
Under the 1999 compacts, the 28* California gaming tribes that had gaming devices as of 
September 1, 1999, make payments to the Special Distribution Fund (SDF) ranging from 
zero to 13 percent of gaming machine revenue, based on the number of machines that 
·However the Rumsey Band ofWintun Indians and the Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians no longer make 
payments to the SDF under 2004 amended compacts; 26 tribes now make payments to the fund. See Table 
8 below. 
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they had in operation at that time. The legislature annually appropriates money from the 
fund. Under a formula enacted in 2003, which sunsets in 2009, payments are directed to 
local jurisdictions. The intent is to mitigate the impact of the casinos on local 
communities. 
Riverside County tribes had more slot machines in 1999 than tribes in other parts of the 
state, and thus those tribes pay more into the SDF. With nine casinos, Riverside County 
has received 41 percent of the SDF funds allocated to date. San Diego County, which has 
eight casinos in operation, has received 18 percent. The number of slot machines in each 
of these counties totals about 13,100. The rest of the SDF has been distributed among the 
other 33 counties with casinos. Ofthe $105 million allocated to date, only $5.5 million 
has gone to eight counties that collectively have ten casinos. 127 
The governor vetoed $20 million ofSDF funds from the FY 2005-06 budget," ... because 
local government agencies have not provided required annual reports that detail the 
specific projects funded." The funding was subsequently restored by legislation. 
In 2003, Governor Davis negotiated compacts with three tribes that required revenue 
sharing with the state of up to five percent of net win. These were the first compacts to 
provide revenue to the state's General Fund. In amended compacts negotiated in 2004, 
six tribes agreed to increase payments to the RSTF and to make payments to the state's 
General Fund based on gaming devices added after the compact amendments became 
effective, in exchange for removing limits on the number of slot machines. In addition, 
these tribes also agreed to make a fixed annual payment equivalent to at least ten percent 
of net win minus expenses in 2003--about $100 million a year--to back a $1 billion state 
transportation bond over 18 years. 
The state greatly over-estimated the amount of General Fund revenue it would receive 
from the new and amended compacts. Administration officials predicted a payment of 
$300 million in FY 2004-05, based on revenues from new slot machines. Instead the 
state is expected to receive about $35 million in General Fund payments from tribes in 
2005-06. The tribes have not increased the number of slot machines in their casinos as 
rapidly as expected. 
Some tribes have signed agreements with local governments, making direct payments to 
offset increased local costs attributed to gaming operations (roads, law enforcement, etc.) 
and contributing to special community funds. For example, the Rumsey Band ofWintun 
Indians has agreed to pay Yolo County $100 million over 18 years. The Viejas Band of 
Kumeyaay Indians recently agreed to pay San Diego County $1.2 million for road 
improvements associated with its casino expansion, as well as funding a full-time deputy 
sheriff and the district attorney's tribal liaison position. 
Because a compact with the state is not required for class II gaming, revenues from class 
II gaming are not contractually shared with the state or local governments, but they may 
be shared voluntarily. For example, the city of San Pablo expects to collect $9 million 
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from Casino San Pablo in FY 2005-06, over half of the city's annual budget and 7.5 
percent of the casino's revenues. 
State and Local Taxes 
Generally, Indian tribes and their property are not subject to state taxation unless 
expressly authorized by an act of Congress. Tribal members living on the reservation are 
subject to federal income tax but not state income tax. If they live outside of Indian lands 
and within California, they are taxed by California on all income, including income from 
Indian-country sources such as per capita casino distributions. They are also taxed by the 
state on all income earned outside oflndian lands regardless ofwhere they live. 128 
The National Conference of State Legislatures notes that "Complex rules regarding state 
taxation and Native American lands and individuals have been the source of many 
misunderstandings ... The legal right of tribal governments to conduct business free of 
state taxation, the right of tribal members to make tax-free purchases, and the obligation 
of non-Indians to pay taxes on their purchases has led both to litigation and to 
negotiation."129 
Sales of goods to tribal members for use on the reservation are exempt from state sales 
and use tax when title to the good passes, and delivery occurs, to a tribal member. This 
includes slot machines, vehicles (and vehicle license fees), construction materials, and 
prepared food. However states can require tribes to collect taxes on goods sold to non-
Indians on Indian lands. 130 In 1976, the United States Supreme Court affirmed" ... the 
State's requirement that the Indian tribal seller collect a tax validly imposed on non-
Indians is a minimal burden ... " 131 In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the state 
of California could legally require collection of excise taxes* by the tribes. 132 
Enforcement is an issue as state sales, use and excise taxes must be collected by the 
tribes. In 2001, the California Board of Equalization, which administers the state's sales 
tax, estimated restaurant and bar sales on California tribal lands to be $200 million 
annually, resulting in approximately $15 million in tax, of which the tribes remitted less 
than $3 million to the state. In addressing the issue of unremitted tax liabilities, the 
Assistant Chief Counsel of the Board had written to the attorney of an Indian casino in 
1997, " ... we have no means at this time ofbringing an action for collection against your 
client without your client's acquiescence ... We will not cancel the liability."133 
In 2002, the Board of Equalization exempted tribes from collecting use tax on meals, 
food, or beverages sold for consumption on an Indian reservation. However Indian 
retailers are required to collect use tax from non-Indian purchasers (except for meals, 
food and beverages), and non-Indian retailers making sales on reservations are 
responsible for collecting sales tax on sales made to non-Indians. This could include, for 
example, items sold in a hotel gift shop. The amount of taxes actually being collected is 
unknown as the Board does not keep statistics on goods purchased on Indian lands. 
• Excise taxes are paid when purchases are made on a specific good such as gasoline, wine or cigarettes. 
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California tribes earned revenues of $544.6 million on non-gaming operations in 2004, a 
seven percent increase from the previous year. As Table 8 indicates, many California 
tribes are heavily invested in retail operations on their lands including hotels, restaurants, 
gas stations, convenience stores, and retail shops. The Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians 
collects and remits state sales and use tax from its retail outlet mall operations, the only 
such example found for this report; San Diego County's share in FY 2000-01 was 
$520,981. 134 
The state of Washington publishes the Indian Guide to Washington State Excise Taxes 
that clarifies which state taxes should be paid, including sales tax on items sold to non-
tribal members. 135 In Minnesota, the Department of Revenue collects millions of dollars 
in sales taxes from restaurants, shops, and hotels on reservations. Connecticut has a tax 
agreement with the Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan tribes establishing which items 
sold on their lands to non-Indians will be subject to state taxes, such as alcoholic 
beverages, gasoline and gift items; the tribes collect and remit the taxes to the state. 136 
States with non-Indian casinos impose a variety of taxes including: wagering taxes 
(varies from four to 70 percent of adjusted gross receipts), an admissions tax (primarily 
riverboat casinos), taxes on slot machines, a tax on complementary items such as 
entertainment and food, taxes on gross revenues and licensing fees to cover municipal 
services. 
Property taxes and local taxes such as hotel occupancy taxes do not apply to reservations. 
In 2004, the Rincon Band of Luisefio Indians successfully sued the county of San Diego 
to stop it from trying to collect more than $1.6 million in hotel transient occupancy taxes 
on Harrah's Rincon Resort and Casino, which has a 651 room hotel. In granting the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the U.S. District Court ruled that the county 
could not tax a hotel on tribal land, even if the hotel is operated by a corporate entity. 137 
The court declared that, "absent a withdrawal or waiver by Congress or the tribe, the 
doctrine of tribal immunity bars the imposition of state taxes." The Rincon Band levies 
its own hotel transient occupancy tax, from which it received $130,000 in 2002-03, when 
the hotel had 200 rooms. 138 
The Displacement Effect 
Gambling does not increase the total pool of money available in the economy but rather 
redistributes it. This is because consumers finance their gambling activities from reduced 
savings and reduced spending on other taxable goods and services. Due to this 
"displacement effect," economists find that the net revenue benefit of gambling to states 
and local governments is smaller than it might appear. A recent article in State Tax Notes 
examined several state-level studies using county-level data to estimate the effect of 
casino gambling on state sales tax revenues. 139 
• A 1998 study in Arizona found that the introduction of Indian casinos diverted 
funds from taxable to non-taxable sectors of the state economy, including from 
retail trade, restaurants and bars, hotels and motels, and particularly from 
amusement and entertainment. The commencement of casino operations lowered 
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sales tax revenues (called transaction privilege tax in Arizona) by an average of 
2. 7 percent. 
• A 2002 study using 1990-97 data from all New Mexico counties found that 
counties with two Indian casinos have a sales tax base that is 6.2 percent lower 
than counties without tribal casinos, suggesting the substitution of gambling for 
other taxable activity. The model controlled for the effect of county employment 
and wages, seasonal variations and systematic differences between counties with 
and without Indian reservations. 
• A 1999 study of riverboat casinos in Missouri found that a ten percent increase in 
casino annual gross revenues was associated with an average decline in sales tax 
revenue in the amusement and recreation sector of three to 5.9 percent. 
The author of a study examining the change in sales tax revenue per dollar of casino 
annual gross revenues found considerable variation among 13 states that have 
commercial (non-Indian) casinos. Four states (Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, South 
Dakota) experienced a net gain in per capita sales tax (of one cent to 47 cents per dollar 
of per capita annual gross casino revenues). These states drew more out-of-state 
gamblers. Eight states experienced a net reduction of sales tax, ranging from -$1.24 in 
Illinois to -$.01 in Rhode Island. The author concluded that casino wagering could 
displace taxable consumer expenditures and, as a result, lower sales tax revenue. 140 
CALIFORNIA INDIAN TRIBES WITH CASINOS 
Table 8 lists the 66 California tribes with tribal-state gaming compacts as of October 
2005, including 
• the number of enrolled members in each tribe (in 2001, as provided by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs) 
• management partners approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission 
• the number of authorized gaming devices, per the California Gambling Control 
Commission 
• other games, non-gaming facilities and profits (as available from press and 
websites) 
• % of revenues paid to tribal members in per capita payments (provided by the 
BIA) 
• payments to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund over a five year period, tribes that 
make payments to the Special Distribution Fund and, when appropriate, state 
revenue-sharing agreements. 
This is a very dynamic industry and information can change quickly. The reader is 
advised to check for more recent updates. 
At the time of the 2000 Census there were 333,346 American Indians residing in 
California, of which members of California's federally recognized tribes are a subset. 
Federally recognized California tribes which had tribal-state gaming compacts as of 
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October 2005, had 31,623 members in 2001 (the most recent data available from the 
BIA), about nine percent of all American Indians residing in California. California 
Indian gaming net win revenues in 2004 were more than $5.7 billion, an average of about 
$188,000 per gambling tribal member. 
Information presented in Table 8 comes from a variety of government and press sources 
and is uneven for revenues and investments in facilities, as this proprietary information 
can only occasionally be gleaned from Securities and Exchange Commission filings of 
casino management companies and other sources. California gaming tribes do not have 
to publicly report earnings and they do not do so. Some other states (Connecticut, 
Nevada, New Jersey) provide for the disclosure of considerably more information about 
casino revenues, audits and disciplinary actions. 
Information is presented about tribal payments made to three funds pursuant to the state's 
tribal-state compacts, from 2000 to September 30, 2005. 
• Payments made to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund by gaming tribes from the 
inception of the fund totaled $154.6 million (including interest). 141 These 
payments are distributed to nongaming tribes. 
• 28 tribes have made payments of $368.7 million (including interest) to the Special 
Distribution Fund; 26 tribes still make payments.* However we are unable to 
provide the amount paid by each tribe, as that information is confidential. 
• Six tribes with 2004 amended compacts paid $20 million into the state's General 
Fund. 
In total, California gaming tribes made payments of$543,445,721 to these three funds 
from 2000 through September 2005. 
The National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) is required to approve all tribal casino 
management contracts; only nine contracts have been approved for California gaming 
tribes with firms such as Harrah's and Station Casinos (one of those contracts has since 
been terminated). NIGC limits the percentage of tribal casino revenues that can be paid 
to management consultants/contractors to thirty percent, according to its staff. 
* The tribes that have made contribution to the Special Distribution Fund include: August Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians, Barona Band of Mission Indians, Berry Creek Rancheria, Big Sandy Rancheria, Big 
Valley Rancheria, Bishop Pauite-Shoshone Indians, Cabazon Band of Cahuilla Indians, Chicken Ranch 
Rancheria, Colusa Indian Community, Hopland Band of Porno Indians, Jackson Rancheria, Mooretown 
Rancheria, Morongo Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians, Redding Rancheria, Robinson Rancheria of Porno 
Indians, Rumsey Band ofWintun Indians, San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians, Santa Rosa Indian 
Community, Santa Ynez Band ofChumash Indians, Smith River Rancheria, Soboba Band ofLuiseno 
Indians, Sycuan Band ofDiegueiio Mission Indians, Table Mountain Rancheria, Tule River Indian Tribe, 
Twenty-Nine Palms Mission Indians, Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians. (The Rumsey and Viejas Bands 
no longer contribute to the SDF under their amended 2004 compacts, but rather have revenue-sharing 
agreements with the state.) 


























Enrollment (2001, BIA) 
Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians, Palm 
Springs, 379 members 
Alturas Rancheria, 
Alturas, 9 members 
Augustine Band of 
Mission Indians, 
Coachella, 8 members 
Barona Band of Mission 
Indians, Lakeside, 362 
members 
Bear River Band of 
Rohnerville Rancheria, 
Humboldt Co., 265 
members 
Berry Creek Rancheria 
of Maidu Indians, 
Oroville, 464 members 
Big Sandy Rancheria 
Band of Western Mono 
Indians, Auberry, 331 
members 
Big Valley Band of 
Porno Indians, 
Lakeport, 696 members 
Table 8 
California Indian Tribes with State Gaming Compacts as of November 2005 
NIGC- Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Approved State 
Authorized Slot Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09/30/05, 
Management Compact 
Machines, Other addition to Facilities, # in per capita SDF Payments, 
Contracts 
Games* casino(s) employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharing++ 
Two casinos, 2,000 228 room hotel, $95 million Spa 
Payments to RSTF 
1999 
slots total, 78 table 13 restaurants, Resort, $90 50% per capita of$3,873,142; SDF games, 700 seat 2 showrooms, million Rancho 
payments bingo hall spa Mirage 
650 slots, 2 table 1 restaurant, Payments to RSTF, 1999 planned 100 60% per capita games 
room hotel $187,500 
Paragon 
77 5 slots, 10 Payments to RSTF, Augustine LLC, 1999 gaming tables 2 restaurants 325 employees $437,500 
Nevada 
2,000 slots, bingo, 397 room hotel, Payments to RSTF 
1999 off-track betting, 70 spa, golf course, 60% per capita of$3,774,550, SDF 
table games 1 0 restaurants payments 
1999 
350 slots, 10 table 
games 
2 restaurants 10% per capita $0** 
900 slots, 22 table 
Hotel, 5 
Payments to RSTF 






350 slots, 8 table 
1 restaurant million hotel- 50% per capita $0,** SDF payments 
games 
casino 
80 room hotel, 
RV park, Payments to RSTF 
1999 






























Bishop Paiute Tribe, 
Bishop, 914 members 
Blue Lake Rancheria, 




Wuk Indians, lone, 
12 members 
Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 
Indio, 30 members 





Cachil Dehe Indian 
Band of Wintun 
Indians, Colusa, 75 
members 
Cahuilla Band of 
Mission Indians, 









350 slots, 3 table 
games 
700 slots, 16 table 
1999 
games, bingo 
1999, Unlimited number 
amended of slots under 
2004 amended compact 
1,956 slots, 30 table 
1999 games, bingo, off-
track betting 
1999 350 slots 
1999 846 slots, table 
games, bingo 
1999 
350 slots, 3 table 
games 
-
Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09/30105, 
addition to Facilities, # in per capita SD F Payments, 
casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharing++ 
1 restaurant, gas 
40% per capita 
$0,** SDF 
station payments 
3 restaurants, Payments to RSTF; 
showroom $437,500 
Proposed Amended compact: 
casino, shops, $200 million 15-25% annual net 
restaurants, estimate win to state, bond 
entertainment payments 




Payments to RSTF 
center, 7 







golf, bowling 2004 
alley, theater 
1 restaurant $0** 
3 restaurants, 20% per capita Payments to RSTF 
hotel, of$403,750, SDF 
showroom payments 
Payments to RSTF 
































Campo Band of 
Mission Indians, 
Campo, 294 members 
Chemehuevi Tribe, 
Havasu Lake, 708 
members 
Cher-Ae Heights 











Hoopa, 90 members 
Concow-Maidu Tribe 
of the Mooretown 
Rancheria, Oroville, 
1, 193 members 
Coyote Valley Tribe 
ofPomo Indians, 









750 slots, 13 table 
1999 games, 46 poker 
video games 
1999 
350 slots, table 
games 




350 slots, bingo 
(900 seats), 
1999 350 slots, no casino 
1999 
1,000 slots, 12 poker 
and 16 table games 
2,000 slots, bingo, 
2004 poker, other table 
games 
Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09/30/05, 
addition to Facilities, # in per capita SDF Payments, 
casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sltarinf(++ 
2 restaurants, 
bar, truck stop 
(gas, 50% per capita 




1 restaurant, air 
strip, marina, 




78 room hotel, 49% per capita $0** 
rental home 





Payments to RSTF 
campground, 3 




Per device fee up to 
750; 12-25% net 
Cafe, gift shop 50% per capita annual win over 
750; RSTF over $50 























Dry Creek Rancheria 





City, 100 members 
Elem Indian Colony 





Indians (also known 
as Cuyapaipe ), 
Alpine, 8 members 
Fort Mojave Indian 
Tribe, Needles, 412 
members in 
California 
Hoopa Valley Tribe, 
Hoopa, 2,500 
members 



















Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Authorized Slot Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09130/05, 
Machines, Other addition to Facilities,# in per capita SD F Payments, 
Games* casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharing++ 
$4.8 million 2"0 
qtr. 2005 ($1.9 
million to 
1,600 slots, 16 table 3 restaurants, Nevada Gold & Payments to RSTF, 
games gift shop Casinos, $7,176,996 
$356,000 to 
tribe); 30% per 
capita 
Golf course, 
400 slots, 5 table RV resort, 
30% per capita 
Payments to RSTF, 
games bowling alley, 1 $62,500 
restaurant 
350 slots, no casino 
Payments to RSTF, 
350 slots; proposed $2,437,433; 
casino on Viejas amended compact: 
tribal lands, federal bond payments, 
approval not yet 15% net win up to 
received $200 million, 25% 
over $200 million 
10-25% annual net 
l ,500 gaming 
win; RSTF over $25 
devices, no casino 
million net win** 
Hotel, gas 
350 slots, 1 table 
station 
$0** 
942 slots, 10 table Payments to RSTF 
games, 1,000 seat 
2 restaurants, 
30% per capita of$2,119,408, SDF lounge 































Band of Miwuk 
Indians, Jackson, 24 
members 
Jamul Indian 
Village, Jamul, 56 
members 
La Jolla Band of 
Luisefio Indians, 
Pauma Valley, 698 
members 

















Morongo Band of 
Mission Indians, 








1,500 slots, 40 table 
1999 
games, bingo 
350 slots, planned 
1999 
2000 class II 
machines, 40 card 
tables 
1999 




350 gaming devices, 
casino 
no casino 
1999 350 slots, no casino 
350 slots, no casino 
1999 
608 slots, 8 table 
games 
2,000 slots, 100 
1999 table games, 22 
poker tables 
Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09130105, 
addition to Facilities, # in per capita SDF Payments, 
casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharin~:++ 
446 room hotel, 
Payments to RSTF 
6 restaurants, 
conference 
25% per capita of$3,026,877, SDF 
center, store 
payments 
Planned 412 Planned $300 
room hotel, 5 million with $0** 
restaurants Lakes Gaming 
800 site 
I campground; $0** 
planned 75 
room hotel 
5% net win 
Payments to RSTF; 
1 restaurant 50% per capita 
$187,500. 
310 room hotel, $250 million Payments to RSTF 
10 restaurants, resort, 3,000+ 70% per capita of$497,300, SDF 

























Pala Band of 
Mission Indians, 
Pala, 891 members 





of Mission Indians, 
Pauma Valley, 132 
members 





of the Chukchansi 
Indians, Coarsegold, 
1,173 members 




Nation, Fort Yuma, 
Imperial County, 




















Unlimited number of 
2004 
slots, 85 table games 
1999 
773 slots, 12 table 
games 
1999, Unlimited number of 
amended in slots authorized in 
2004 2004, table games 
1999 
2,000 slots, 174 table 
games 
1999 
1,800 slots, 47 table 
games 
350 slots, 3 table 
1999 games, 70 bingo 
seats 
1999, 
350 slots, 15 table 
games; seeking 
amended approval for 2"d CA 
2005 but 
not ratified 
casino with 1, 100 
slots 
Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09/30/05, 
addition to Facilities, # in per capita SDF Payments, 
casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharinf(++ 
Payments to RSTF, 
507 room hotel, 





spa, theater, 2 
win 2003-04; 50% 
10-25% annual net 
lounges 
per capita 
win, RSTF, bond 
payments 
4 restaurants, 2 
Payments to RSTF, 
hotels with 120 10% per capita 
rooms 
$528,750 
Payments to RSTF, 
$44.2 million net 
$1,080,421; 
Cafe, lounge win 2003-04; 
amended compact: 
48% per capita 
25% annual net 
win, bond 
payments 
522 room hotel, 
11 restaurants, $1 00+ million in Payments to RSTF 
store, R V resort $252 million annual revenue; of$1,533,780, SDF 
convention hall, 80% per capita payments 
gas station 
192 room hotel, 










































Rincon Band of San 
Luisefio Indians, 
Valley Center, 639 
members 
Robinson Rancheria 
Porno Indians, Nice, 
433 members 
Rumsey Band of 
Wintun Indians, 44 
members 




San Pasquel Band of 
Mission Indians, 
Valley View, 529 
members 
Santa Ynez Band of 
Chumash Indians, 
Santa Ynez, 159 
members 
NIGC-




951 slots, 18 table 
1999 games, 300 bingo 
seats 
Harrah's 1,600 slots, 51 table 
Entertainment 1999 games and 8 poker 
Inc., Nevada tables 
600 slots, I 0 table 
1999 games, 530 bingo 
seats 
1999, 
Unlimited slots under 
2004 amendment, 
amended 
111 table games, 
2004 
bingo 
2,000 slots, 99 table 




1,572 slots, 10 table 
LLC, Nevada games 
2,000 slots, bingo 
(1,000 seats), 40 table 
1999 
games, 14 poker 
tables 
Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09/30105, 
addition to Facilities, # in per capita SD F Payments, 
casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ SharinK++ 
4 restaurants, Payments to RSTF 
planned 100 60% per capita of$687,500, SDF 
room hotel payments 




1,500 50% per capita 






48 room hotel, 
2 restaurants, 
Payments to RSTF RV park, 
49% per capita of $275,000, SDF 
conference 
center, gift payments 
shop, 
200 room hotel, Payments to RSTF, 
mini mart, spa, $250 million in 
$5,634,900; 
amended compact: 
showroom, 8 2003 (net); 30% 
25% annual net 






Payments to RSTF 
6 restaurants, million/year 
gift shop 




45% per capita 
SDF payments 
3 restaurants 45% per capita 
Payments to RSTF, 
$6,261,281 
hotel, spa, 3 
$200 million 
Payments to RSTF 
annual net 
restaurants, of$7,072,164, SDF 
showroom 



























Santa Ysabel Band 
of Mission Indians, 













River, 896 members 
Soboba Band of 
Luisefio Indians, 






Sycuan Band of 
Kumeyaay Nation, 





















Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Authorized Slot Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09130!05, 
Machines, Other addition to Facilities, # in per capita SD F Payments, 
Games* casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharing++ 
Planned $30 
350 slots; no casino 
5% annual net win 
million to state 
350 slots Cafe 65% per capita $0** 
350 slots; not open 
Planned $250 Payments to RSTF, 
million $1,238,750 
350 slots, 2 blackjack 
Restaurant 
$0,** SDF 
tables, bingo payments 
2,000 slot machines, 
3 restaurants, 
21 table games, 10 
entertainment Payments to RSTF 
table poker room, 
pavilion, 950 employees of$3,858,730, 
350 seat bingo hall 
proposed 400 SDF payments 
room hotel 
350 slots, table 3 restaurants, 
games gift shop 
$0** 
I 02 room hotel, 
2,000 slots, 64 table 5 restaurants, 
games, off-track entertainment 
Payments to RSTF 
betting, 1,254 seat hall, golf 
32% per capita of$12,579,097, 
































Tribe, Friant, 115 
members 





Band of Cahuilla 
Indians, Salton 
City, 532 members 




Tule River Indian 
Tribe, Porterville, 
1 ,425 members 
Twenty Nine Palms 





Lincoln, El Dorado 
















Casinos, LLC amended 
Nevada 2004 
Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Authorized Slot Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09130/05, 
Machines, Other addition to Facilities, # in per capita SDF Payments, 
Games* casino employees+ payments to State Revenue 
members+ Sharint:++ 
2,000 slots, 32 table 
2 restaurants, 
Cascade Payments to RSTF 
games, 800 seat 
gift shop Entertainment 
25% per capita of$6,285,920, SDF 
bingo hall Group payments 
2,000 slots, 17 table Payments to RSTF 
games, 950 seat 4 restaurants 30% per capita of$13,042,151, 
bingo hall SDF payments 
Planned 350 slots on 
Revenue sharing of 
existing reservation; 
Truck stop 3% 1st yr., 4% 2nd 
possible 1,650 
yr., 5% 3'd yr. 
expansion 
7 bars and ! 
1,013 slots, 24 table restaurants, Expansion 
1% per capita 
Payments to RSTF, 
I games bowling alley, underway $828,750. 
arcade 
• 1 ,500 slots, table 2 restaurants, Payments to RSTF ! 
games, bingo ( 450 showroom, gift 35% per capita of$2,897,124, SDF I 
seat) shop payments 
3 restaurants, Payments to RSTF, 
2,000 slots, 37 table 





$338 million in 
under 2004 
11 restaurants $100 million 2003 (net); 40% 
Payments to RSTF, 



























Total revenues Payments to RSTF 
Enrollment (2001, Approved State 
Authorized Slot Facilities in Investment in and % revenues 2000 to 09/30/05, 
BIA) Management Compact 
Machines, Other addition to Facilities, # in per capita SDF Payments, 
Contracts 




Payments to RSTF, 
Viejas Band of 
1999, 
under 2004 6 restaurants, 
+$25million 
$174 million $4, 192,366; 
Kumeyaay Indians, 
amended 
amendment, 62 table factory outlet 
expansion, 
annual net win amended compact: 
Alpine, 268 
2004 
games, 900 seat store mall, 
$56.6 million 
2003-04; 55% per 25% annual net 
members bingo hall, off-track outdoor theater 
in outlet center 
capita win, payments to 
betting secure bond 
The information provided in this table is drawn from government and news sources. Given how quickly new developments occur, there may be more recent changes. 
*Some tribes do not have all authorized slot machines in operation; information about other games is taken from tribal websites. 
**Tribes with 350 or fewer gaming devices (slot machines) are defined as "non-gaming tribes" and are eligible to receive a full share from the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, 
which currently provides $1.1 million/year to eligible compact tribes. 
+Revenue information is considered to be proprietary and so is incomplete. Per capita% is from the Office oflndian Gaming Management, U.S. Department of the Interior. 
++Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) payments began July 1, 2000. The RSTF receives license fees of$0-$4,350 per device per year, depending on the number of gaming 
devices a tribe operates. Some of the 2003-2005 compact tribes pay only into the RSTF; others pay only a% of net win to the state, as described .. 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMP ACTS OF INDIAN CASINOS 
In the last two chapters of this report, we discuss the social and economic impacts of 
gambling in more detail. In this section, we review research that focuses solely on the 
impact of Indian casinos. 
On Tribes 
Many of the country's 1.9 million American Indians have lived in poverty on rural 
federal trust reservations for decades, receiving minimal government services and 
suffering from inadequate housing, poor schools, and chronic diseases such as diabetes, 
alcoholism, and drug abuse. In 1990, per capita income for Indians on reservations was 
less than one-third the U.S. average; college attainment was less than half the U.S. level; 
unemployment was three times the U.S. level; and Indian homes disproportionately 
lacked access to running water and wastewater facilities. 142 
California tribes have experienced unemployment as high as 90 percent, welfare 
dependency, and poor education and health services. Inadequate investment in 
infrastructure on the tribes' isolated lands has increased their lack ofbusiness 
opportunities. For example, the state's largest tribe, the Yurok (about 4,000 members), 
lives on a reservation in which 80 percent of the homes lack electricity, 75 percent of the 
tribal members do not have jobs or phone lines, water and sewer systems are inadequate, 
and there is only a one lane roadway. 143 
A Brookings Institute report summarized the costs of concentrated poverty on individuals 
and society: 
These costs come in the form of: reduced private-sector investment and local job 
opportunities; increased prices for the poor; higher levels of crime; negative impacts 
on mental and physical health; low-quality neighborhood schools; and heavy burdens 
on local governments that induce out-migration of middle-class households. 
Together, these factors combine to limit the life chances and quality of life available 
to residents ofhigh-poverty neighborhoods. 144 
Improved Socioeconomic Well-Being 
The IGRA requires that revenues from tribal gaming be used to fund tribal governmental 
gaming operations and programs, provide for the general welfare oftribal citizens, 
promote economic development, support charitable organizations, and fund operations 
for local, non-tribal government agencies. Some tribes have used gaming profits to build 
houses, schools, day-care centers, clinics, and hospitals; to support social service 
programs; to build infrastructure such as roads and sewer and water systems; to make 
direct per capita payments to tribal members; and to fund retirement programs and 
college scholarships. Welfare and unemployment have been eliminated for members of 
some gaming tribes. 
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Indian gaming has had a tremendous impact on the economic well being of many 
California tribes, resulting in: 
... well-paying jobs; a viable revenue stream with which to provide essential 
government services; a means to leverage economic growth, development and 
economic diversification; the chance to revitalize culture and tradition; and the 
opportunity to strengthen the institutions of tribal governance ... 145 
A National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 study found that four years after tribes 
opened casinos, tribal employment increased by 26 percent and tribal populations 
increased by about 12 percent, while the fraction of poor working adults declined by 14 
percent. The increased employment was not necessarily in gaming, as some tribes have 
diversified their economic base. 146 
An extensive study by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, 
summarized in Table 9, found many positive changes nationally from 1990, when few 
tribes had gaming enterprises, to 2000, when many tribal-state compacts were in 
operation (although large scale Indian gaming did not begin in California until after 
2000). As the authors suggest, the results are remarkable. They conclude that a national 
policy of Indian self-government is driving socioeconomic change as well as gambling, 
given the reported improvements for non-gaming as well as gaming tribes. 147 
Table 9 
Changes on Reservations Other than Navajo (1990-2000) 
Non-Gaming Gaming U.S. overall 
Real per capita income +21% +36% +11% 
Median family income +14% +35% +4% 
Family poverty -6.9% -11.8% -0.8% 
Child poverty -8.1% -11.6% -1.7% 
Deep poverty -1.4% -3.4% -0.4% 
Public assistance +0.7% -1.6% +0.3% 
Unemployment -1.8% -4.8% -0.5% 
Labor force participation -1.6% +1.6% -1.3% 
Overcrowded homes -1.3% -0.1% +1.1% 
Homes lacking plumbing -4.6% -3.3% -0.1% 
Homes lacking kitchen +1.3% -0.6% +0.2% 
College graduates +1.7% +2.6% +4.2% 
Only high school or equivalent -0.3% +1.8% -1.4% 
Less than 8th grade -5.5% -6.3% -2.8% 
Source: Jonathan B. Taylor, Joseph P. Kalt, American Indians on Reservations: A Databook of Socioeconomic Change 
Between The 1990 and 2000 Census, p. xi. 
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Despite these impressive socioeconomic gains, the gap between American Indians living 
on reservations and the United States as a whole remains significant. Per capita income 
in 2000 was less than half the U.S. level, unemployment was twice the U.S. rate, and 
family poverty was three times the U.S. rate. The authors of the Harvard Project study 
point out that, "If U.S. and on-reservation Indian per capita incomes were to continue to 
grow at their 1990's rate, it would take half a century for tribes to catch up." 148 
A recent study by University of California, Riverside researchers relies on data developed 
by the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development from the 1990 and 
2000 censuses to arrive at conclusions about the impact of Indian gaming on California 
tribes and nearby communities. Since California's tribal-state gaming compacts were not 
approved by the voters until March 2000, the study was not able to measure the full 
impact of Indian gaming in the state, although it provides a useful baseline. 
The UC Riverside study found that the income of gaming tribes increased 55 percent 
from 1990 to 2000, reducing the percentage of families living in poverty from 36 percent 
to 26 percent. In comparison, the income of non-gaming tribes increased by 15 percent. 
Gaming tribes also experienced a reduction in the number of members with less than a 
ninth grade education, from 11 percent to six percent; in contrast, the percentage of non-
gaming tribe members with less than a ninth grade education increased from 12 percent 
to 14 percent. 149 
Improved Child Well-Being 
A study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 
examined the impact of casino revenues on the mental health of youth living on the 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indian reservation in North Carolina. The study began in 
1993, with the goal of studying the development ofpsychiatric disorders and the need for 
mental health services in rural and urban youth. One quarter of the sample was 
composed of children aged 9, 11 and 13 years old living on the reservation. A "natural 
experiment" occurred halfway through the eight year study when a casino was built, 
bringing jobs and per capita payments of$12,000 a year (in 2001) to tribal members, 
lifting around 30 percent of the Indian families in the study sample out of poverty. 150 
Children living in poverty are more likely to have psychiatric disorders. The study found 
that "Children whose families moved out of poverty ... showed a significant decrease in 
the mean number of psychiatric symptoms after the casino opened." Parental supervision 
was the intervening variable, accounting for 77 percent ofthe improved behavioral 
symptoms. The authors conclude that, "This finding raises the possibility that children's 
symptoms, particularly those of oppositional and deviant behavior, are affected by 
economic constraints on parents' ability to devote scarce time resources to supervision." 
Concentrated Impact 
While Indian gaming has greatly improved the social and economic status of many tribes, 
its impact has been concentrated. Two-thirds of the nation's American Indian population 
belongs to tribes that do not have casinos, some for cultural reasons and others because 
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their reservations are too remote. In 2001, " ... 22 of the more than 300 casinos and bingo 
halls generated 56 percent of the nation's tribal gambling revenues." 151 
Gaming tribes represent nine percent of California's American Indian residents. Sixty-
two of California's 108 federally recognized tribes currently have tribal-state compacts to 
operate casinos, but the size oftheir operations and revenues varies considerably (see 
Table 8). The largest tribal gambling facilities are located near major population centers. 
Non-gaming tribes are located primarily in sparsely populated areas in Northern 
California and along the eastern border of the state. 
Tribes that have "hit the jackpot" with large, successful gaming operations are able to 
provide a very high standard of living for their members. According to Chairman 
Richard Milanovich, a tribal survey conducted by the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians in 1993, before the opening of the tribe's Spa Hotel and Casino in downtown 
Palm Springs, found that 50 percent of the tribe's members lived at or below federal 
poverty levels, with about 40 percent living in substandard housing. Now the tribe offers 
all members a health and dental and vision program, pays all college tuition and 
expenses, and pays a direct per capita payment to all members. Much of the tribe's 
casino profits are put into its economic development programs, purchasing commercial 
property around Palm Springs and a 45 percent share in a local bank, among other 
investments. 152 
Disharmony 
Gaming can bring tribal members together, giving them a choice in the direction of their 
economic development. However in some tribes gaming profits have contributed to 
disputes over tribal membership. Tribal membership criteria are up to the discretion of 
the tribe, generally as interpreted by the tribal council. Most tribes determine 
membership by the applicant's percent of tribal blood-one quarter, one eighth or less. 
Some tribal councils exclude certain blood relatives if they have not participated in tribal 
affairs. Pechanga, Table Mountain, and Cabazon are among the tribes mentioned in press 
accounts as having expelled members, in some cases leading to unsuccessful litigation in 
state courts (which have ruled that they have no jurisdiction). 
The Pechanga lawsuit lays out in considerable detail the benefits from gaming revenues 
that the expelled members have lost. The 11 plaintiffs sued on behalf of an extended 
family of more than 130 adults and children who claim ancestry in the Pechanga tribe but 
were ousted from the tribe. They claim losing about $120,000 a year apiece in casino 
profits that came with tribal membership, as well as homes, jobs and health benefits. 
According to a news account, at least ten of California's gambling tribes have " ... kicked 
out members or denied them a share of casino profits that often exceed $50 million a 
year. The expulsions and exclusions have tom apart families and rekindled old 
hatreds."153 Disenrolled members lose their share of casino profits and their status as 
federally recognized Indians entitled to federal housing assistance, health care and 
tuition. 
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Perhaps the most serious quarrel over gaming profits occurred in the mid-1990s in the 
Elem Indian Colony, in which disputes over gaming funds led to five days of violence, 
including drive-by shooting and homes set on fire. Nine people were injured, ten homes 
were made uninhabitable, and almost 60 tribal members fled the reservation to take 
refuge at a nearby Navy base. 154 
More Effective Governance 
Casino revenues have provided tribal governments the means to professionalize their 
operations and to offer their members a wide variety of services. Gaming tribes have 
fully staffed departments providing a range of services from health and finance to public 
safety and public works. This increase in capacity has also assisted the tribes to 
successfully compete for federal and state grant funds. The UC Riverside study found 
that" ... the opening of a tribal gaming facility .. .is associated with an additional $535,000 
in federal American Indian grants for that county."155 
A 2005 survey conducted as part of the UC Riverside study, with responses from a 
limited sample of 11 gaming and ten non-gaming tribes, found that: 
... the gaming tribes provide more public services to their members, they have 
more fully developed tribal legal structures, employ more workers ... develop lines 
of communication with other local governments, are more likely to be engaged in 
policy discussions of regional and community issues, and have more diversified 
economic activities. 156 
The survey also found that non-gaming tribes are adding services at the same rate as 
gaming tribes, a beneficial result of the 1999 tribal-state compacts, under which non-
gaming tribes receive Revenue Sharing Trust Fund payments, currently $1.1 million a 
year. 
About a fourth of the local government officials in communities located near gaming 
tribes responding to the UC Riverside study rated the tribes as "constantly engaged in 
area issues," compared to about five percent of respondents from communities located 
near non-gaming tribes. These communications are likely to take place through the 
tribe's professional administrative staff, reflecting the stronger institutional capacity of 
gaming tribes. 157 
A number of statewide and regional intertribal organizations strengthen tribal influences 
on public policy decisions. For example, the tribal leader heading the Southern 
California Tribal Chairmen's association also chairs a subcommittee of the San Diego 
Association of Governments. Tribal chairs participate in chambers of commerce and in 
regional planning groups. 15s 
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On Communities and Consumers 
Background 
Indian gaming is located in less than half (25 counties) of California's 58 counties. These 
are primarily rural counties, containing 26 percent of California's population. An 
analysis by UC Riverside researchers found that 11 percent of California's population 
lives near a tribal gaming facility when measured at the census tract level. 159 
As Table 10 illustrates, Indian gaming confers both cost and benefits to the tribes and the 
larger society. 
Table 10 
Benefits and Costs of Indian Gaming 
Benefits Costs 
1. Reduced taxes and lottery sales, offset by 
1. Some tribal economies profit. revenue sharing with the state and payments to 
some local governments. 
2. Can reduce unemployment both on and off 2. Can increase unemployment in other sectors 
the reservation. of the state economy. 
3. Can reduce state social service costs. 3. Can increase state social service costs. 
4. Increased tribal income can stimulate local 4. Can negatively impact local businesses. 
businesses. 
5. Decreased cost of providing public services 5. Increases the demand for public services. 
to reservations. 
Source: "Testimony before the National Gambling Impact Study Commission," Gary C. Anders, Ph.D. 
Economic Impact 
California's $6.3 billion (gaming and non-gaming) tribal industries (2004 data) provide 
economic and employment benefits to many Californians, particularly in the rural areas 
where most Indian casinos are located. Off reservation communities benefit 
economically when rural casinos attract gamblers from other places and some of their 
money is spent outside the casino. The casinos also provide a new source of employment 
for local residents, since up to 90 percent of casino employees are non-Indians. 160 Higher 
crime rates and more personal bankruptcies offset these benefits. 
A 2004 study of the impact of California Indian casinos by researchers at California State 
University, Sacramento (CSUS), based on county-level data, found " ... a modest 
correlation between Indian casinos and [higher] county employment 
rates ... [and] ... somewhat higher crime and higher rates of personal bankruptcy." 
Aggravated assault and violent crimes were correlated with a greater casino presence, as 
were increased public expenditures ($15.33 per capita) for law enforcement. The study 
also found somewhat higher tax revenues, primarily generated by room occupancy taxes 
and tobacco taxes. Since local jurisdictions cannot impose a room occupancy tax on 
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hotels located on an Indian reservation, the increased tax revenues were most likely 
generated by hotels located outside of the reservations. 161 
These findings run parallel to a 2002 National Bureau of Economic Research study using 
county-level data, which found that after the opening of a Native American casino, 
employment increased by about five percent in nearby communities, while crime and 
bankruptcy rates increased by about ten percent. 162 
UC Riverside researchers examining 1990 and 2000 census data, found increased family 
incomes in census tracts located near California Indian casinos. The study concluded that 
" ... the establishment of gaming had beneficial impacts on poverty, employment, 
educational expansion and the receipt of public assistance ... resulting from the fact that 
most Indian reservations in California, even the better-off ones, are located in the poorest 
counties and tracts in the state." 163 
However there are limitations to the UC Riverside study: 
• The study's conclusions are based primarily on 1990-2000 census data. However, 
as the researchers note, class III Indian casino gaming was not legal in California 
until March 2000. Between 2000 and 2005, 16 new Indian casinos opened in 
California and the average casino doubled in size. 
• The rural areas in Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego counties (where 
many casinos are located) experienced considerable population and economic 
growth during 1990-2000, for reasons not related to gaming, and the study did not 
control for these factors. 
• The study concludes that tribal gaming was associated with a decline in the 
number of poor people on public assistance, without taking into account the 
impact of the 1994 federal welfare reform that resulted in a dramatic decrease in 
public assistance rolls. 
• The study examines a limited range of variables and does not, for example, take 
into account the public and private costs associated with Indian gaming such as 
public safety, infrastructure, crime, environmental degradation and problem and 
pathological gambling. These issues are considered below. 
UC Riverside researchers also conducted a 2005 survey oflocal officials located in 
communities near Indian gaming operations. About half of these officials viewed gaming 
as a benefit to the local business community, as shown in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
Casinos" Effects on Local Businesses as Perceived by Local 
Government Officials (2005) 
Casino Effects on Business Local Officials' Opinion 
Help business 49.2% 
Have no effect 29.2% 
Hurt business 12.3% 
Does not apply 9.2% 
Source: UC Riverside, 2005. 
A 2003 study by San Diego County estimated the following economic impacts from 
tribal gaming in the county: 164 
• Creation of about 12,000 jobs, primarily for non-Indians, with an annual payroll 
of $270 million. 
• Purchases of$263 million in goods and services in 2001, including contracts with 
over 2,000 vendors, most in the county. 
• Contributions of over $7 million to community organizations. 
The following examples ofthe substantial economic impact of rural tribal casinos are 
drawn primarily from tribal and news reports because information about tribal gaming 
operations is proprietary and confidential. 
• According to the 2002 Financial Statement of the Viejas Band ofKumeyaay 
Indians, the tribe's total payroll for its casino and retail operations in rural Alpine 
was $72 million, creating 3,000 jobs in San Diego County. Its enterprises 
generated $41 million in federal, state, and local taxes. The tribe purchased $83 
million in goods and services, and made the following payments: 
o $2 million to community and charitable contributions 
o $. 7 million to non-gaming tribes per tribal-state compact 
o $3.8 million to the Special Distribution Fund per compace65 
• The Viejas Band has a diversified investment portfolio. It purchased a half-
interest in a San Diego company that operates three radio stations and is 
participating in financing of Marriott Inns in Washington, D.C. and Sacramento. 
• The Rincon Band of San Luisefio Indians' Harrah's Rincon casino in San Diego 
County employs 1,500 people, with a payroll of$56 million. It spends about $32 
million with 1,042 vendors in California and $17 million elsewhere, and generates 
more than $5 million in payroll, sales and tribal hotel occupancy taxes. 166 
• Indian gaming helps drive the Inland Empire economy, with ~en casinos providing 
more than 14,400 jobs in Riverside and San Bernardino counties. The most 
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profitable Inland casino slot machines are believed to pull in $450 to $500 a 
day.I67 
• The Jackson Rancheria Casino Hotel & Conference Center is the largest employer 
in Amador County, of 1,700 people. 
• Barstow officials estimate that two tribes' plans to build casinos and hotels would 
create 3,700 jobs and yield up to $9 million yearly for the city, based on a 4.5 
percent share of slot machine profits. 168 
Urban casinos 
The cost-benefit calculus for an urban casino is different from that of rural casinos. 
Negative economic impacts can result when gaming operations alter established retail 
spending or employment patterns, create more problem gambling, and increase costs for 
traffic, law enforcement and infrastructure. In part this is because more of the gamblers 
are local residents so the money they spend on gambling displaces other local 
expenditures. Gambling in rural areas tends to draw residents from other regions, 
bringing money into the local economy. 
An analysis prepared for opponents of a proposed 5,000 slot machine Indian casino in the 
city of San Pablo concluded that the casino would result in a regional economic loss of 
$138 million a year, not taking into consideration social, public health, or safety costs. 
Money lost to the local economy, which would otherwise have been spent on local goods 
and services, was estimated to have a multiplier effect on the regional economy resulting 
in 7,219 jobs lost (compared to an estimated 2,000 employed at the casino). 169 The 
smaller casino (805 class II bingo machines) currently operated by the Lytton Rancheria 
employs 540 unionized workers, and reportedly has had little effect on nearby businesses 
because most players are from the local area and leave after they gamble. 170 
Public Revenues 
As noted above, some California gaming tribes with 1999 compacts make payments into 
the Special Distribution Fund (SDF). Tribes with more recent compacts also make 
payments to the state's General Fund and, in the case of six tribes, payments to fund a 
state transportation bond issue. Some ofthese revenues fund state programs for problem 
and pathological gamblers, cover state regulatory and enforcement costs at a relatively 
low level and mitigate some of the off-reservation impacts on local governments. 
Local Infrastructure 
Casinos in rural areas draw tens of thousands of people into relatively isolated areas that 
may lack adequate roads, water supplies, and sewer infrastructure. The projected cost to 
local and state governments of providing the needed investment is substantial. Tribes 
have paid for some road improvements directly, and for others through the Special 
Distribution Fund, but these payments do not fully mitigate the impact. For example, San 
Diego County estimated in 2003 that the price of improving roads to casinos in rural 
areas was $150 million. 171 The county estimated that the tribal "fair-share" to improve 
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county roads near reservations was $23.9 million. Three tribes had comprehensive 
cooperative agreements with the county to fund $10.9 million ofthat amount. In another 
example, the Rumsey Band of Wintun Indians agreed to pay Yolo County $5 million a 
year for 18 years to mitigate the traffic, environmental and other problems associated 
with its casino expansion. 
Large casinos can easily double the daily population in small communities, increasing 
traffic congestion and air pollution. San Diego County notes that "Deterioration of air 
quality in the vicinity of gaming and resort projects is still a significant issue for the 
County that is largely unaddressed, and the major road improvements needed to prevent 
development of"hot spots" take years to construct, under the best of circumstances."172 
Sewer and wastewater treatment are another major concern. Some casinos are located in 
dry rural areas that lack sufficient water and have inadequate wastewater infrastructure. 
Local governments do not have jurisdiction, and the state's role is limited, particularly 
under the 1999 tribal-state compacts. For example, according to an August 2005 article, 
the state wanted to inspect the wastewater treatment system at the Campo Band of 
Mission Indian's Golden Acorn Casino to ensure that it is not a threat to public health, 
but under the tribal-state compact, the state can only investigate in the absence of regular 
federal inspections. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had inspected earlier in 
the year but did not test for harmful bacteria or require safety equipment for workers. 173 
Labor Standards 
The 1999 California tribal-state compacts require that the tribes provide" ... an agreement 
or other procedures acceptable to the State for addressing organization and representation 
rights of class III Gaming Employees and other employees associated with the Tribe's 
class III gaming enterprise ... " More recent tribal-state compacts contain more explicit 
language providing employees the right to organize for collective bargaining purposes if 
they choose to do so. For example, the tribal-state compact with the Coyote Valley Band 
ofPomo Indians, ratified in 2003, contains the following provisions: 
• The tribe is to adopt and comply with federal and state workplace and 
occupational health and safety standards, and to allow for inspection of the 
gaming facility by state inspectors to assess compliance. Violations are a 
violation ofthe compact and may result in enjoining employees from entering into 
the gaming facility. 
• The tribe agrees to participate in the state's workers' compensation program for 
employees of the gaming facility and independent contractors, and consents to the 
jurisdiction of the Worker's Compensation Appeals Board and state courts for 
purposes of enforcement. 
• The tribe is to enact an ordinance that affords employees the right to self-
organize, bargain collectively, and engage in other concerted activities including a 
right to strike and to select a representative through secret ballot. The model 
ordinance describes the certification process (after employment of250 or more 
persons), defines eligible employees and access to those employees, describes 
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unfair labor practices and unfair union practices, provides for free speech and 
posting of information, and ensures tribal preference in employment. 
• All issues are to be resolved through a binding dispute resolution mechanism. 
Employees in six Indian casinos in the state are unionized and have collective bargaining 
agreements. UNITE HERE, which represents nearly half a million workers in the 
hospitality, gaming, apparel, textile, retail, distribution and laundry industries in North 
America, has contracts with four casinos: Casino San Pablo (Lytton), Cache Creek 
(Rumsey), Thunder Valley (United Auburn) and the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino 
(Picayune Rancheria); and is in negotiations with the Pala Casino (Pala). The 
Communications Workers of America represents gaming workers in two Southern 
California casinos owned by the Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians and the San Manuel 
Band of Mission Indians. Other tribes have been involved in organizing battles with 
unions and reportedly object to the collective bargaining provisions in the new gaming 
compacts. 
A Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board in 2004, found that tribal 
operation of a casino is not an exercise of self-governance and that the Board has 
jurisdiction over labor relations. 174 In its opinion, the Board noted that tribal enterprises 
are playing" ... an increasingly important role in the Nation's economy ... [ as] ... significant 
employers of non-Indians and serious competitors of non-Indian owned businesses." 
Significantly, the Board found that, "When the Indian tribes act in this manner, the 
special attributes of their sovereignty are not implicated. Running a commercial business 
is not an expression of sovereignty in the same way that running a tribal court system is." 
Tribal casino employment manuals specify grievance procedures for casino employees. 
In a recent civil suit against Thunder Valley Casino, alleging civil rights violations 
ranging from sexual assault to age bias, a Placer Court commissioner found that neither 
the casino nor its owner, United Auburn Indian Community, could be sued for violations 
of state and federal civil rights laws because the tribe is a sovereign nation. The 
employees have appealed. Related civil suits against a supervisor and Station Casinos, 
Inc., the casino's contract manager, are pending. 175 
Many of the jobs created by Indian casinos are service jobs involving restaurant and hotel 
work and are relatively low paying. A 2003 study of Wages and Healthcare Benefits of 
Workers at Agua Caliente Casino (Rancho Mirage), found that the average hourly wage 
of employees was $8.93, with an average workweek of38 hours, resulting in an annual 
income of$16,967. The authors concluded that this income was not enough for casino 
employees with children to achieve a modest standard ofliving. Over a quarter of the 
casino employees had second jobs, indirect evidence of the "inadequacy of their casino 
earnings." 176 The authors also found that "Agua Caliente Casino induces employees to 
depend on government subsidized health-care for their children ... [and] potentially 
increases casino profits by as much as $1,000,000 a year. .. [but] ... costs state taxpayers 
who fund the Health Families and Medi-Cal programs." The casino employed 
approximately 1,000 workers, of whom 470 were covered by the Tribal Labor Relations 
Ordinance. 
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Environmental Impact 
Language in the state's 1999 compacts with gaming tribes intended to mitigate the 
environmental impact of large casino construction projects has proven to be vague and 
"largely unenforceable." Tribes are required by the compact to adopt environmental 
ordinances and conduct environmental impact studies, making a" ... good faith effort to 
incorporate the policies and purposes ofthe National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) consistent with the Tribe's 
governmental interest" (Sec. 1 0.8.1 ). Tribal signatories are also charged with making 
" ... good faith efforts to mitigate any and all such significant adverse off-Reservation 
environmental impacts" [Sec. 10.8.2 (b) (2)]. 
The first wave of casino construction was driven by a compact deadline requiring that 
slot machines authorized under licenses drawn from the compact-created license pool be 
in operation within a year. This happened before any agreement was reached on what 
environmental protections were required. The Attorney General notified at least three 
tribes (Rincon, San Pasquel, Tuolumne Band of Me-Wuk) that they had failed to comply 
with the basic guidelines of CEQA. 177 For example, the Attorney General's letter to the 
Tuolumne Band of Me-Wuk Indians declared that under either NEPA or CEQA, the 
Draft Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tuolumne Rancheria 's Grading and 
Clearing Operation was inadequate, and " ... must be withdrawn until such time as the 
environmental impacts of the entire project have been considered."178 However that tribe 
continued grading and clearing for construction. The Attorney General does not have the 
authority to enforce provisions ofthe compact-that responsibility remains with the 
governor. 
Concerns have been raised around the state about the sufficiency of some tribal 
environmental impact reports and mitigation efforts, particularly relating to wastewater, 
groundwater depletion, endangered species, water contamination, grading of land, and 
dangerous road conditions. In some areas, such as near the Barona casino and golf 
course, local residents have experienced loss of water due to ground water depletion. The 
Campo Indian tribe's Golden Acorn Casino sewage system allowed wastewater to flow to 
a hillside behind the casino for about two years. 179 
The casinos' large-scale developments have changed the character of some rural areas. 
After an extensive review, San Diego County concluded that: 
In general, the Environmental Assessments prepared for individual proposed 
gaming facilities have not provided the level of detail the County requires of 
projects under its jurisdiction, and have not included factual analysis to support 
the conclusions that the tribal projects did not have significant impacts on the 
community character ofthe surrounding areas. 180 
Environmental standards are still unclear in the 2004 amended compacts. For example, 
the county of San Diego has asked the governor to intervene in a dispute with the Pauma 
Band of Mission Indians, which county officials say has illegally expanded its casino 
operations. At issue is what "significant" environmental impact actually means in the 
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tribe's 2004 amended contract, and whether the 1999 compact provisions continue to 
apply to the project. 181 
Public Health Impact 
Alcohol 
Some California Indian casinos provide alcohol for their patrons. Federal law requires 
that they first receive a state license to sell alcohol, which is issued and regulated by the 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) in California. The Department 
regularly inspects the premises of businesses with liquor licenses, including tribal 
casinos, to make sure they are enforcing state laws, such as against underage drinking. 
Issuance of a liquor license is not automatic. In some areas there is strong local 
opposition to granting a liquor license to a tribal casino. For example, The River Rock 
Casino's application for a liquor license, which has been approved by the ABC, is 
opposed by the Sonoma County sheriff, the Sonoma County fire chief, town officials, and 
local residents. 182 
Many tribal casinos are located in rural areas and reached by narrow winding roads, 
leading to special problems with drunken driving (see Crime section). In the opinion of a 
Riverside County deputy district attorney, tribal casinos need to train their alcohol servers 
better, as" People do not get drunk unless someone serves them." 183 
The following 15 tribes, about one quarter of the state's gaming tribes, had state liquor 
licenses as of October 2005, according to the ABC: 
• Viejas Band ofKumeyaay Indians (5 licenses) 
• Pechanga Band of Luisefio Indians (2 licenses) 
• Chemehuevi Tribe (3 licenses) 
• Cabazon Band ofMission Indians (1 license) 
• Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (3 licenses) 
• Quechan Tribe ofFort Yuma Indian Reservation (I license) 
• Morongo Band ofMission Indians (5 licenses) 
• Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Mission Indians (1 license) 
• La Jolla Band of Mission Indians (1 license) 
• Pala Band ofMission Indians (2licenses) 
• Rincon Band ofLuisefio Indians (!license) 
• Rumsey Indian Rancheria ofWintun Indians (I license) 
• Big Sandy Band of Western Mono Indians (1 license) 
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• Concow Maidu Tribe of the Mooretown Rancheria (1 license) 
• Colusa Indian Community Council (1 license) 
Liquor license applications have also been approved by the ABC following 
administrative judicial determinations for the River Rock Casino (Dry Creek Rancheria 
Band ofPomo Indians) and the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino (San Manuel Band 
ofMission Indians). 
Smoking 
Smoking presents a major public health issue for casino workers and patrons, as most 
casinos allow smoking. Bingo halls in particular are well known for their heavy 
smoking. The California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEP A) estimates that 
casinos and bingo parlors that allow smoking may expose their patrons and staff to 
twenty three times more nicotine than venues where smoking is prohibited. 184 
California's tribal-state gaming compacts exempt tribes from "any state laws, regulations, 
or standards governing the use of tobacco." However beginning in 2003, with La Posta 
Band of Mission Indians' tribal-state gaming compact, casinos are required to have non-
smoking areas and ventilation systems that exhaust tobacco smoke. The small Lucky 
Bear Casino owned by the Hoopa Valley Tribe is advertised as a non-smoking casino. 
According to CalEP A, environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) aggravates asthma and 
contributes to chronic respiratory impairment, coronary heart disease and lung, nasal 
sinus, breast and cervical cancers. It may be associated with decreased fertility. For 
pregnant women, exposure to environmental tobacco smoke adversely affects fetal 
growth, with elevated risks oflow birth weight, perinatal mortality, and other health 
problems. 185 In labeling ETS as toxic, the California Air Resources Board relied on 
CalEPA's study finding a clear link between secondhand smoke and breast cancer. The 
findings, the first of their kind by a government agency in the United States, concluded 
that premenopausal women exposed to significant amounts of secondhand smoke 
suffered a 68 percent to 120 percent higher risk ofbreast cancer. 186 
Any increase in exposure to environmental tobacco smoke translates into increased 
healthcare costs for individuals and society. 
Emergency Services and Public Safety 
Under the 1999 tribal-state compact, all gaming facility construction is to conform to the 
building and safety codes of the tribe, which are to meet the standards of the local county 
or the Uniform Buildings Codes, and to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Subsequent tribal-state compacts contain more explicit standards. For example, the 2004 
tribal state compact with the Coyote Valley Band of Porno Indians provides that the tribal 
ordinance governing new construction or building modifications must meet or exceed the 
California Building Code and the Public Safety Code applicable to the city or county in 
which the facility is located. 
80 California Research Bureau, California State Library 
There are concerns about the adequacy of fire protection for some casino properties. 
Rural counties and cities may not have the capacity to provide fire protection for the large 
hotels that have been built on tribal lands next to some casinos. For example, according 
to the Indio Police Chief, the city does not have a ladder truck that can meet the fire 
protection needs of the Cabazon tribal casino and hotel, and the tribe recently disbanded 
its fire department for financial reasons. 187 The most recent tribal state compacts address 
this issue. The 2004 tribal state compact with the Coyote Valley Band ofPomo Indians 
provides for the tribe to ensure availability of fire suppression services and to satisfy all 
requirements ofTitle 19 ofthe California Code ofRegulations. 
The adequacy of rural road infrastructure and traffic control is a major concern given the 
thousands of patrons drawn daily to many tribal casinos. For example, the California 
Highway Patrol has determined that the estimated 9,400 daily trips to a casino-hotel 
proposed by the Jamul Indian Village could not be accommodated on Highway 94, and 
that an additional twelve officers and two sergeants would be required to handle traffic 
control. 188 
About a fourth of the local officials in communities located near gaming tribes 
responding to a 2005 UC Riverside survey, indicated that they contract with tribal 
gaming operations to provide services. 189 Some tribes, such as United Auburn Indian 
Community, have signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with local governments 
to provide fire and police protection. United Auburn built a fire station on casino 
property and pays the county nearly a million dollars annually for staffing and 
maintenance costs. In another example, the Dry Creek Rancheria Band ofPomo Indians 
is currently paying $336,000 a year for emergency fire services from the Geyserville Fire 
Protection District. 190 
In some cases there are jurisdictional overlaps and inefficiencies in policing casino 
properties. For example, the Indio police patrol the parking lots while sheriffs deputies 
respond to problems inside the Cabazon casino. The tribe had its own police force, 
which it disbanded earlier this year. 
An analysis by the Abaris Group of the potential impact of a Las Vegas-style casino in 
the city of San Pablo estimated three EMS responses to the casino and one additional 
automobile crash daily, requiring a new ambulance at a cost of$490,000. The experience 
of the first five months, with a smaller bingo-casino in San Pablo, is that the ambulance 
has responded 19 times, compared to six times over the same time period in 2003 and 
2004. 191 The number of visitors has increased from 54,000 to 155,000 visitors monthly. 
Riverside County reports an average of three to four ambulance responses daily to each 
ofthe major casinos in their county, with many of the responses for casino employees.192 
CRIME 
Law enforcement on Indian lands is a complex issue beyond the scope of this report. 
Both the state of California and county governments (through Public Law 280) and the 
federal government have law enforcement responsibilities, as do the tribes. Most gaming 
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tribes have large security operations in place to protect the integrity and safety of their 
gaming operations. 
The following figure, drawn from data developed by San Diego County, shows that 
arrests, crime cases and calls for service to the county sheriff on reservations with casinos 
have increased considerably since 1999. 193 
Figure 12 
Trends in Arrests, Crime Cases and Calls for Service on 














Casinos attract large numbers of people and thus may become venues for crime. For 
example, the Palace Casino in Lemoore, California, owned by the Tachi Y okut Tribe, 
was the site of a major drug bust in January 2004. Some casinos in rural San Diego near 
the border attract immigrant smugglers who look for down-and-out gamblers to transport 
undocumented immigrants. According to an article in the San Diego Union-Tribune, the 
parking lots of casinos such as the Golden Acorn and Viejas have been used as staging 
areas for smuggling operations. 194 
A 2002 analysis by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that: "Four years 
after a casino opens, bankruptcy rates, violent crime, auto thefts and larceny are up 10 
percent in counties with a casino."195 This association is supported by other studies and is 
discussed more extensively in the chapter of this report on social impacts. 
According to the Inspector General of the U.S. Department ofthe Interior, Indian casinos 
are particularly attractive to money launderers, who can cash-in illegal proceeds for 
chips, gamble for a while, and then redeem "clean" money. Tribal financial institutions 
without federal or state charters and regulations are particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation. 196 Nevada estimates that six percent of net gaming revenues are lost to 
theft, fraud, and embezzlement every year. 197 If that were true in California, losses would 
be around $320 million per year. 
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Local Law Enforcement 
The Riverside District Attorney's office received $700,000 from the Special Distribution 
Fund to form an Indian gaming prosecution unit for casino-related crime in 2005. The 
county has eight gaming tribes and nine casinos. As of October 2005, the unit had 
prosecuted 104 felonies and 264 misdemeanor crimes in the previous nine months. 
Driving Under Intoxication (DUI) was the most common felony crime, followed by ID 
thefts (credit cards and fake checks), and auto theft and violent crimes (ten percent). 
Misdemeanors included petty theft, drunk in public, and trespassing (people who have 
been barred from the casinos but keep going back). 198 
Crime at the casinos may not be disproportionate given the large numbers of people who 
visit, although DUI is a particular concern, according to the Riverside prosecutor. 
Prosecution of crimes committed inside a casino is fairly straightforward, given that they 
are captured on surveillance cameras. 199 
Traffic safety is an issue for tribal members and casino patrons. A 2002 report found that 
Native Americans are at the highest risk of motor vehicle-related death of all ethnic 
groups. Moreover, the number of fatal crashes on Indian reservations increased by 52.2 
percent between 1975 and 2002, compared to a two percent decrease for the nation as a 
whole. Alcohol-related crime is a major contributor-the "great majority of calls to tribal 
police involve alcohol-related offenses, including driving under the influence."200 
Casino-related crime has a workload impact on local law enforcement. For example, 
according to the Sonoma County sheriff, calls for deputies to respond to the River Rock 
Casino in Geyserville increased by 51 percent from 2003 (85 calls) to 2004 (128 calls), 
diverting law enforcement from the rest of the north county. The sheriff estimates a cost 
of $700,000 to increase patrols to accommodate the increased workload. In 2004, Alpine 
law enforcement responded to 443 calls from the Viejas reservation, mostly from the 
casino and outlet center, which draw about 21,000 people a day. 201 Calls to San Pablo 
police have increased from an average of 12 a month (at the smaller card room) to 71 
monthly calls at the Lytton bingo-casino. 
Some gaming tribes support local law enforcement services through MOUs or grants. 
For example, the Paskenta Band ofNomlaki Indians (Rolling Hills Casino) earlier this 
year gave $200,000 to the Tehama County general fund, $50,000 to fund a deputy district 
attorney and $180,000 to the sheriff.2°2 
Problem and Pathological Gambling 
"Compulsive or pathological gambling remains the most real and serious side-effect of 
gambling legalization."203 Problem and pathological gambling affects approximately four 
percent of adults in the United States (see Chapter on Social Impacts) and can lead to a 
number of serious problems including personal bankruptcy, family abuse, and crimes 
such as theft. Adolescents who gamble are more likely to develop into problem 
gamblers, making underage gambling a major concern. California's 1999 tribal state 
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compact allows individuals 18 and older to gamble. More recent compacts draw the line 
at age 21. 
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that the number of compulsive 
and problem gamblers doubles when a casino is placed within 50 miles of their home. 
Greater access and closer proximity to casinos results in more problem gambling, 
particularly among low-income gamblers.204 Thus casinos in or close to urban areas 
create significantly more social costs than do rural casinos. Personal bankruptcies 
increase and the impact on family income can be substantiaL Financial tensions in poorer 
families can result in increased domestic violence and child abuse. These impacts are 
discussed in more detail later in this report. 
Over three quarters (77.5 percent) of the calls to the problem gambling helpline of the 
California Council on Problem Gambling, Inc., a nonprofit organization, are generated by 
gamblers whose primary preference is gambling in an Indian casino. The top ten Indian 
casinos of choice for problem gamblers in 2004 were (in order, beginning with the most): 
Thunder Valley (United Auburn), Pechanga, Casino Morongo, Cache Creek (Rumsey), 
San Manuel, Barona, Viejas, Soboba, Harrah's Rincon and Jackson. An additional five 
percent of the problem gamblers calling the helpline prefer to gamble in Nevada casinos. 
Thus casino gambling generates 82.5 percent of all problem gambling help line calls, 
making it the predominant venue for problem gambling in California. 205 
An analysis of the impact of a casino proposed by the Lytton Band ofPomo Indians for 
the city of San Pablo, with 2,500 slot machines and 100 gaming tables, estimated that it 
would create 10,341 new compulsive gamblers and 12,065 new problem gamblers, with 
associated costs to Contra Costa and Alameda counties of$54,899,128.206 
California gaming tribes support the state's Office of Problem Gambling, in the 
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs, through payments to the Special Distribution 
Fund. Funding for the Office is $3 million a year. The Office* was created by AB 673 
(Statutes of 2003) to develop a problem gambling prevention program consisting of a 
toll-free telephone number, public awareness campaigns, research, and training ofhealth 
care professionals and gambling industry personneL This effort is just getting underway. 
The state does not fund gambling treatment programs, in contrast to some other states 
with casino gambling. 
The California Council on Gambling estimates that the 3,399 callers who called in 2004 
for help with problem gambling had an average gambling-related debt of$32,461, and 
spent an average of$33,636 per year on gambling, resulting in a total of$45,745,199 
spent on gambling that year. We estimate later in the paper, using prevalence and cost 
data published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), that problem 
and pathological gamblers cost $1 billion a year in California. 
Many states have laws requiring commercial casinos to address pathological gambling. 
A review of California tribal casino websites finds that very few provide information 
• http://www.adp.ca.gov/OPG/OPGhome.shtml. 
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about problem/pathological gambling or have links to resources to help individuals who 
experience this serious problem. 
The most recent California tribal-state gaming compacts provide for tribes to negotiate 
written agreements with local jurisdictions including mitigation of gambling addiction. 
The 2005 amended 1999 compact with the Quechan tribe, which has not yet been ratified 
by the legislature, provides for the tribe to establish a self-exclusion program for patrons, 
and create signage and advertising to encourage responsible gambling. Data developed 
by the California Council on Problem Gambling finds that casino signs generate nearly 
half of all calls to the problem gambling help line, suggesting that this type of information 
marketing is importance. Friends and the Internet were the next more frequent sources of 
referral, at about seven percent each. 207 
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CALIFORNIA STATE LOTTERY 
BACKGROUND 
The drawing of lots--a lottery--may be the oldest game of chance. A lottery is "A contest 
in which tokens are distributed or sold, the winning token or tokens being secretly 
predetermined or ultimately selected in a random drawing." 208 Lotteries are based on the 
pari mutuel system of wagering, in which all the money bet is divided up among those 
who have winning tickets (after expenses and other deductions are made). The term 
"parier mutuel," meaning, "betting among ourselves," originated in France in the 19th 
century, and became known as "Paris mutuals" and then "pari mutuels" in England.209 
New Hampshire authorized the first state-run lottery, a sweepstakes based on the results 
of a horse race, in 1963. New York followed with monthly drawings in 1967, and in 
1969 New Jersey began to offer weekly state lottery games promoted by mass marketing 
that became the first modem successful lottery in the United States. By the year 2000, 
lotteries were operating in 37 states plus the District of Colombia. 
The California State Lottery Act, enacted by the voters by initiative in 1984, was passed 
by 58 percent. The initiative also amended the state Constitution to prohibit "casinos of 
the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey," and required that at least 34 
percent oflottery revenues go to public education. 210 
Lotteries are the most popular of all legal wagering games. A 2005 poll by The Luntz 
Research Companies found that 53 percent of American adults had purchased lottery 
tickets in the last year. The second largest group--35 percent-had visited a casino. In 
2002, the average Californian spent $77 on lotteries.211 
Figure 13 
Gambling Participation in Previous 12 Months by 
American Adults, 2005 
Lottery Casino Poker Horseracing 
Source: The Luntz Research Companies. 
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California's lottery currently offers a number of games: Super Lotto Plus, Daily 3, Daily 
Derby, Scratchers (including a bingo variation authorized by legislation in 2003), Big 
Spin, Fantasy 5, Hot Spot, and Mega Millions. The goal is to attract players by offering a 
variety of games with either quick or large jackpots. Information about all California 
State Lottery games is presented on the state's official website via links from the 
Lottery's site, but tickets must be purchased from authorized retailers in order to play. 
In 1996, the California Supreme Court ruled that the state lottery was not authorized to 
offer electronic keno, since keno is a banked game, pitting the state against the player and 
thus giving the state an interest in the outcome of each game, contrary to the state's 
constitutional restrictions on Nevada-style banked gaming (Western Telcon Inc. v. 
California State Lottery).212 
There are currently 18,500 retailers that sell lottery products in California under contract 
with the State Lottery. That number will increase to nearly 20,000 over the next six 
months as the Lottery seeks additional outlets for its games. Sales commissions range 
from four and one half percent to six percent. Retailers also receive cash bonuses for 
cashing winning tickets ranging from two percent of the prize value for a winning 
Scratchers ticket, to a half a percent of the jackpot prize for selling a top prize ticket such 
as for MEGA Millions or a SuperLOTTO Plus Jackpot winner.213 
The California State Lottery is operated and administered by the Lottery Commission, 
which is composed of five members appointed by the governor, and meets quarterly and 
as needed. The Lottery's Security Division and independent auditors maintain the 
integrity of the games. The Security Division conducts background checks on employees 
and vendors and monitors complaints against vendors. Retailers' contracts may be 
terminated for just cause, such as fraudulent activity. In general, however, the Lottery's 
primary motivation is to expand its vendor base and market, not decrease it through 
enforcement actions. 
COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND EXPANSION 
State lotteries compete with other forms of gambling for customers, so like other 
businesses, they must be innovative in order to maintain and gain market share. 
Preprogrammed instant scratch-offtickets were first introduced in Massachusetts in 1974, 
and are now offered in most states with lotteries. Instant ticket vending machines operate 
in 30 states. Some state lotteries offer subscription programs, allowing players to sign up 
in advance for drawings without having to go to a retailer to buy tickets. New games are 
regularly introduced by all lotteries. Competition for the gaming dollar worldwide is 
fierce: 
88 
... many lotteries around the world are worrying about generating revenues in a 
softening economy, fmding new channels of distribution, creating interesting new 
products, and enhancing public awareness of how lottery revenues benefit good 
causes.214 
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Video Lottery Terminals 
Some states allow video lottery terminals (VLTs), which are played like slot machines. 
By law, the California State Lottery does not operate VLTs. VLT revenues dwarf other 
lottery revenues in states where they are allowed to operate.215 The six states in which 
lotteries operate VLTs reported net machine income of$3.2 billion in FY 2004-05, an 
increase of 17 percent from the previous year. 
VLTs are run by lotteries in South Dakota, Oregon, New York, Delaware, Rhode Island, 
and West Virginia, by other state agencies in Montana, Indiana, Mississippi, Colorado, 
Illinois, and are authorized for operation by racetracks in Iowa, New Mexico, and 
Louisiana (see discussion of"racinos"). Maine and Pennsylvania expect to offer VLTs 
by the end of2006. New York has set a goal of one VLT for every 1,188 people.216 
South Dakota was the first state to offer VLTs in 1989, and now offers variations of 
poker, blackjack, keno, and bingo games. The private sector runs the South Dakota's 
VLT games to a significant degree, with the state serving more as a regulator than an 
operator. State administrative expenses consume only 0.5 percent of net machine 
income; 49.5 percent is deposited in the state's property tax reduction fund and 50 
percent goes to licensed operators. 217 
Multistate Games 
In 1985, the smaller states ofNew Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont began the first multi-
state lottery in order to compete against larger states with bigger prizes. In 1987, six 
states got together to offer Lotto America (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, West Virginia and the District of Columbia). The Multi-State Lottery Association 
(MUSL), which is now comprised of29 states (not including California), the District of 
Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands, currently runs six games, of which Powerball is 
the best known. The Powerball game is designed to sell about $2 billion a year or about 
17 percent of the total lottery sales of all its members; the amount contributed to total 
state sales varies from four to nearly 60 percent in different states.218 
Mega Millions is another large multistate lottery that currently includes 12 states: 
California, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, Texas, Virginia and Washington.* It began in 1996 as The Big Game with 
six states, and was given the name Mega Millions in 2002. Jackpots start at $12 million 
and can roll over to higher levels. The largest jackpot, of $363 million, occurred in 2002. 
The average jackpot in 2004 was $70 million. Smaller prizes range from $250,000 to $1 
million. Each play costs one dollar. 
With a combined population of over 150 million people in the 12 participating states, 
Mega "Nfillions jackpots attract attention that draws in more players. For example, in 
2004, the New York lottery's Mega Millions revenue increased by more than $100 
million, prompted in part by a $239 millionjackpot.219 According to the game's website, 
• Florida is the only state lottery not to participate in a multi-state game. 
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on average 35 percent of all Mega Millions ticket sales go to support government services 
in the member states, 50 percent is returned to players as prizes, five percent goes to 
retailers who sell tickets and ten percent is used for lottery administrative expenses.220 
California is the most recent state to join Mega Millions. Its 2005 entry resulted in 
considerable controversy, a lawsuit and pending legislation. The state entered into the 
multi-state game without legislative approval, which the legislative counsel opined was 
necessary, but with the Attorney General's approval.221 State law does not allow the 
lottery to have games in which prizes do not increase as ticket sales increase. Mega 
Millions jackpots increase with ticket sales, but eight other non-jackpot prizes are fixed. 
In order to enable California to enter the game, the other states agreed to let the 
California Lottery create its own non-jackpot prize levels.222 
Internet Lottery Games 
In other parts of the world, especially the European Union, government lotteries are 
going online, retailing their ticket games from web sites, interactive televisions and 
mobile phones, but not in the United States. This is because the federall961 Wire Act 
prohibits online gambling, although horse racing has since carved out an exemption (see 
Chapter on horse racing). 
Nonetheless, some states are developing Internet lottery games that are legal because the 
transactions do not actually occur on the Internet and the outcome is predetermined. In 
2004, the Kansas Lottery began offering an interactive Internet lottery game, eScratch, 
while New Jersey offered Cyber Slingo. Once a player has purchased a ticket for a given 
amount and number of plays, he/she can go to the website listed on the ticket to play the 
game. If they win, they must return to the retail establishment to claim their prize. 
Alternatively, they can ask the retailer to scan the ticket to determine if it is a winner.223 
However the real potential appears to be in allowing ticket sales on the Internet. 224 
Currently state and multi-state lotteries provide information about gambling opportunities 
on their websites, but do not offer direct access to gambling by allowing online purchase 
of tickets. However Internet technology is transforming lottery games: "Traditional 
online lottery systems are printing instant-win and extended-play instant games, and 
tickets bought at retail, either in a regular scratch format or as an online ticket voucher, 
have an Internet gaming component."225 
REVENUES 
State lotteries are the single largest contributor to state treasuries of any gambling 
industry, earning $15.7 billion in 2005 on gross gambling revenues of$47.6 billion 
(excluding VLTs )226• With thousands of retail outlets at the neighborhood level, state 
lotteries also have the most extensive system of distribution of any gambling industry. 
State lottery sales are significantly influenced by the top prize amount and the odds of 
winning it. States set prize amounts, the number of combinations, and the probabilities of 
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winning each prize, thereby determining the structure ofthe lottery and its games.227 
Multi-state games can offer larger prizes and attract more players. 
In 2003, the California State Lottery was ranked tenth in the world based on total sales of 
nearly $2.8 billion. The national lotteries of Japan, Spain, France, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom were in the top five spots, followed by the state lotteries of New York, 
Massachusetts, Texas, Florida, and California.228 In 2005, California lottery sales 
increased to $3.3 billion, resulting in gross revenues of$1.59 billion.229 
Efficiency in lottery operations is an important component in the amount of revenue 
returned to the state. Table 12 provides information on the California State Lottery's 
revenues and expenses for 2003 and 2004. 
Sales 
Table 12 
California State Lottery Revenue/Expense Analysis 
(2003 and 2004) 
2003 2004 
$2,781,569,856 $2,973,975,717 
Prizes $1,451,804,079 (52.2%) $1,566,027,494 (52.7%) 
Gross Revenue* $1,329,765,777 $1,407,948,223 
Operating Expenses** $362,342,273 $370,821,346 
Operating Income*** $967,423,504 $1,037,126,877 
Net to state government**** $1,019,816,972 $1,094,256,988 
Source: International Gaming & Wagering, June 2004, p. 28, and March 2005, p. 30, and the California 
State Lottery. 
*Total sales minus total prizes paid, or the net gaming revenue. 
**Current year expenses, including retailer commissions. 
***Net revenue from current year operations. 
****Includes current year operations and nonoperating items such as interest and investments. 
Table 13 examines the amount of revenue that each state lottery returned to state 
governments in 2004, and the per capita transfer amount adjusted for population. West 
Virginia, the state with the highest per capita transfer, benefited from its location as the 
only state offering VLTs in its geographical region. That strategy is not open to 
California, which placed 32nd out of 41 in this comparison. Many factors influence state 
lottery operations, making state-to-state comparisons difficult. These include 
demographic characteristics, product offerings, promotion and distribution methods, and 
the competitive environment_l30 
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Table 13 
State Lottery Returns to State Governments, 2004 
State 
'04 Transfer Transfer 
State 
'04 Transfer Transfer per 
in millions per capita in millions capita 
Arizona $107.8 $19.25 Missouri $230 $40.35 
California $1090 $30.70 Montana $58.2 $74.67 
Connecticut* $202.5 $44.02 Nebraska $20.8 $12.24 
District of Columbia $73.5 $122.50 New Hampshire $73.7 $56.69 
Delaware $222 $277.50 New Jersey $793 $92.21 
Florida $1051 $61.82 New Mexico* $193.7 $101.95 
Georgia $782 $89.89 New York $1890 $98.44 
Idaho $25 $17.86 Ohio $648.1 $56.85 
Illinois* $1239.7 $97.61 Oregon $364.7 $101.31 
Indiana* $942.1 $151.95 Pennsylvania $818.7 $66.02 
Iowa* $280.7 $96.79 Rhode Island $281 $255.45 
Kansas $70 $25.93 South Carolina $287 $70.00 
Kentucky $193.5 $47.20 South Dakota $115.5 $144.38 
Louisiana* $656.6 $145.91 Texas $1000 $45.25 
Maine $41.8 $32.15 Vermont $19.5 $32.50 
Maryland $458 $83.27 Virginia $408 $55.14 
Massachusetts $912 $142.50 Washington $117.6 $19.28 
Michigan $644.5 $63.81 West Virginia $512 $284.44 
Minnesota $100 $19.61 Wisconsin $154.89 $28.16 
*Return figure includes lottery and non-lottery-operated FY 2004 gaming machine return. 
Source: Public GaminR International, February 2005, p. 15. 
While the states with the largest per capita returns have VLTs, Massachusetts and the 
District of Columbia have achieved very high per capita returns without them. Returns 
are a function ofthe types of games that are legally allowed, degree of competition, 
efficiency of operations, and marketing effectiveness. Developing new content and 
widening distribution channels are key areas that drive growth. 
Differences in state lottery sales can partly be explained by the socioeconomic 
characteristics of state residents. National studies generally find that lottery sales are 
higher for individuals who belong to minority groups, have little or no formal education, 
are residents of urban areas, and are between 45 and 65 years old. 231 
Displacement Effect 
When consumers spend money on lottery tickets they spend less on other items, some of 
which would have been taxable. Thus general sales and excise tax revenues fall with 
additional lottery revenues. This is called a "displacement effect." 
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The amount of displacement found in different studies varies:232 
• A multistate analysis spanning the years 1953 to 1987 found that the displacement 
effect ranged from a two cent to a 14 cent reduction in sales tax revenue per one 
dollar increase in state lottery revenues. 
• The most recent multistate study, examining 1967 to 1999, found that sales tax 
revenues declined by $1.35 per $1 in additional lottery revenues, in part due to 
substitution of lottery purchases for taxable purchases and in part due to a reduced 
likelihood that a state will raise sales taxes when lottery revenues are high. 
There is also evidence of substitution of spending among games. Interstate lottery 
competition can reduce single state lottery sales, and the introduction of new lottery 
games reduces spending on traditional lottery games.233 
PUBLIC EDUCATION-CALIFORNIA'S STATE LOTTERY BENEFICIARY 
State lotteries transfer a portion of their revenues to states to help fund important 
programs such as education, economic development and natural resource programs. The 
beneficiaries of the revenues vary in each state. The California and New York lotteries 
provide funds for public education. The Pennsylvania lottery generates funds for older 
residents, contributing more than $14.6 billion since 1971 to elder programs that provide 
low-cost prescription drugs, specialized transportation, and rent and property tax 
assistance. 
By law, the California lottery must send a minimum of34 percent of revenues to schools, 
although over a 20 year period the average has been 37 percent due to unclaimed prizes 
and other savings. As of November 2004, the California Lottery had sent nearly $16 
billion to education during its 19 years of existence.234 Most ofthat funding 
($12,890,874,665) went to K-12 schools, as shown in Figure 14. The funds can be used 
only for instructional purposes. Schools spend the majority of funds, 80 to 90 percent, 
for teachers. 
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Figure 14 
California State Lottery Education Allocations 
(1985-2004) 
K-12 C. Colleges csu uc 
Source: California State Lottery, 2004. 
Other 
Total California state revenues in FY 2004-05 were $98.7 billion. Net lottery revenue 
contributed about one percent of that amount. 
The California State Lottery's contribution to state public education in FY 2003-04 was 
$1,094,601,888. That year the Governor's budget proposed to spend $35,900,000,000 on 
public education (K-12, higher education, other); lottery income contributed about three 
percent of that amount. 
Studies find that state lottery funds generally do not benefit the statutory recipients 
because equivalent funds are merely shifted into other programs. Several studies have 
examined the earmarking of lottery funds for education and found that" ... the state was 
robbing Peter to pay Paul," and that" .. .lottery revenues earmarked for education had no 
impact on education expen<litures.m35 According to a California school official, when 
districts first received lottery money the state simultaneously reduced funding nearly the 
same amount, making the deal a wash.236 Proposition 98, which was enacted four years 
after the lottery, sets a minimum level of school funding from the state's General Fund. 
Funds from the lottery are on top of that funding. 
CONSUMER IMPACT-PROBLEM GAMBLING 
A study published in 2002 found that the introduction of a state lottery results in 
increased household gambling expenditures and participation, and a decrease in 
nongambling expenditures by about two percent on average:237 
• Participation in lotteries among adults living in lottery states was 54.7 percent 
versus 25.2 percent in non-lottery states. 
• Lottery expenditures substituted away from other non-gambling consumption: 
"The introduction of a state lottery is associated with a decline of $115 per quarter 
in household non-gambling consumption." 
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• For low-income households, there was a larger $139 or three percent average 
quarterly reduction in non-gambling consumption, financed by reduced 
expenditures on food eaten in the home (3.1 percent) and home mortgage, rent 
and other bills (6.9 percent). 
As Table 14 shows, Blacks spent nearly twice as much on lottery tickets as did Whites 
and Hispanics. According to the study author, the Black male high-school dropouts in 
the sample reported average annual expenditures of over $1,000. Expenditures among 
income groups were roughly equivalent, meaning that low-income households spent a 
larger amount of their wealth on lottery tickets than other households. 
Table 14 
Lottery Participation Rates and Expenditures in Lottery States 
(1998 survey data adjusted to 2000 dollars) 
% Playing in the Mean annual spending, 
previous year all adults 
Overall 55.7% $128.4 
Male 51.8% $153.4 
Female 59.9% $105.3 
White 57% $119.3 
Black 46% $230 
Hispanic 61% $107.5 
Other 51.8% $81.8 
Household income less than $27,000 50.5% $139.5 
$27,000-$54,000 63% $127.1 
More than $54,000 62.9% $158.9 
High school drop out 54% $197.2 
High school graduate 57.3% $155.1 
Some college 58.8% $120 
College graduate 52% $86.7 
Source: 1998 National Survey on Gambling conducted by the National Opinion Research Council, as presented in 
Kearney, NBER Working Paper 9330. p. 31. 
A study in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that 3.6 percent of 
lottery patrons were problem gamblers and 5.2 percent were pathological gamblers (see 
the Chapter on Social Impacts for a discussion of problem and pathological gambling).238 
Lotteries appear to be a key entry point into this disorder, given their widespread and 
ready availability and state-sponsored legitimacy. 
An Oregon study reinforces this finding. An analysis of individuals in gambling 
treatment and prevention programs in the state found that nearly 70 percent gambled 
primarily at a lottery retailer near their home. The average gambling debt was $22,840, 
and the average annual household income was $36,246.239 Oregon has video lottery 
terminals (VLTs), which are prohibited by law in California. VLTs have been called "the 
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most addictive form of gambling in history," because they create pathological addiction 
nearly four times faster than other popular games of chance.240 
Adolescents who gamble are more likely to develop problem and pathological gambling 
problems. Studies find that underage youth have little difficulty in purchasing lottery 
tickets. One study found that 90 percent of young people in the United States had 
purchased lottery tickets by the time they were seniors in high schoot241 An Oregon 
study of 13 to 17 year olds found that 39 percent had played the Oregon Lottery at least 
once, 30 percent within the last year. Over a third of those bought their tickets illegally at 
grocery and convenience stores.242 
Figure 15 shows the types of gambling that adolescents had engaged in during the 
previous year, as measured in 1999, according to a survey conducted by the National 
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. More minors played the lottery 
than any other game. 
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Given that lotteries are the entry point into problem gambling for many adolescents, the 
enforcement of California's prohibition against the purchase of lottery tickets by minors 
is important. Government Code § 8880.52 provides that: 
No tickets or shares in Lottery Games shall be sold to persons under the age of 18 
years. Any person who knowingly sells a ticket or share in a Lottery Game to a 
person under the age of 18 years is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person under 
the age of 18 years who buys a ticket or share in a Lottery is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. In the case of lottery tickets or shares sold by Lottery Game 
Retailers or their employees, these persons shall establish safeguards to assure 
that the sales are not made to persons under the age of 18 years. 
There appears to be very limited enforcement of California's laws against the purchase of 
lottery tickets by persons under the age of 18. The State Lottery's investigations unit 
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relies on complaints and self-regulation by retailers, and does not undertake stings to 
locate retailers who sell to underage customers. This type of enforcement has proven to 
be critical to enforcing laws against underage purchase of alcohol and tobacco. In the last 
five years, no retailer in California has had its contract with the State Lottery terminated 
because of sales to underage players. Although state law provides that underage players 
may not collect winnings, as a practical matter anyone can redeem a ticket that pays 
under $500 at the retailer. 243 
Lottery advertising is controversial, as it represents state government actively promoting 
gambling. The National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that ads that are 
persuasive, manipulative, or misleading (i.e. not explaining the poor odds of winning) are 
particularly troublesome when targeted towards groups least able to afford to play. A 
few states ban lottery ads designed to induce people to play.244 
Some state lottery websites prominently display a link to information about problem 
gambling, including how to identify a problem, links to Gamblers Anonymous and a toll-
free help line number. In contrast, a small-type grey link at the bottom of the California 
Lottery's website is entitled "Play Responsibly." While not featured prominently, it 
contains useful information about problem gambling and provides links to the Lottery's 
help line, the California Council on Problem Gambling, NICOS Chinese Health Coalition 
and other service providers. The California Lottery website does not include information 
indicating that adolescents should not play. 
The California Lottery contracts with the California Council on Problem Gambling to 
respond to calls to its helpline. In 2004, 3,399 calls for help with problem gambling were 
made to the helpline, predominantly from people who prefer casino gambling (82 
percent). Nearly 41 percent of the callers played the lottery, but the lottery was the 
referral source of only about two percent of the calls.245 In contrast, casinos signs were 
the referral source of nearly half of all calls. This suggests that the lottery is not 
providing a strong message about where to find assistance with problem gambling. The 
lottery does distribute pamphlets to its retail outlets, but a visit to several retailers 
indicates that they are not being distributed effectively. 
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CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING 
BACKGROUND 
Horseracing has a long history in California. The Californians, inheritors of a proud 
tradition from Spain and Mexico, were renowned horsemen and regularly held races on 
Sundays for entertainment and wagering. After California became a state, organized 
racing was conducted at district fairs. In addition, many communities had local horse 
race tracks. Horses were the primary means oftransportation, and races were analogous 
in popularity to today's car racing. 
During the Great Depression, the need for state revenues and for a stable source of 
support for county fairs led to the adoption of state-regulated horse racing and wagering. 
The California Horse Racing Act of 1933 was ratified by the voters in 1933, and Article 
IV, Section 19(b) was added to the state Constitution: 
The Legislature may provide for the regulation of horse races and horse race 
meetings and wagering on the results. 
The California Horse Racing Act provides for a California Horse Racing Board to 
oversee the industry, " ... with the goal of protecting the public from fraud, promoting 
California agriculture and quality racehorse breeding, and encouraging expansion of the 
racing industry to maximize tax revenues in the public interest."246 The board is charged 
with maintaining the integrity of the races, ensuring that the state and local jurisdictions 
receive tax revenues, overseeing the licensing of tracks and operators, and preventing 
cnme. 
Several of the state's major racetracks were created in the 1930s, including Santa Anita 
(1934), Hollywood Park (1938) and Bay Meadows (1934). The late 1930s through the 
early 1980s was horse racing's "golden era," including the much celebrated Seabiscuit. 
Attendance in 1972 at the tracks nationally was triple that of baseball, 72 million 
people.247 However over the last decade, attendance has declined considerably both 
nationally and in the state (see discussion below). 
Horseracing uses the pari-mutuel system of wagering, in which bettors bet against one 
another instead of against the house. The money bet on a race is pooled, with 
approximately 80 percent returned to the winning bettors and 20 percent paid out to 
jockeys and horse owners, the racetrack, and state and local governments. 
The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on California's Horse-Racing Industry 
reports that the sport generates over $4 billion a year for the state's agribusiness, tourism, 
and entertainment economies and directly or indirectly employs more than 52,500 
Californians. The California Horse Racing Board licenses nearly 14,000 individuals who 
work in the industry (trainers, jockeys, etc.). More than 1,000 farms in California breed 
racehorses. 248 
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CALIFORNIA RACE TRACKS 
The state has seven licensed racetracks (although Bay Meadows will close soon) and nine 
licensed racing series at county fairs, as shown in Table 15. 
Table 15 
California Horse Racing Venues, 2005 
Race Tracks Racine Fairs 
Bay Meadows (San Mateo }-scheduled to Alameda County Fair 
close and be replaced by housing 
Cal Expo (Sacramento) California State Fair, Sacramento 
Del Mar (Del Mar) Humboldt County Fair 
Golden Gate (Albany) Los Angeles County Fair 
Hollywood Park (Inglewood) San Joaquin Fair 
Los Alamitos (Los Alamitos) San Mateo County Fair 
Santa Anita (Arcadia) Solano County Fair 
Sonoma County Fair 
The Big Fresno Fair 
Source: California Horse Racing Board, www.chrb.ca.gov. 
A person does not have to be at tracks to wager on the results of the race. Simulcast 
facilities where races may be viewed and bets placed are located around the state at the 
following locations: 
Alameda County Fair, Antelope Valley Fair, Barona Casino, Bay Meadows Race 
Track, CalExpo (Sacramento), Desert Expocentre (Indio), Earl Warren 
Showgrounds (Santa Barbara), Fantasy Spring Casino, Fresno Club One, Fresno 
District Fairground, Hollywood Park Race Track, Kern County Fair, Lake Perris 
Sports Pavilion, Los Alamitos Race Course, Los Angeles County Fair, Los 
Angeles Turf Club, Monterey County Fair, National Orange Show (San 
Bernardino), Pacific Racing Association (Albany), Redwood Acres Fair (Eureka), 
San Bernardino County Fair, San Joaquin Fair, Santa Clara County Fair, Santa 
Anita Race Track, Santa Barbara County Fair, Shasta District Fair, Sonoma 
County Fair, Solano County Fair, Stanislaus County Fair, Surfside Race Place 
(Del Mar), Sycuan Casino, Tulare County Fair, Ventura County Fair, Viejas 
Casino & Turf Club 
California's horse racing industry, like its counterparts nationally has experienced 
declining attendance for the better part of a decade. From a 28 percent share of 
America's gambling market in 1982, horse racing declined to a 5.2 percent share in 2000, 
the" ... victim of shifts in consumer preference ... from the track window to the slot 
machine."249 Since 1990, attendance at California racetracks has declined by 35 percent 
and on-track handle has decreased by 59 percent. There were 938 horse racing days in 
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California in 2004, with an average daily attendance of9,540 and an average daily 
handle* of more than four million dollars.250 The 2005 attendance and handle numbers at 
the CalExpo spring harness meet were down more than 25 percent from the previous 
year. 2s1 
The growth is in off-track and Internet betting. According to analysts, "Without off-track 
betting and simulcasting, horse racing as we know it today would not exist." 252 Off-track 
betting at simulcast locations generated $13.1 billion nationally in 2001, 82 percent ofthe 
industry total. Off-track handle now accounts for nearly three quarters of wagering on 
California horse races and is increasing rapidly, particularly for Advance Deposit 
Wagering (see discussion). Wagers actually made at the state's racetracks account for 
less than 22 percent of total wagers. Off-track betting in the state's simulcast facilities 
accounts for nearly 40 percent, with out-of-state wagers nearly as significant, at 38 
percent.253 Competition from offshore Internet betting services that offer a wider 
selection of betting options at lower prices is one reason for declining track revenues. 254 
California's horse racing industry is consolidating. Magna Entertainment Corporation 
operates Santa Anita Park and Golden Gate Fields. In August 2005, the California Horse 
Racing Board approved the purchase of Hollywood Park by the owner-operator of Bay 
Meadows. Bay Meadows will close and be replaced by housing. 
ACCOUNT WAGERING 
In 2001, Governor Gray Davis signed a bill (AB 471 Hertzberg, Chapter 198, Statutes of 
2001) to permit in-state Internet and telephone gambling on authorized horse races, and 
allowing California-licensed operators to accept bets from people in any state that 
authorizes interstate betting. This is called "advance deposit wagering" (ADW). 
According to I. Nelson Rose, a leading authority on gambling law, this may have been 
" ... the second largest expansion oflegal gambling in the history of the United States." 
(According to Rose, the largest expansion was California's authorization of Indian 
gaming in 2000).255 
California's entrance into long distance electronic gambling on horse races followed 
Congress' 2000 expansion of the Interstate Horseracing Act to allow wagers across state 
lines by phone or other electronic media, which presumably includes the Internet (15 
U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007). The Act governs the relationship between the off-track betting 
operators, " .. .licensed Internet and interactive television horserace betting services, the 
tracks, the horse owners and trainers, and the state racing commissions concerning 
wagers placed in one state on the outcome of races being held in another state."256 The 
state where the bettor is located and the state where the "off-track betting operator" is 
located must both have authorized interstate betting. Twelve states have authorized the 
acceptance of ADW over the Internet for off-track pari-mutuel wagering. 
The California Horse Racing Board is the state's lead agency responsible for adopting 
regulations and approving all arrangements involving ADW. From the California Horse 
• "Handle" is the sum of wagers (or "pari-mutuel pool") made on a race. 
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Racing Board's state website, one can directly access three authorized ADW companies: 
XpressBet, youbet.com and TVG. XpressBet enables betting on horse races in England 
and Australia, creating a state-licensed international Internet gambling opportunity. 
Conversely, bettors in other countries can bet on California horse races. For example, 
Darwin All Sports, an account wagering system based in Australia, has an agreement that 
allows it to merge its wagers into California pari-mutuel pools. California's total ADW 
handle increased by more than $89 million from 2003 to 2004 (about 28 percent), to $403 
million, and has increased 37 percent in 2005 over the previous year for three fair meets 
(Sonoma, San Mateo, and Humboldt).257 
Internet gambling on horse races outside of the established state-regulated wagering 
systems is increasing at a rapid rate. Offshore Internet gambling sites may offer higher 
return rates, as they do not need to make payments to jockeys, owners, tracks or state and 
local governments. This hurts the horse racing industry, which needs the income 
provided by state-regulated pari-mutuel wagering to survive. 
Federal legislation introduced by Senator Kyl (R-AZ) in 1998 and 1999, and again 2005, 
would prohibit all wagering over the Internet, including for horse racing. The immediate 
impetus is a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision involving a dispute between the 
United States and Antigua over Antigua's attempt to secure rights to host Internet casinos 
serving U.S. residents. 258 A WTO appeals panel decision in April2005, found that the 
entire U.S. gambling service sector was covered by the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and thus the ability oflocal, state and federal governments to regulate 
all forms of gambling was limited by the rules of GATS. The WTO ruling found that the 
government does have the right to restrict remote gambling to protect public morals and 
public order, but must consistently apply restrictions to domestic and foreign operations. 
The fact that the United States allows an exemption for ADW on horse races over the 
Internet weakens the U.S. position. 
REGULATION 
The California Horse Racing Board is composed of seven members appointed by the 
governor. Its purpose: 
.. .is to regulate pari-mutuel wagering for the protection of the betting public, to 
promote horse racing and breeding industries, and to maximize State of California 
tax revenues ... Principal activities of the board include: protecting the betting 
public; licensing of racing associations; sanctioning of every person who 
participates in any phase of horse racing; designating racing days and charity days; 
acting as a quasi-judicial body in matters pertaining to horse racing meets; 
collecting the state's lawful share of revenue derived from horse racing meets; and 
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to horse racing in California. 259 
The board is financed by horse racing fees (nearly $8.5 million in 2005-06). Judging 
from the board's agendas, it spends a considerable amount of time creating and enforcing 
safety standards and investigating and fining violators. Drug abuse is a particular 
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concern. Equine research at the University of California, Davis, receives a share of the 
pari-mutuel tax (.06 percent in 2003 and 2004), amounting to $2,183,975 in 2004, for 
research and for the equine analytical chemistry laboratory which carries out the board's 
drug testing programs. 
The board delegates its enforcement responsibility at each track to three stewards, who it 
licenses, and they serve as judges in determining legal violations. Stewards can" .. .level 
fines, suspend licenses, bar individuals from the track, and suspend horses from racing. 
They determine the official results of races, and can order the redistribution ofpurses."260 
Their decisions can be appealed to the board. 
RACINOS 
Over the last decade, the horse racing industry has experienced declining attendance and 
increased competition from other forms of legalized gambling, primarily lotteries and 
casinos: "The [horse racing] industry was taking a real beating when lotteries and 
commercial casinos were introduced ... "261 The response in some jurisdictions has been 
to allow other types of gambling at the tracks, resulting in "racinos"-- "racing" plus 
"casino." 
According to the American Gaming Association, the racetrack casino sector of the 
commercial gaming industry experienced substantial growth in 2004: "The 23 
operational racetrack casinos in seven states generated nearly $2.9 billion in gross 
gaming revenues, a 30 percent increase over 2003 figures."262 
Table 16 
Racetrack Casino State Statistics, 2004 
State #Racetrack Gross gaming Distribution to Number of 
casinos revenue state and local employees 
government 
Delaware 3 $553.32 million $196.26 million 2,370 
Iowa 3 $337.48 million $98.31 million 2,207 
Louisiana 3 $280.97 million $42.6 million 1,856 
New Mexico 5 $149.68 million $37.42 million 518 
New York 4 $192.45 million $136.64 million 1,813 
Rhode Island 2 $383.8 million $234.1 million 1,057 
West Virginia 4 $882.4 million $327.63 million 4,404 
Total 24 $2.86 billion $1.07 billion 14,225 
Source: American Gaming Association, 2006 
In California, Hollywood Park in Los Angeles operates the third largest card club in the 
state. Minnesota permits card games at racetracks, with limitations on the types of 
games, amount of wagers and number of tables. A number of states have considered 
allowing expanded gambling operations at racetracks. A proposal to do so was opposed 
by tribal gambling interests and defeated by California voters in November 2004. In 
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some other states, tribes are buying racetracks and/or operating casino facilities at 
racetracks (Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Minnesota among others). 
In the mid-1990s, video lottery terminals were allowed at racetracks in Rhode Island, 
Oregon, Louisiana, Delaware, and New Mexico. They have been very profitable. For 
example, in FY 2004-05, the West Virginia Lottery's racetrack VLT net machine income 
totaled $894.5 million, up 4.6 percent from the previous year.263 
In 2004, New York began implementing a video gaming system in eight of its racetracks, 
and similar legislation has been introduced in a number of states. The first New York 
racino to open was Saratoga Gaming and Raceway, with 1,324 video gaming machines. 
In the facility's first month of operation, it earned $5.1 million from $81 million in 
wagers, of which the state received $3.7 million. During that month, video gaming 
machines averaged more than $11,500 per hour in revenues, generating approximately 
$185,000 per day.264 Two ofthe New York racinos being planned will house 4,500 and 
5,500 VLT machines each. In addition, Governor Pataki has proposed authorizing eight 
additional facilities, with the only restriction being that they are not located within 15 
miles of an existing facility (not necessarily at a racetrack). 
Other states allow slot machines at racetracks. Their revenues are subsidizing the racing 
side of the house. For example, New Mexico's horseracing industry was "on the verge of 
collapse" when the legislature approved slot machines at the tracks (as part of tribal-state 
gaming compacts). Revenues from slot machines have led to facility improvements and 
bigger horse racing purses. However slot machine players generally do not convert to 
racing enthusiasts. 265 
Slot machines draw recreational gamblers to the tracks, but there seems to be very little 
crossover between the trackside and the gaming side. Nonetheless, racing revenue is also 
rising. The additional traffic and revenue have allowed for stronger racing programs and 
facility upgrades, leading to larger purses, higher horse sales and growth in the breeding 
industry, according to observations drawn from racinos in Ontario, Canada, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Texas and New Mexico.266 
REVENUES 
According to the California Horse Racing Board's most recent annual report, $4.1 billion 
was wagered on California horse racing during the 2004-05 fiscal year (FY), $138 
million less than in FY 2002-03. Payments of over $3.3 billion were returned to holders 
ofwinning tickets, an 80.1 percent return.267 The remaining nearly 20 percent supported 
purses for winning owners and jockeys, racetrack commissions, off-track betting 
operations and taxes. In 2004, the state received $39.5 million in licensing fees and 
breakage* (1.03 percent), local governments retained more than $7 million (0.19 percent), 
the tracks kept $153 million (four percent), and horsemen earned $149 million (four 
percent). 268 
• "Breakage" is the odd cents not paid to winning ticket holders. 
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In FY 1999-2000, the state received $44 million from wagering on California horse races, 
($4.5 million more than in FY 2004-05), of which $37.5 million went to the Fair and 
Exposition Fund and $4.5 million to the General Fund. Donations to local charities from 
legally required benefits races totaled more than $1 million.269 (Most charity proceeds are 
directed to equine-related charities.) 
County Fairs 
Horse racing license fees help support the state's 79local fairs. 270 The Department of 
Food & Agriculture's 2005/06 Expenditure Plan for the Fair and Exposition Fund and 
Satellite Wagering Account projected a slight increase in horse racing fees to result in 
over $39 million in revenues. Nearly $8.5 million of that amount funds the California 
Horse Racing Board, and the department receives over $4 million for its support of the 
state's fairs and expositions. About $26.3 million is allocated for local assistance, of 
which $14.8 million is for general fair programs and funding. Once various 
reimbursements and fees are subtracted, the local fair revenue base was $9.7 million.271 
Given that there were 79 fairs scheduled in California in 2005, the average payment per 
fair from horse racing fees was less than $125,000. 
According to the Department, county fair economic activity results in more than $136 
million in direct state and local income from sales, income and other tax sources and 
28,000 jobs, with a total statewide economic impact of $2.5 billion.272 
SOCIAL IMP ACT 
Race betting has the fewest players relative to other forms of legal gambling, but a 2001 
survey found that each player represents substantially more revenue. Race bettors spent 
an average of$171 per month compared to casino ($164), lottery ($95) and bingo players 
($104). 273 
Studies find that adults who bet on horse racing (both on and off-track) have the highest 
incidence of problem and pathological gambling of any gambling patrons. Fourteen 
percent of pari-mutuel bettors are estimated to be problem gamblers and 25 percent are 
pathological gamblers.274 The California Horse Racing Board does not have any 
programs designed to assist people with gambling problems and seems to provide state-
sanctioned encouragement for gambling (for example their web site links directly to sites 
that offer online account deposit wagering on horse races--see 
http://www.chrb.ca.gov/advance deposit wagering.htm). 
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CALIFORNIA'S CARD CLUBS 
BACKGROUND 
Card clubs (also called cardrooms) have existed in California since before statehood. 
They were a particularly popular form of entertainment during the Gold Rush, when 
gambling was pervasive. However in 1860, all house-banked games (meaning that each 
player wagers money against the gambling establishment) were prohibited by the 
legislature. From the 1860s through the 1980s, the poker club, or cardroom, was the 
major form of gambling in the state, with the house acting as a neutral overseer of the 
games.275 The clubs were regulated at the local level with minimal state oversight. 
Rather than having a stake in the game (house banked) and taking a percentage of the 
wager, California card clubs provide a house dealer and charge a player participation fee 
by time period (generally every half hour) or by hand played. Third party players are 
paid by a card club or an independent business to play in the games, usually to start a new 
game or keep a shorthanded game going. 
Card clubs are limited in the types of games that they can offer by the California 
Constitution, which reserves house-banked Nevada-style casino games for casinos 
operated by tribes that have federally-approved tribal-state gaming compacts. 
As of July 2005, there were 98 licensed card clubs and four clubs with provisional 
licenses in California (one has since received a regular license, according to the state 
Department of Justice; see Table 17); in February 2006, there were 86 licensed card 
clubs. In contrast, in 2001, the state had 113 card clubs with 1,473 tables. The industry 
is consolidating but business is booming; the number of tables had increased to 1,515 in 
July 2005, primarily due to the popularity of poker. Some clubs are open 24 hours, with 
people waiting in line to play poker.276 
Cardroom revenues statewide have increased by nearly 75 percent over the last eight 
years (see Figure 17). Revenues in the five cardroom states--California, Florida, 
Minnesota, Montana and Washington-rose from $844 million in 2003 to $1.01 billion in 
2004.277 
Many card clubs are small businesses but a few are quite large (see Table 17). The 
Hollywood Park Casino in Inglewood is co-located with a racetrack. It offers a variety of 
games 24 hours a day and is the most profitable of Hollywood Park's divisions. The 
Hawaiian Gardens Casino has 180 tables and 1,675 employees, with yearly revenues of 
$85 million. 
The state currently has a moratorium on the authorization and expansion of cardrooms 
until 201 0, which does not allow local jurisdiction to expand gaming beyond that 
permitted on January 1, 1996 (Business and Professions Code §19962). However a 
number of local ordinances in effect as of that deadline already allowed for considerable 
expansion, and in addition state law allows expansion of up to 25 percent in the number 
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oflicensed cardrooms, gambling tables (total and per card room), hours of operation and 
in the maximum wager over the limits imposed in 1996 by a city or county (Business and 
Professions Code§ 19961). Thus in actuality state law allows for considerable cardroom 
expansion. For example, according to press accounts the Hawaiian Gardens Casino is 
expanding from five tables in 1997 to a planned 300 tables by the end of the year.278 
POKER 
Poker is the most widely known card game and in its various formats is played more than 
any other game. Its popularity has increased considerably and has brought new 
customers to the state's card rooms, drawn by televised tournaments of Texas Hold'Em. 
According to the American Gaming Association, 18 percent of American adults played 
poker in 2004, a 50 percent increase over the previous year. Poker draws in younger 
players, ages 21 through 39, who also provide incremental revenue at other table games, 
as well as purchasing food and beverages. 
Some forms of poker are house-banked and can be offered only by tribal casinos in 
California, including blackjack, craps (with cards, not dice), baccarat, Caribbean Stud 
Poker, Let It Ride, Spanish 21, Three Card Poker, and Pai Gow poker. New games are 
introduced regularly, with the most successful being variations on blackjack or poker that 
offer larger jackpots.279 
Poker tournaments have become very popular. The California Gambling Control 
Commission recently clarified that both state and local city approval must be obtained by 
a card room before the number of tables, which is set by licensing regulations, can be 
expanded to accommodate a tournament. The Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) Board 
followed with an Industry Advisory that ABC-licensed premises cannot hold, or allow 
anyone else to hold, unlicensed poker tournaments. 
Online poker does not have these restrictions and offers cheaper fees. One analyst asserts 
that online poker is having the effect on card rooms that ''Napster" had on the music 
industry-widespread low or no cost access that bypasses traditional retailers.280 
SHARED STATE AND LOCAL CONTROL 
In 1997, the legislature enacted the California Gambling Act, which among other things 
created the Division of Gambling Control in the Department of Justice and the California 
Gambling Control Commission, an independent agency with quasi-judicial powers and 
five members appointed by the governor. The Act established a concurrent state 
regulatory jurisdiction with local governments over cardrooms and created uniform 
statewide minimum regulatory standards. Local governments may enact more stringent 
controls by local ordinance on matters such as size, location, hours of operation, security, 
and wagering limits. 
The state administers a comprehensive licensing and registration system for cardrooms, 
their key employees, and work permit holders. The Division and the Commission are 
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jointly responsible for ensuring that card club licenses, approvals, and permits are not 
issued to unqualified or disqualified persons. The Division investigates the background 
of applicants for gambling licenses, including owners, directors, employees and vendors, 
and forwards its findings to the Commission, which issues licenses. The Division also 
monitors the conduct of licensees, regulates accounting and internal controls, reviews and 
approves gaming equipment and rules of the games, investigates suspected violations and 
complaints, and initiates disciplinary actions.281 
Since 1984, when state licensing by the Department of Justice began, 304 applications for 
card club licenses have been approved, 123 were denied, 49 were revoked, and two have 
been surrendered. Key employees must also be licensed. There are currently 254 
licensed key card room employees. Since 1984, 43 applications for key employee 
licenses have been denied and four were revoked. Many more have been withdrawn. 
Third party providers of proposition player services run a business in which a player is 
paid by a card club or an independent business to play in the games, usually to start a new 
game or keep a shorthanded game going. For example, Network Management Group, 
Inc., bills itself as the largest provider of third-party proposition player services in the 
California gambling industry, employing more than 650 associates in over a dozen card 
rooms.282 
Contracts for proposition player services must be approved in advance by the Division of 
Gambling Control, and businesses that utilize the services must register with the 
California Gambling Control Commission. Some clubs do not have contracts with third 
parties, but have banking businesses that may register with the Gambling Control 
Commission on a voluntary basis. The goal is to protect patrons from money laundering, 
loan sharking, * and organized crime. According to the Division, although many card 
rooms have these businesses on their premises, only about 25 are registered. It would 
require an investigation to locate the other businesses, and the Division does not have 
sufficient resources to uncover them. 283 
Both the Division and the Commission are special funded by fees. All applications for 
state card club licenses include a nomefundable fee of$500. Card clubs pay licensing 
fees set in statute in 1998 (Business & Professions Code § 19951 ). Fee revenue is less 
now than in 1998, when inflation is taken into account. Cardroom revenues have 
increased by nearly 75 percent since that time. 
• A club with one to five tables pays $250 for each table. 
• A club with five to eight tables, or earning $200,000 to $499,999 in gross 
revenues, pays $450 per table. 
• Clubs with nine to 14 tables, or earning $500,000 to $1,999,999 in gross revenues, 
pay $1,050 for each table. 
• Loan sharking is the practice oflending money to heavy gamblers at extremely high interest rates, 
making it difficult for the gambler to ever pay off the debt. As a consequence, the gambler may fall under 
the control of the loan sharking operation. 
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• Clubs with 15 to 25 tables, or earning $2 million to $9,999,999 in gross revenues, 
pay $2,150 per table. 
• Clubs with 26 to 70 tables, or earning ten million dollars or more in gross 
revenues, pay $3,200 per table. 
• Clubs with 71 or more tables pay $3,700 for each table. 
As shown in Figure 16, fees paid by California cardrooms to the state have not increased 
appreciably for six years ("other revenues" on the chart include application fees, 
background deposits and initial license fees). Since fees are intended to support the 
state's regulatory operations, low fees impede the ability of the state to enforce its 
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REVENUES AND TAXES 
A 1995 survey found that California card clubs are the largest in the nation, with a total 
handle (wagering total) of$8.9 million and gross revenues of$711 million.284 According 
to the American Gaming Association, California cardrooms earned $688 million in 2003, 
an increase from $563 million in 2002, fueled by the popularity of poker and other table 
games.285 The gross gaming revenues reported by cardrooms to the Division of Gambling 
Control are shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 














The state does not tax cardrooms, although they pay licensing fees as described above, 
but local governments may negotiate a tax, typically on the table fees collected by the 
cardrooms. These can be very lucrative sources of revenue. For example, the Lake 
Elsinore Hotel & Casino pays a gaming fee of more than $74,000 a year for 18 table 
games, as well as property, sales, and hotel-room taxes.286 
Some cities are particularly dependent on card room revenues as a major source of 
municipal funds. Cities such as Commerce, Bell Gardens, Colma, Hawaiian Gardens, 
Gardena, and San Pablo depend on local cardrooms for a significant portion of their 
income. This dependence has niised questions as to whether these cities can adequately 
regulate club operations, as they are in essence a "municipal partner."287 
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In 2005, the small town of Colma's ordinance allowing unlimited card betting was 
declared illegal by the Attorney General as a violation of the state's moratorium on card 
club expansion, a finding that reportedly could cost the city half of the $3.8 million in 
fees that the Lucky Chances Casino generates for the town each year. 288 The California 
Gambling Control Division subsequently ordered Lucky Chances Casino to halt 
unlimited card betting. The casino's owner is advocating removing the betting cap via a 
local ordinance and state legislation. (He was recently indicted for allegedly diverting 
card room money and owing nearly $1 million in taxes.Y89 
The Colma dispute over wagering limits has raised a larger issue, as some 30 local 
jurisdictions apparently do not comply with the state's moratorium on card club 
expansion. The result is a patchwork of wagering limits in different jurisdictions and 
clubs that may create a competitive disadvantage for some card clubs.290 
CRIME 
Gambling in card clubs has been associated with a number of crimes including 
embezzlement, bookmaking, loan sharking, money laundering, criminal gangs, job 
selling, prostitution, cheating and gambling by minors. For example, in 2000, 55 people 
were indicted in connection with alleged illegal activity at the Bay 101 and Garden City 
cardrooms in San Jose. Testimony before the grand jury described loan-sharking, drug 
sales, credit-card and check fraud, and buying stolen computer chips, all of which were 
alleged to have taken place on a routine basis.291 
Proposals to allow or expand local card clubs can be extremely contentious, particularly 
since most are located in urban areas. For example, some members of the Vietnamese-
American community in San Jose have been vocal in their opposition to the city's two 
cardrooms, which they claim have exploited gambling addiction in the Vietnamese 
community and led to increased crime, domestic violence and child neglect.292 In 2000, 
San Jose's two cardrooms produced $7.5 million in tax revenue, based on a 13 percent 
tax on gross receipts. Asian games provide about 70 percent of the clubs' combined 
revenues. 
Gambling by minors in card clubs is particularly problematic given the popularity of 
youth poker and its role as a gateway to adolescent problem gambling. Gambling by 
minors is also illegal. According to Division of Gambling Control's records, only one 
cardroom has been cited for minor gambling but pled guilty to having a minor on the 
premises, a lesser charge. Three other cardrooms have received violation notices for 
having a minor on premises. A Division investigator contends, ''I'm sure more is 
occurring out there. We just do not have the staff to be on site in the cardrooms as much 
as we would like."293 Local governments are also responsible for enforcing gambling 
laws in cardrooms. 
Cardrooms are subject to the Federal Bank Secrecy Act and must track cash buy-ins and 
cash-outs at the gaming tables, and report all transactions in excess of $10,000 in any 
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gambling day to the IRS. The IRS has audit and investigation authority for compliance 
purposes. 
OWNERSIDP 
State law prohibits California card club proprietors from owning an interest in out-of-
state gambling operations that would be illegal under California law, with the exception 
of companies that own racetracks. Since slot machines are illegal (except in Indian 
casinos), companies that are engaged in casino operations legal in other states may not 
operate a card club in California. State law also requires that every owner, director and 
key employee be licensed, including shareholders of corporations, effectively excluding 
most publicly owned companies from operating card clubs. Over the last five years, 
several bills have been introduced in the legislature to remove one or both of these 
prohibitions, but they have either been defeated or vetoed. 
According to the Little Hoover Commission, these prohibitions were enacted as attempts 
to keep organized crime out ofCalifornia.294 However publicly traded gambling 
companies with good reputations now dominate the gambling market and even manage 
casinos for California Indian gaming tribes. The Commission concludes that state's card 
club ownership prohibitions are not necessary to protect the public against criminal 
activities and are " ... an anachronistic attempt to protect public safety."295 The 
prohibitions do have the effect of limiting the capital resources available to card clubs 
and thus restricting their expansion, a goal of anti-gambling forces and other competitors 
in the gaming industry such as tribal casinos. 
LOCATIONS 
Of the state's 58 counties, 24 do not have any card rooms and 13 only have one card 
room. Los Angeles County has over half the licensed tables in the state, while the city of 
Sacramento has the most card rooms of any city. The size and location of card rooms 
varies considerably, as Table 17 shows (updated lists can be found at 
http://www .cgcc.ca.gov /cardrooms/CardRoomData.htm). 




























Napa Valley Casino 
Kelly's 
Nineteenth Hole, The 
Outlaws Bar & Grill 
Dealer's Choice Cardroom 
Golden West Casino 
Bell Gardens Bicycle Club 
Bruce's Casino 
Cibola Club 
Black Sheep Casino 
Old Cayucos Tavern 
Angie's Poker Club 
Village Club 
Lucky Derby Casino 
Phoenix Lounge Casino 
Clovis 500 Club 
Commerce Casino 
Crystal Park Casino 
Table 17 
California Card Clubs by City, December 2005 
No. of 
Club Address City 
Tables 
8 3466 Broadway American Canyon 
6 408 "0" St. Antioch 
5 2746 W. Tregallas Antioch 
2 9850 E. Front Rd. Atascadero 
3 13483 Bowman Rd. Auburn 
25 1001 S. Union Ave. Bakersfield 
170 7301 Eastern Ave. Bell Gardens 
1 116 S. Main Blythe 
1 138 N. Main Blythe 
2 3181 Cameron Park Dr., # 1 08 Cameron Park 
2 130 N. Ocean Ave. Cayucos 
3 114 W. 15th St. Chico 
12 429 Broadway Chula Vista 
7 7433 Greenback Lane, Ste. C Citrus Heights 
7 5948 Auburn Blvd. Citrus Heights 
6 500 Clovis Ave. Clovis 
243 6131 E. Telegraph Rd. Commerce 





94589 12/01/04 11/30/05 
94509 08/01105 02/28/06 
94509 10/01105 09/30/06 
93423 12/01/04 07/31/06 
95603 12/01104 06/30/06 
93307 03/01105 02/28/06 
90201 01101/05 12/31/05 
92225 07101105 06/30/06 
92225 10/01/04 09/30/05 
95682 08/01105 07/31/06 
93430 12/01/04 11/30/05 
95928 11101/05 04/30/07 
91910 01/01105 12/31/05 
95610 08/01105 07/31106 
95621 08/01/05 07/31/06 
93612 06/01/05 05/31/06 
90040 01101/05 12/31105 





























St. Charles Place 
Tommy's Casino & Saloon 
Oaks Card Club 
Klondike Casino 
S & K Card Room 
Lake Bowl Cardroom 
Hustler Casino 
Normandie Club 
Garlic City Club 
I Gloria's Lounge & Casino 
Gold Rush Casino 
Central Coast Casino-G.B. 
i Jalisco Pool Room 
Cottage, The 
i Hawaiian Gardens Casino 
i Palace Card Room 
Table 17 
California Card Clubs by City, December 2005 
No. of 
Club Address City Tables 
10 7617 Atlantic Ave. Cudahy 
2 1225 Airport Dr. Delano 
1 315 Main St. Downieville 
3 467 W. Main St. El Centro 
40 4097 San Pablo Ave. Emeryville 
2 1930 Fourth St. Eureka 
4 306 F St. Eureka 
5 511 E. Bidwell St. Folsom 
65 15331 So. Vermont Gardena 
45 1045 W. Rosecrans Gardena 
5 40 Hornlien Ct. Gilroy 
2 30435 Road 68 Visalia 
5 106 E. Main St. Grass Valley 
2 359 Grand Ave. Grover Beach 
4 920 Guadalupe St. Guadalupe 
3 106 W. Seventh St. Hanford 
180 11871 Carson St. Hawaiian Gardens 




90201 02/01/05 01/31106 
93215 10/01/05 09/30/06 
95936 09/01105 08/31106 
92243 01/01/05 12/31/05 
94608 02/01/05 01/31106 
95501 10/01/05 01/31/07 
95501 11/01/05 01/31/06 
95630 10/01/05 09/30/06 
90247 02/01/05 01131106 
90247 12/01/04 05/31106 
95020 09/01/05 03/31107 
93291 11/01/05 10/31/06 
95945 10/01/05 01/31/06 
93433 12/01/04 06/30/06 
93434 07/01/05 06/30/06 
93230 11/01/04 10/31/05 
90716 09101105 08/31106 























Hotel Del Rio & Casino 
Rogelio's, Inc. 
Royal Flush Card Room 
Livermore Casino 
Lucky Buck Card Club 
Axtion Jaxon Cardroom 
La Primavera Pool Hall & Cafe 
Casino Real 
Marina Club 




Poker Flats Casino 
Empire Sportsmen's Assoc. 
~emphill's Card Room 
Table 17 
California Card Clubs by City, December 2005 
No. of 
Club Address City 
Tables 
102 3883 W. Century Blvd. Inglewood 
4 209 Second St. Isleton 
2 34 Main St. Isleton 
2 44 North 19Yz Ave. Lemoore 
3 2223 First St. Livermore 
5 1620 Railroad Ave. Livermore 
3 29 N. Sacramento St. Lodi 
2 224 S. "C" St. Madera 
6 1030-B West Yosemite Manteca 
7 204 Carmel Ave. Marina 
5 3100 Del Monte Blvd. Marina 
1 5402 Lindhurst Ave. Marysville 
4 515 Fourth St. Marysville 
4 2217 Yosemite Parkway Merced 
4 
1714 Martin Luther King Jr., 
Merced 
Way 
5 5801 N. McHenry Modesto 




90301 01101/05 12/31/05 
95641 11/01105 10/31/06 
95641 09/01/05 03/31/07 
93245 11/01/05 10/31/06 
94550 09/01105 08/31/06 
94550 02/01/05 01131106 
95240 08/01/05 07/31/06 
93638 05/01/05 04/30/06 
95336 07/01/05 06/30/06 
93933 11101/05 10/31/06 
93933 09/01/05 11130/05 
95901 03/01105 02/28/06 
95901 09/01105 08/31/06 
95340 05/01/05 04/30/06 
95340 08/01/05 07/31/06 
95356 12/01/04 11/30/05 
94558 10/01105 09/30/05 






















Mike's Card Casino 
Brooks Oceana Cardroom 
Ocean's Eleven Casino 
California Grand Casino 
Central Coast Casino-P.R. 
101 Casino, The 
River Cardroom, The 
Mint, The 
Don Juan Club & Casino 
Rancho's Club 
Casino Club 






..... ~~p's Saloon 
---~---------~------~-----
Table 17 
California Card Clubs by City, December 2005 
No. of 
Club Address City Zip 
License License 
Tables Issuance Expiration 
5 112 N. Yosemite Ave. Oakdale 95361 04/01105 03/31/06 
3 1795 Front St. Oceana 93445 12/01104 06/30/06 
45 121 Brooks St. Oceanside 92054 12/01/04 11/30/05 
14 5867 Pacheco Blvd. Pacheco 94553 11101/05 10/31/06 
2 1428 Spring St. Paso Robles 93446 11101/05 10/31/06 
15 5151 Montero Way Petaluma 94954 01/01105 12/31105 
7 246 Petaluma Blvd., North Petaluma 94952 05/01/05 04/30/06 
3 940 West Morton Ave. Porterville 93257 05101105 06/30/06 
1 2785 Don Juan Dr. Rancho Cordova 95670 12/01/04 06/30/05 
7 2740 Mills Park Dr. Rancho Cordova 95670 09/01/05 01/31/07 
5 1885 Hilltop Dr. Redding 96002 01101/05 12/31105 
3 117 Ridgecrest Blvd., #A Ridgecrest 93555 11101/05 02/28/07 
16 118 20th Street West Rosamond 93560 10/01105 09/30/06 
8 411 N. 16th St. Sacramento 95814 06101105 05/31/06 
1 1944 El Camino Ave. Sacramento 95815 04/01/05 03/31106 
5 1 014 Alhambra Blvd. Sacramento 95816 09/01/05 05/31107 
7 6010 Stockton Blvd. Sacramento 95824 08/01105 07/31/06 


























Artichoke's Joe's Casino 
Lucky Lady 
Palomar Card Club 
Garden City 
Sutter's Place, Inc. dba Bay 1 01 
Club San Rafael 
Ocean View Cardroom 
VenA Mexico 
Cameo Club 
Delta Club Card Room 
Saigon Casino Club 
Comstock Cardroom 
Turlock Poker Room 
Player's Poker Club 





California Card Clubs by City, December 2005 
No. of 
Club Address City Zip 
License License 
Tables Issuance Expiration 
51 659 Huntington Ave. 1 San Bruno 94066 08/01/05 07/31/06 
7 5526 El Cajon Blvd. San Diego 92115 01/01105 01/31/06 
5 2724 El Cajon Blvd. San Diego 92104 10/01/05 02/28/07 
40 360 South Saratoga Ave. San Jose 95129 10/01/05 09/30/06 
40 1801 Bering Dr. San Jose 95112 01/01105 12/31/05 
4 721 Lincoln Ave. San Rafael 94901 01/01/05 12/31/05 
4 709 Pacific Ave. Santa Cruz 95060 03/01/05 02/28/06 
2 955 Front St. Soledad 93960 12/01/04 11/30/05 • 
6 5757 Pacific Ave. Stockton 95202 01/01/05 01/31/06 I 
6 6518 A Pacific Ave. Stockton 95207 12/01104 11130/05 ! 
4 146 E Market St. Stockton 95202 12/01/04 11130/05 
5 125 W. 11th St. Tracy 95376 11/01/05 10/31/06 
4 270 W. Main St. Turlock 95380 06/01/05 05/31/06 
4 906 N. Ventura Ave. Ventura 93001 09/01/05 03/31/07 
1 15638 Ave., 296 Visalia 93292 05/01/05 04/30/06 
3 184 Main St. Watsonville 95076 12/01104 11130/05 
5 410 Rodriguez St. Watsonville 95077 10/01/04 09/30/05 
1 154 N. Valencia Woodlake 93286 12/01/04 06/30/06 
(") 
2.. 




















California Card Clubs by City, December 2005 
Active Clubs 
No. of 
Club Address City Zip 
License License 
Tables Issuance Expiration 
La Fuerza 2 175 E. Antelope Woodlake 93286 09/01/05 08/31/06 
Total Tables 1417 
Provisionally Licensed Clubs 
No. of 
Club Address City Zip 
Tables 
Club One, Inc. 35 1033 Van Ness Ave. Fresno 93721 
Lucky Chances 43 1700 Hillside Blvd. Colma 94014 
Pastime Club 2 726 First St. Benicia 94510 
Lake Elsinore Hotel and Casino 
18 20930 Malaga Rd. Lake Elsinore 92350 
(Sahara Dunes) 
Total Tables 98 
Sources: The Division of Gambling Control, Department of Justice, and the California Gambling Control Commission, 12/2005. 
-------------- ------------~--------
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INTERNET GAMBLING 
BACKGROUND 
The Internet's global reach and the ability of individuals to access it by wire and wireless 
devices have enabled an unprecedented movement of goods and information across 
national borders. Gambling is no exception. Internet gambling offers a powerful means 
to reach people in their homes and allows gambling without the need for a physical 
gaming establishment. 
Global gaming operations were quick to understand the potential and ramped up 
operations in the late 1990s. Virtually all of the estimated 250 to 300 companies that 
operated about 1,400 Internet gambling services in 2003 were privately held and located 
offshore in 55 different jurisdictions. As shown in Figure 19, revenues were estimated to 
have been $1.5 billion in 2000, $5.7 billion in 2003, $8.2 billion in 2004, and $10.7 
billion in 2005.296 The American Gaming Association estimates that in 2006, Internet 










Estimated Worldwide Internet Gambling Revenues 
(in$ billions) 
_. $10.7 
~ ---- $8.2 --~$5.7 
~ 
.. $1.5 
2000 2003 2004 2005 
Sources: International Gaming & Wagering Business, 2002, and Los Angeles Times, 2005. 
A 2003 Government Accounting Office (GAO) study estimated that United States 
players make up between 50 and 70 percent of Internet gamblers worldwide, despite the 
fact that Internet gambling is illegal in the United States (except on horse racing--see 
chapter on horse racing). 298 
The industry is moving towards legalization in some countries, most recently in the 
United Kingdom, which has instituted a comprehensive licensing and regulatory regime 
for Internet, iTV and mobile phone gambling. Major Internet gambling companies are 
now traded on the London Stock Exchange. For example PartyGaming, the parent 
company ofPartyPoker.com, is licensed in Gibraltar and was valued at $8.5 billion on the 
London Stock Exchange when it went public on June 30, 2005.299 It is now valued at 
$9.6 billion. SportingBet and BetOnSports are also publicly traded in London. 
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SportingBet acquired 700,000 new customers in a recent quarter, almost equal to the 
number of people who signed up the previous year. The company reports taking in 
$530,000 a day just from its poker business. American investment houses own substantial 
amounts of stock in these highly profitable, fast-growing companies, even though online 
gambling is illegal under federallaw. 300 
PLAYERS 
Internet gambling sites can tum a personal computer or a cell phone into a virtual 
duplicate of a casino video slot machine. Online games include blackjack, video poker, 
bingo, craps, roulette, baccarat, and keno--virtually every form of gambling. Players 
deposit "front money," which includes payment in advance by credit/debit card, wire 
transfer, mailed checks, money orders, or payment aggregators. Many sites allow players 
to obtain a small number of chips for free. Even with low stakes betting, the fastest 
games can run through hundreds of dollars an hour. 
Two of the online market's fastest growing areas are betting exchanges and online poker. 
Poker accounts for nearly a quarter of Internet gaming revenues; sports betting and online 
casinos each account for 35 percent ofrevenues.301 
Sport betting is one of the most popular forms of at-home gambling, although it is illegal 
in many jurisdictions. Industry analysts estimate that online sports betting generated 
$4.29 billion in revenues in 2005, more than double the $1.7 billion earned in 2001.302 
One 24-hour online site advertises that over 7,000 players are logged in during peak 
times. According to the site, payments can be made by cash advances through credit card 
companies and by direct access to bank accounts. 
Online poker is especially popular with young men and has even become a problem on 
school campuses where kids play it on their mobile phones. Recently the president of the 
sophomore class at Lehigh University robbed a bank in an attempt to pay off$5,000 in 
Internet gambling debts. 303 
A 2001 study found that 14 of the top 20 most recognized Internet gambling sites were 
online casinos.304 While 83 percent of gamblers played online, only one third of that 
group, or 28 percent of all gamblers, played for real money. The rest were drawn by 
websites that offered free games. Other findings included: 
• Seventy-three percent of the gamblers who played both on-and-offline had lost 
money in the past month, compared to 80 percent of players at bricks and mortar 
casmos. 
• Three of five online gamblers visited more than one gambling site a day, and one-
fifth visited four or more. 
• Gamblers who played both at land-based casinos and online lost an average (net 
loss) of $122 a month, double that of any other group. 
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• Players who wagered exclusively online tended to confine their gambling to bingo 
and lottery sites, and lost the least of any of the real-money gambler groups. 
• One quarter of online bingo players gambled for real money, averaging about 
$1 04 a month, compared to their casino counterparts who spent $164 per month. 
THE LEGALITY OF INTERNET GAMBLING IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Internet" .. .is a means, not a location, it exists and functions outside of traditional 
governmental spheres of central control, sovereignty, and regulation ... [and] presents 
considerable challenges to any attempt to regulate its use."305 
State governments have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of 
gambling may legally take place within their borders, and for this reason gambling has 
traditionally been treated as a state's rights or 1oth amendment issue. Prohibitions vary 
from state to state. Nevada makes it a crime to make or accept a wager over the Internet 
unless the operator is a state licensee. Certain aspects of Internet gambling are prohibited 
in Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and South Dakota (excluding the state lottery), and are 
covered by broader laws in other states. Washington State recently made it a felony to 
play poker on the Internet.306 
If and how state prohibitions can be effectively enforced is an open question given that 
Internet gambling consists of interstate transactions. Some state Attorneys General have 
been active in attempting to regulate online gambling. For example, in 1998-99, the 
Florida Attorney General distributed "cease and desist" letters to at least ten media 
companies providing publishing or broadcasting advertisements for offshore computer 
gambling sites.307 
Federal gambling law (the Wire Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, and the Travel 
Act) prohibits most interstate and extraterritorial gambling, including transmitting bets 
over state lines. However the language of the law has become outdated by technology 
and various courts have interpreted it differently. For example, the Wire Act has been 
used primarily to prosecute cases involving sports betting. It does not clearly prohibit 
Internet gambling sites.308 According to one analysis, "The Department of Justice has 
limited its few criminal complaints to American citizens licensed in foreign countries 
who were taking bets from the United States."309 
The growing participation by Americans in online gambling, as well as large investments 
by many of Wall Street's largest firms in shares of online casinos and betting parlors, 
underscores" ... a striking gap between the federal law enforcement position on online 
gambling and the realities behind what has emerged as a booming business."310 
Several bills have been introduced in Congress to create a regulatory scheme that would 
identify and block financial transactions related to illegal Internet gambling, but none has 
passed. How to address off-the-track Internet betting on horse racing, allowed in some 
states including California, is one unresolved issue (see chapter on horse racing). 
Multistate lotteries also raise issues. A major concern of the Department of Justice is 
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how a law making it a federal crime to place a bet over the Internet would be enforced, 
raising memories of Prohibition. For this reason, most bills target businesses by making 
it a crime to conduct gambling online. 
Given the loopholes in anti-Internet gambling laws, the federal government has 
concentrated its prohibition efforts on credit card companies and advertisers. In 2003, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) sent letters to the National Association of Broadcasters, the 
Magazine Publishers of America and other trade groups warning that ads for Internet 
gambling are "ubiquitous," misleading the public into believing that such gambling is 
legal, when it is not. The DOJ threatened to prosecute major communications companies 
under aiding and abetting statutes for accepting advertising from online gaming 
companies, raising First Amendment concerns. 311 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), major U.S. credit card 
companies have tried to restrict the use of their cards for Internet gambling by denying 
authorization for Internet gambling transactions and by developing transaction codes that 
banks can use to block payments at their discretion. Attempts by Visa and Mastercard to 
prohibit the use of their credit cards for Internet gambling purposes have not always been 
effective, however, although GAO estimates that they have slowed the growth of the 
industry. This is because payments are actually made through banks, some of which 
operate in jurisdictions where Internet gambling is legal. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
distinguish between legal (i.e., bets on horse racing) and illegal gambling transactions. 
Debts incurred through potentially illegal activities are unenforceable. Some losing 
bettors have refused to pay their credit card gambling debts, claiming that the banks 
issuing the credit cards facilitated illegal activities.312 
Online payment providers that aggregate payments, such as PayPal, can also be used to 
circumvent Internet gambling prohibitions, since banks cannot necessarily determine the 
type of activity being charged. In addition, wire transfers, private label debit cards, direct 
deposit/withdrawal and personal checks are other ways to transfer funds. Finally, 
electronic cash allows an individual to use real money to purchase electronic cash units to 
make any transaction over the Internet. The authors of one analysis conclude that, "From 
the U.S. experience, regulating prohibition oflnternet gambling effectively is 
unfeasible."313 
If Internet gambling operators are U.S. citizens, they may be prosecuted under state and 
federal criminal and/or civil laws for accepting bets from residents in every state.314 
Individual citizens are not likely to be charged for betting online, however, and thus 
online gambling is available to consumers as a practical matter. 315 
An International Business 
As of2003, Internet gambling had been legalized in over 50 countries and jurisdictions, 
including Europe, the Caribbean, Australia, and the Pacific islands. In April2005, online 
casinos became legal in the United Kingdom. Other European countries are considering 
similar actions. Sportingbet pic, a publicly traded company on the London Stock 
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Exchange, recently joined forces with Paradise Poker to form the world's largest online 
betting company, with over two million customers. Partypoker.com, another large 
website, is licensed in Gibraltar. 
At least two U.S. courts have held that foreign casino businesses accepting bets from 
customers in the United States may violate federal law. However extradition treaties 
ordinarily cannot reach offshore operators and may be contrary to U.S. treaty obligations 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).316 
Whether the federal government can restrict virtual casinos that originate in areas where 
casino gambling is a legal activity has been the subject of a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute brought by the nation of Antigua, which houses some Internet gaming 
operations. In April2005, a WTO appeals panel ruled that the U.S. federal ban on 
Internet gambling violated WTO treaty obligations, and that the entire U.S. gambling 
service sector was covered by the GATS, thus limiting the ability of federal, state and 
local government to limit gambling. According to one commentator, the ruling also puts 
state lotteries and tribal-state gaming compacts at risk because GATS prohibits 
government monopolies. 
The fact that the United States allows an exemption for account deposit wagering* on 
horse races over the Internet weakens the U.S. position. The WTO ruling found that the 
government does have the right to restrict remote gambling to protect public morals and 
public order, but must consistently apply restrictions to domestic and foreign operations. 
Congress is considering removing the exemption allowing account deposit wagering for 
horse racing in order to strengthen the U.S. position.317 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF INTERNET GAMBLING 
Congress created the National Gambling Impact Study Commission in 1996, to study the 
social and economic impacts of gambling. Concerns about Internet gambling raised by 
the Commission in its 1999 report included: increased and unregulated underage 
gambling, more pathological and problem gambling with associated personal, family and 
community costs, lack of consumer protections and criminal abuse. The use of virtual 
cash, unlimited accessibility, and the solitary nature of gambling on the Internet are all 
potential risk factors for the development of problem gambling.318 
Critics contend that gambling on the Internet offers a particularly addictive and child-
alluring form of gambling, as evidenced by the number ofwebsites that offer free 
electronic games as an introduction to gambling. Research shows that young people are 
particularly at risk of becoming addicted to gambling. Parents may have little control, 
even with the most advanced software protections. 
The convenience of easy access to gambling in one's home may lead to more personal 
bankruptcies for consumers of all ages (see a more extended discussion, under Economic 
See discussion of account deposit wagering in the chapter on horse racing. 
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Impacts). According to an analysis by Deloitte, "Managing the issues of problem and 
under-age gaming will be critical to the industry's success ... "319 
Law enforcement officials are concerned about an increased risk of fraud in today's 
umegulated Internet gaming environment, and the enhanced opportunity for international 
money laundering by organized crime and terrorists. According to GAO, "Law 
enforcement officials said they believed that Internet gambling could potentially be a 
powerful vehicle for laundering criminal proceeds [due to] ... the volume, speed and 
international reach of Internet transactions and the offshore locations of Internet 
gambling sites."320 However gaming industry officials contend that all e-commerce is 
susceptible to money laundering, not just gaming. 
I. Nelson Rose, a prolific analyst of gaming law, concludes that: 
126 
There is general agreement that a complete prohibition [oflntemet gambling] is 
impossible to enforce, while complete legalization without regulation would cause 
untold social harm, particularly to children and compulsive gamblers. Lawmakers 
at all levels and in all branches of government are now faced with the necessity of 
finding a way to control this constantly evolving invention.321 
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SOCIAL IMPACTS OF GAMBLING 
PROBLEM AND PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING 
Background 
If everyone could gamble responsibly, as most people do for recreation and leisure, a 
discussion ofthe social impacts of gambling might be relatively brief. However a 
significant percentage of people who gamble do so excessively, harming themselves, 
their families, and their communities. As access to gambling--either state-promoted or 
authorized--increases, the prevalence of problem and pathological gambling is also 
increasing. This addiction creates social costs analogous to the impact of excessive 
alcohol consumption or oftobacco and illegal drug use.322 
Problem gambling refers to gambling that significantly interferes with a person's basic 
occupational, interpersonal, and financial functioning. Pathological gambling is the most 
severe form and is classified as a mental disorder with similarities to drug abuse 
including" ... features of tolerance, withdrawal, diminished control, and relinquishing of 
important activities."323 
Pathological gamblers are important to the fiscal health of the gaming industry, 
generating 15 percent of the industry's gross revenues, according to a study by the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. 324 A 1999 study by the 
Australian Productivity Commission found that problem gamblers accounted for about 
one-third of the gambling industries' market in the country, and that problem gamblers 
lost, on average, around $12,000 a year compared with under $650 for other gamblers.325 
Clinical Definition 
In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) recognized compulsive gambling 
as a mental disorder. The World Health Organization also recognizes this mental 
disorder. 
Pathological gambling is classified as an impulse control disorder or a nonsubstance-
related addictive disorder, a" ... failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to 
perform some act that is harmful to the person or others."326 It is characterized by "High 
rates of mood, psychotic, anxiety, attention-deficit, personality, and substance use 
disorders."327 An individual suffering from pathological gambling is unable to participate 
responsibility in gambling with any sense of moderation, and is unable to stop. The AP A 
states: 
The essential features of this disorder are a chronic and progressive failure to 
resist impulses to gambling, and gambling behavior that compromises, disrupts, 
or damages personal, family, or vocational pursuits. The gambling preoccupation, 
urge and activity increase during periods of stress. Problems that arise as a result 
of gambling lead to an intensification of the gambling behavior. Characteristic 
problems include extensive indebtedness and consequent default on debts and 
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other financial responsibility, disrupted family relationships, inattention at work, 
and financially motivated illegal activities to pay for gambling. 328 
The diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling includes at least five of the following 
behaviors (DSM-IV):* 
1. Is preoccupied with gambling. 
2. Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the 
desired excitement. 
3. Has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control or stop gambling. 
4. Is restless or irritable when attempting to control or stop gambling. 
5. Gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving feelings of 
helplessness, guilt, anxiety, and depression. 
6. After losing money, often returns another day in order to get even ("chasing 
losses"). 329 
Studies have suggested" ... neurobiological explanations for the similarities and high rates 
of co-morbidity between substance abuse disorders and pathological gambling."330 
Recent studies of medicines prescribed to calm tremors ofParkinson's disease have 
found an association with a heightened risk of pathological gambling, according to an 
analysis of adverse drug reactions reported to the Food and Drug Administration. The 
link seems to be related to increased dopamine, which leads to impulsive behavior.331 
Prevalence 
A meta-analysis of prevalence studies published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA) estimated an adult population prevalence rate for pathological 
gamblers in the United States of 1.2 percent for the previous year and 1.6 percent over a 
lifetime.332 Problem gamblers comprised an additional 2.8 percent during the previous 
year, and 3.85 percent over a lifetime. The problem increases considerably among 
gambling patrons--4.6 percent (problem gamblers) and 5.4 percent (pathological 
gamblers) for casino gamblers, 3.6 percent and 5.2 percent for gamblers at lottery 
terminals, and 14.3 percent and 25 percent for gamblers in pari-mutuel locations. 
The National Council on Problem Gambling cites similar estimates: two million (one 
percent) U.S. adults meet the criteria for pathological gambling in a given year. Another 
four to eight million adults (two to three percent) are problem gamblers who do not meet 
the full diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling, but meet one or more of the criteria 
and are experiencing problems due to their gambling behavior.333 
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission estimated in its 1999 report that of the 
125 million Americans who gambled at least once a year, about 5.5 million had some 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, IV ed. (DSM-IV) 
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form of gambling problem (2.5 million pathological gamblers and three million problem 
gamblers), while another 15 million were "at risk" of developing a gambling problem.334 
If we apply the JAMA estimates to California, using 2000 Census data, we find that 
336,419 adults are pathological gamblers and 588,733 adults are problem gamblers 
(lifetime prevalence). This means that 925,151 adults in California had a serious 
gambling problem in 2000, a number that is probably closer to one million now. 
Researchers have also concluded that the rate of problem gambling increases when more 
gambling alternatives become available in a community. 
• A study by the National Opinion Research Center found that adults living within 
50 miles of a casino had double the probability of pathological or problem 
gambling. 335 
• A 1998 study in sevenjurisdictions with new casinos estimated that 16 percent of 
local residents had a gambling problem.336 
• A 1999 study by the Australian government found that "The prevalence of 
problem gambling is related to the degree of accessibility of gambling, 
particularly gaming machines."337 
• In Nevada, which has casinos located in every comer of the state, the Nevada 
Council on Problem Gambling estimates that as many at six percent of Nevada 
adults may suffer from a gambling problem, a number twice the estimated 
national prevelance. 338 
In a 2003 Gallup Lifestyle Poll, eight percent ofthose who had participated in gambling 
activities said they sometimes gambled more than they should, and six percent said that 
gambling had been a source of problems within their families. Twelve percent of 18-to-
29 year olds agreed that gambling had been a problem for someone in their family, 
compared to four percent of those aged over 50.339 A 1999 Gallup Poll found that 41 
percent of adults and 10 percent ofteens reported knowing someone outside their family 
for whom gambling had become a problem.340 
The California Council on Problem Gambling operates a help line for problem gamblers 
that received 3,399 calls in 2004. The largest number (12 percent) of calls originated in 
the San Bernardino County area. Over half the callers were male (53 percent). Nearly 
half the callers were married (48 percent) and 11 percent were divorced or separated. 
Most ofthe callers were middle-aged, as shown in Figure 20. 

















Age of Callers to California Problem Gambling Hotline, 
2004 
Age 
Source: California Council on Problem Gambling, 2004. 
As discussed previously, Indian casinos were the primary gambling preference of over 
three quarters of the calls to the state's problem gambling helpline in 2004 (77.5 percent). 
Another five percent preferred gambling in Nevada casinos. Thus casino gambling is by 
far the largest source of problem gambling in California. 
Vulnerable Groups 
High risk groups include adults in mental health and substance abuse treatment, who have 
rates of problem and pathological gambling four to ten times higher than the general 
population.341 Men have a prevalence rate two to three times higher than women 
(although they call the state helpline in roughly equal numbers). Adolescents are more 
likely than adults to become problem and pathological gamblers. 
Some ethnic groups are especially vulnerable to problem gambling. A study in St. Louis, 
Missouri, found that African Americans comprised 31 percent of persons with problem 
and pathological gambling.342 In California, the Commission on Asian & Pacific Islander 
American Affairs (APIAs) has identified problem gambling as a serious concern, citing 
research that" ... APIAs may have significantly higher rates of problem gambling 
compared with that of the mainstream population." For example, the Commission cites 
anecdotal reports that as many 70 percent of the gamblers at the Lucky Chance card room 
in Colma are Asian Pacific Islanders.343 
Newspaper accounts verify that Indian casinos and card clubs target their marketing 
efforts at the APIA community. The Barona tribal casino recently opened an office in 
San Gabriel Valley, which is 22 percent Asian American; "Every property in Southern 
California tries to appeal to the Asian community, because Asians have a propensity to 
play table games ... "344 In Northern California, buses from the Cache Creek Casino 
operated by the Rumsey Band ofWintun Indians pick up Chinese gamblers from San 
Francisco, following practices long established by Nevada casinos. Casino San Pablo 
targets Asian language advertising and " ... celebrates the Chinese, Vietnamese, and 
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Cambodian new years and employs APIA music promoters, celebrities, and performers 
from Vietnam and Cambodia to provide entertainment at the casino."345 
The Commission's report cites a study by the NICos* Chinese Health Coalition in San 
Francisco that found that gambling was the number one social concern in the Chinese 
American community. The NICOS study also found that 84 percent of Chinese 
American adults in the community reported gambling in the previous year; 15 percent 
were classified as problem gamblers and 21 percent were classified as pathological 
gamblers.346 
The Commission and a community coalition have formed the Asian and Pacific Islander 
Problem Gambling Task Force to gather information and make recommendations, which 
include securing more revenues from all sectors of the gambling industry for prevention 
and treatment services for problem and pathological gamblers. The United Cambodian 
Association of Minnesota and the Lao Family Community of Minnesota have also 
developed prevention and education programs to inform young people about the risks of 
adolescent gambling. 
People who work in the industry are particularly vulnerable to problems with their own 
gambling behaviors. In a notable case, the president of Caesars Atlantic City was fired 
and lost his license in 2001, due to compulsive gambling.347 Employees who have 
problem gambling behaviors may be afraid to seek help. However some gambling 
companies have developed training programs and responsible gambling programs and 
policies to help their employees who have gambling problems.348 
Adolescents 
A number of studies have found that adolescents who engage in adult forms of gambling 
are more likely to develop problem and pathological gambling problems: 
• A 1998 study by the National Research Council estimated that as many as 1.1 
million adolescents, or six percent of teenagers between the ages of 12 and 18, 
were pathological gamblers, a higher rate than adults.349 350 
• As many at 30 percent of American youth wager money on some game of chance 
weekly and four percent gamble daily; between four and eight percent have a very 
serious gambling problem, with another ten to 15 percent at risk for developing a 
gambling problem.351 
• Young adults ages 18-24, especially males, comprise a disproportionate number 
of adults with significant gambling disorders, almost double their representation 
in the population (they represent 12.7 percent of the population but 20.4 percent 
of the population with a gambling problem).352 
• The organizations, whose names form the acronym "NICOS," are: North East Medical Services, IPA 
(Chinese Community Health Care Association), Chinese Hospital, On-Lok Senior Health Services, and 
Self-Help for the Elderly. 
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A study by the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania found 
that the number of American men ages 14 to 22 who gamble once a month rose 20 
percent from 2004 to 2005. Of the 2.9 million young people who gamble on cards at 
least once a week, 80 percent are men. Over half of male college students gamble on 
cards at least once a month. Poker competitions and Internet betting websites are 
especially popular, and college students are the target demographic. One poker website, 
absolutepoker.com/, based in Canada, offers to pay a semester's tuition for tournament 
winners. In a notable case, the president of the sophomore class at Lehigh University 
robbed a bank in an attempt to pay off$5,000 in Internet gambling debts. 353 
A 1998 Oregon study found that 75 percent of 13-17 year olds in the state had gambled 
for money at least once, 66 percent within the last year. Boys and older adolescents were 
more likely to gamble than girls and younger adolescents. The study measured self-
reported youth gambling on a continuum of involvement ranging from 0 (no gambling), 
to 1 (social, no problem), 2 (signs of gambling problems), 3 (gambling-related disorder 
with impairment) and 4 (impaired gambler who seeks treatment). The study found that 
11.2 percent of Oregon adolescents were level 2 gamblers and 4.1 percent were level 3 
gamblers, equating to an estimated 20,000 to 29,000 youth in the state with a gambling 
problem, and between 4,700 and 13,600 youth with a gambling-related disorder. 354 
In the 2000 Census, 27 percent of California's population was under age 18; of that 
group, 42 percent or 3.9 million youth were ages ten to 18. Ifwe apply Oregon's 
gambling problem/disorder prevalence percentages to California,* we could expect to 
find that 436,800 youth are level2 problem gamblers and 159,900 youth are level three 
gamblers who have gambling-related disorders with impairment. In total, 600,000 
California youth could have serious gambling problems. 
In California, it is a misdemeanor for a person under 21 years of age to play any 
gambling game, or loiter in any room where gambling is conducted. Any gambling 
licensee or employee who allows a minor to gamble is also guilty of a misdemeanor 
unless he/she can demonstrate that the minor presented a fake identification card 
[Business & Professions Code§ 19941(a) and (b)]. However persons 18 and older can 
play the state lottery, and the state's 1999 tribal-state gaming compact, which applies to 
most Indian casinos in the state, allows individuals 18 or older to gamble. Beginning in 
2003, tribal-state gaming compacts began providing that no persons under age 21 may be 
present in any room where class III gaming activities are taking place unless enroute to a 
nongammg area. 
Adolescent excessive gambling can result in a number of long-term negative 
consequences, including truancy, dropping out of school, severed relationships with 
family and friends, and mental health and behavioral problems including illegal behavior 
to finance gambling. In addition, there is a moderate correlation between adolescent 
gambling and other risk behaviors including alcohol, drug, and tobacco use. A study of 
adolescent pathological gamblers found the following significant negative behaviors:355 
• Oregon has a different mix of gambling opportunities than California, particularly video lottery terminals, 
which are more accessible and may create more adolescent problem gambling. 
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... 91% of adolescents with a pathological gambling problem show signs of 
having a preoccupation with gambling; 85% indicate chasing their losses; 70% lie 
to family members, peer and friends about their gambling behavior; 61% use their 
lunch money and/or allowance for gambling; 61% become tense and restless 
when trying to cut down on their gambling; 57% report spending increasing 
amounts of money gambling; 52% gamble as a way of escaping problems; 27% 
report skipping school (more than five times) to gamble in the past year; 24% 
have taken money from a family member to gamble without their knowledge; 
21% have developed familial problems resulting from their gambling behavior; 
and 12% report having stolen money from outside the family to gamble. 
Adolescent pathological gamblers report starting as early as age ten, often with family 
members, which means that early prevention efforts--of which there are few--need to 
begin in the elementary grades. Youth often fail to comprehend the risks and odds 
associated with gambling. They find Internet gambling particularly attractive. Sites 
incorporating video technology offer blackjack, roulette, slots, poker and other casino 
games and sports betting. "Practice sites" where no money is needed to play expose 
youth to adult games without adult supervision or control. The similarity of video games 
with online gambling games can be deceptive since the more one plays video games, the 
more one can improve, compared to gambling, which is a game of chance each time. 
The availability of gambling in the community affects youth participation even though it 
is illegal. A study of the impact of gambling in Atlantic City in the mid 1980s found that 
86 percent of high school students in New Jersey had gambled in the past year and 91 
percent had participated in some form of gambling during their lifetime.356 
Young men in the military are vulnerable to developing gambling problems. There are 
4,150 video slot machines located in officers' clubs, activity centers and bowling alleys 
on overseas bases taking in about $2 billion a year, of which $127 million remains with 
the armed forces to help pay for recreational programs such as golf courses and family 
activity centers. A PricewaterhouseCoopers report found "a general lack of accessible 
treatment for gambling addiction" in the military.357 
Gambling opponents argue that slot machines are increasingly designed to attract 
children. Machines that give cash payments without authorization enable youth 
gambling. Machines that are distributed in the community at convenience locations such 
as gas stations, liquor stores, restaurants and laundromats, exacerbate adolescent (and 
adult) problem gambling because they are so easily accessible.35s 
Electronic Technologies and Problem Gambling 
Video poker, slot machines, and other video gambling terminals are the most addictive 
forms of gambling as well as the most effective at generating revenue.359 "These 
machines combine quick-cycling, sensory-rich experiences, the psychologically attractive 
principle of intermittent reward, and the statistically inevitable house advantage which 
are assured to produce significant gambling losses over time."360 A recent article in the 
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Atlantic Monthly calls them the "crack cocaine" of the gambling world, and points out 
that the United States has twice as many publicly available gambling devices (740,000) 
that take money as it does ATMS that dispense it.361 
A study by the State of Oregon of gambling treatment and prevention programs in the 
state found that the primary gambling activity of gamblers enrolled in treatment was 
video poker (74.5 percent), followed by slot machines (10 percent), cards (5.2 percent), 
betting on animals (1.6 percent), Keno (1.5 percent), and bingo (1.4 percent).362 A 2005 
study for the California Office of Problem Gambling found that "Policies that 
significantly enhance access to electronic gambling machines, casino table games and 
other continuous gambling forms can be expected to generate increases in problem 
gambling."363 
Electronic technology has also made it easier than ever for a pathological or problem 
gambler to access money to play. Cash can be transferred from a player's bank account 
to a machine on the casino floor and ATM machines are readily accessible. The National 
Gambling hnpact Study Commission recommended that this ready access to gambling 
cash be restricted, but its recommendations were not adopted as public policy or by the 
industry. According to articles in trade magazines, the industry is focused on making it 
easier for people to obtain quick cash and credit to gamble through cashclub cards and 
other devices that let the casino keep the entire transaction fee. 364 
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission examined the issue of ready access to 
credit in casinos, which can contribute to problem and pathological gambling. The 
Commission found that 40 to 60 percent of the cash wagered by individuals in casinos is 
not physically brought onto the premises. Casinos extend billions of dollars of credit, 
accounting for nearly ten percent of casino revenues in Nevada. This figure does not 
include credit extensions from ATM's, debit and credit cards, or other credit providers.365 
There is a significant monetary benefit to casinos by enabling gamblers to spend money 
easily. When bill acceptors were introduced in casinos, they enabled people to play more 
quickly by eliminating coins, and thus " ... dramatically increased slot machine revenues" 
by 30 to 40 percent.366 Many casinos place ATM machines near their gambling 
machines. Credit cards and debit cards can allow people, especially compulsive 
gamblers, to run up debts they cannot pay. The question then arises as to who is 
responsible for those debts-the casino or the player-and whether credit card companies 
can and will enforce collection. 
Public Health Impacts 
Suicide 
A number of studies have attempted to document whether excessive gambling losses lead 
to suicide. There are many tragic stories but prevalence studies are unclear; some find an 
effect and some do not. This is because gambling may be one of several interacting or 
independent variables contributing to an individual's decision to commit suicide. 
Clinical studies have reported elevated levels of"suicidality" in pathological gamblers, 
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ranging from 17 to 80 percent for thoughts-of-suicide and from four to 23 percent for 
actual attempts. An Australian study of coroner's files estimated that approximately 1. 7 
percent of suicides during 1997 were gambling related.367 Studies of individuals in 
treatment for pathological gambling and of members of Gambler Anonymous have found 
rates of attempted suicide of 17 to 24 percent.368 
Males aged 15 to 35 are the group at highest risk for both suicide and the development of 
gambling problems. 
Domestic Violence and Child Neglect 
Testimonial accounts before the National Gambling Impact Study Commission suggest 
that individuals who suffer from problem or pathological gambling engage in destructive 
family behavior, such as domestic violence, divorce, child neglect and homelessness. 
However the data is inconclusive, and quantifying social costs by isolating gambling 
from other contributing factors, such as drug and alcohol abuse, has proven difficult. A 
National Opinion Research Center survey conducted for the Commission found that 53.5 
percent of identified pathological gamblers reported having been divorced; the U.S. per 
capita divorce rate at the time ofthe survey was 41 percent. Two studies found that 
between one quarter and one half of the spouses of compulsive gamblers had been 
abused. 369 
The Commission on Asian & Pacific Islander American Affairs' Annual Report 2005 
found that" ... gambling leads to problems related to child welfare and domestic 
violence." The report presents testimony from a Santa Clara social service worker who 
estimated that about 20 percent of the APIA child neglect cases he sees are caused by 
problem gambling. For example, children are left unattended in cars in parking lots while 
their parents gamble. A family counselor in San Francisco estimated that about 30 
percent of the APIA domestic violence cases he sees are related to gambling.370 
Social Costs 
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that individuals with problem 
and pathological gambling " ... had higher rates of receipt of past-year unemployment and 
welfare benefits, bankruptcy, arrest, incarceration, divorce, poor or fair physical health, 
and mental health treatment." Out-of-control gambling is an important contributor to this 
cluster of problems and the related social costs.* A study conducted for the Commission 
estimated the annual cost in the United States at that time to be $1,200 for each adult 
pathological gambler and $715 for each adult problem gambler, or an estimated $5 billion 
annuaV$40 billion in lifetime costs ($6 billion annuaV$48 billion in 2006 dollars). Each 
• The deftnition of"social costs" in the gambling literature is not clear, and, in general, studies do not 
isolate gambling's contribution to the array of social costs associated with problem and pathological 
gambling. As Walker and Barnett point out," ... simply observing that gambling is correlated with such 
problems does not imply that gambling causes them." Douglas M. Walker, A.H. Barnett, "The Social 
Costs of Gambling: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Gambling Studies, Vol. 15, No.3, September 
1999, p. 195. 
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adult problem gambler cost society an estimated $5,130 and each pathological gambler 
cost society an estimated $10,550 over his/her lifetime 371 
If we update these estimated costs to 2006, and apply them to California, we find that 
each adult problem gambler in the state annually costs society an estimated $865, or 
$6211 over his/her lifetime, while each adult pathological gambler annually costs an 
estimated $1,453, or $12,77 4 over a lifetime. Given our previous estimate of 588,733 
adult problem gamblers and 333,419 adult pathological gamblers in the state, based on 
JAMA data, the annual estimated cost of pathological gamblers in California is 
$488,816,807, while the annual estimated cost of problem gamblers is $509,254,045, or 
nearly one billion dollars in total. Table 18 presents average estimated financial and 
health effects. 
Table 18 
Lifetime Financial and Health Effects for 




Any unemployment benefits, 12 
4.6% 10.9% 15% 
months 
Welfare benefits, 12 months 1.9% 7.3% 4.6% 
Household income, 12 months $36,000 $45,000 $40,000 
Household debt $22,000 $14,000 $48,000 
Health poor/fair last year 22.8% 16.3% 31.1% 
Depression NA 16.9% 29.1% 
Divorce 18.2% 29.8% 53.5% 
Emotionally harmful family 
NA 15.8% 53.1% 
arguments about gambling 
Alcohol/drug dependent, ever 1.1% 12.4% 9.9% 
Job loss, last year 2.6% 10.8% 13.8% 
Bankruptcy, ever 3.9% 10.3% 19.2% 
Arrested, ever 4% 10.4% 21.4% 
Source: National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
Report, 1999, pp. 7-21,7-26. 
Prevention and Treatment 
Primary prevention efforts seek to delay or prevent the onset of activities that can lead to 
harmful gambling. These include public education and careful enforcement of 
prohibitions against gambling by minors. Secondary prevention efforts target social 
gamblers to ensure that they do not develop problems related to gambling. Once a person 
has a gambling problem, prevention efforts seek to stop the behavior and minimize the 
harm caused by that behavior. 
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Pathological gambling is a compulsive disorder that can be treated, but it is often a 
hidden addiction. There are various treatment approaches. Gamblers Anonymous is a 
self-help program that recommends that its members do not go near or enter a gambling 
establishment. There are also pharmaceutical treatments utilizing drugs that obstruct or 
impede the pathway of nerve cells to the brain's reward center. 
The gambling industry recognizes that gambling addiction is a problem in the industry. 
According to a study by the National Opinion Research Center, 96 percent of the 25 
largest casinos provide gambling treatment coverage for their employees.372 
States that authorize state lotteries, like California, generally have programs to assist and 
treat problem and pathological gamblers. California's Office of Problem Gambling was 
founded in 1997, in the Department ofMental Health, and moved by 2003 legislation to 
the Department of Drug and Alcohol Programs in order to take advantage of the state's 
network of county alcohol and drug abuse service providers. The 2003 legislation 
directed the Office to develop a problem gambling program including, as a first priority, a 
statewide plan to address problem and pathological gambling. The Office is also directed 
to establish a toll-free telephone service; undertake public awareness campaigns; sponsor 
research into prevalence, causation, and best treatment practices; and, offer training for 
health care and law enforcement professionals. 
The Office was appropriated $3 million from the Special Distribution Fund in FY 2004-
05, but did not spend the funds. In FY 2005-06, the Office expects to expend most of its 
$3 million in funding. It is a very small amount compared to the size of gambling in 
California and the estimated prevalence of problem and pathological gamblers. The 
Office's website is not easy to find on the Department of Alcohol and Drug homepage, as 
the user must scroll down past prominently featured drug and alcohol abuse programs. 
There is no state funding for treatment services in California. In recommending that the 
state provide treatment funding, the Commission on Asian & Pacific Islander Americans 
noted that "Other states, such as Wisconsin, have set aside between 0.5% and 1 % of all 
gross [gambling] revenues for treatment, prevention, and education of pathological 
gambling.m73 One percent of gross gambling revenues in California would generate 
about $120,000,000. 
The California Council on Problem Gambling reports that most callers to its gambling 
problem help line have exhausted their resources and do not have funds to cover the cost 
of gambling addiction treatment. A typical six-week intensive treatment might cost 
$2,800, with a reference to Gambler's Anonymous (which is free) for aftercare. Given 
our previous estimate of one million problem and pathological gamblers in the state, 
treatment costs could top $280,000,000 a year if they all requested it. 
In March 2005, the Office of Problem Gambling issued a report, Situational Assessment 
of Problem Gambling Services in California, which found that there are few trained 
problem gambling counselors and problem gambling service programs in California. The 
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assessment concluded that" ... there is clearly an enormous gap between the need for 
problem gambling treatment in California and the availability of such services." Nearly 
three quarters of crisis and treatment respondents did not know where to refer their clients 
for problem gambling services or only referred them to Gambler Anonymous.374 
The Commission on Asian & Pacific Islander American Affairs, in its Annual Report 
2005, found one "culturally competent" gambling prevention and treatment service in the 
state, in San Francisco--the NICOS Chinese Health Coalition. Despite the large number 
of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in Southern California, and widespread 
marketing of gambling to that community, there are no prevention and treatment 
programs directed to that community. 
Very few treatment programs in California target adolescent gamblers and "The vast 
majority of schools [ colleges] ... have no formal or informal policy regarding gambling." 
Most counselors on campuses have very little training in understanding what constitutes a 
gambling problem. Experts recommend youth education, starting young, the same 
prevention strategy used for drugs and alcohoL375 
A study in Oregon found that 28 percent of gamblers enrolling in treatment and 
prevention programs accessed the system through the Help line; ten percent through 
recommendations of a current or former program participant; and, ten percent through a 
family or friend. A goal of the treatment system is to respond in a timely manner. The 
average number of workdays between first call to a program and a first appointment was 
less than four days.376 
There are four statewide help line numbers that problem gamblers in California can call. 
In 2003, there were 13,349 calls to these help lines; 60 percent were from Southern 
California, 20 percent from the San Francisco Bay Area, and 15 percent from the 
Sacramento and Fresno areas.377 Data developed by the California Council on Problem 
Gambling finds that casino signs generate nearly half of all calls to the problem gambling 
help line, suggesting that this type of information marketing is important. Friends and the 
Internet were the next most frequent sources of referraL378 
Some states and casinos have instituted voluntary self-exclusion programs, in which an 
individual can request in writing to be refused entrance to all gaming venues. 
California's Gambling Control Act provides for the exclusion of individuals from gaming 
establishments (Business and Professions Code § 19844) for violations of law or 
offensive behavior such as intoxication, but not to preclude problem gambling. However 
some efforts are underway. 
The California Gambling Control Commission is developing a problem gambling 
regulation in which a voluntary, confidential "self-exclusion" list would be maintained by 
the Division of Gambling ControL Gambling establishments would be prohibited from 
issuing credit, cashing a check or marketing to individuals on the list.379 In addition, the 
Division is coordinating with the casino and card club industries, the Commission and the 
Office of Problem Gambling to write regulations that would require card clubs to have 
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problem gambling materials available for patrons, a Help line phone number posted, 
trained staff and a voluntary self exclusion program. 
The recent tribal-state compact with the Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian 
Reservation (negotiated in 2005, but not ratified) provides for the tribe to establish a self-
exclusion program for problem gamblers, the first compact to do so. The California 
Tribal Business Alliance, composed of six tribes with casinos, has announced a 
responsible gambling policy that includes a self-exclusion program, employee training, 
casino advertising standards, a toll-free help line and problem-gambling information to be 
posted on casino web sites. 
Australia 's Responsible Gambling Code 
In response to a government-commissioned report that found that one in 50 adults in 
Australia have a gambling problem, the industry's Australian Gaming Council crafted a 
responsible gambling code. In the code, the industry acknowledges that problem 
gambling is a community issue and makes a commitment to develop measures to reduce 
the potential for harm including training staff, allowing self-exclusion arrangements, and 
providing better public information about the likelihood ofwinning.380 
CRIME 
Crime and gambling interact in a number of ways, including: illegal gambling, which is a 
direct violation of the law; crimes committed by problem and pathological gamblers; and, 
crimes associated with legal gambling. 
Public Corruption 
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission pointed out in its 1999 report that 
" ... the shape and operation of legalized gambling has been largely a product of 
government decisions ... [and a] ... key determinant of the various industries' potential 
profits and losses."381 Thus it is not surprising that legal gambling is at times associated 
with public corruption. An article published in 1998, entitled "Follow the Money: 
Gambling, Ethics and Subpoenas," found " ... significant congressional fears that the 
gambling industry could become sufficiently powerful to change U.S. policy and the 
economy (locally, regionally and nationally)."382 
A scandal currently unfolding in Washington, D.C. involves, in part, $66 million in 
contributions from six gaming tribes made to indicted lobbyists, in part to block rival 
casinos. Casino-owning tribes also contributed millions of dollars to congressional 
campaigns at the lobbyists' direction.383 Federal law allows Indian tribes to contribute to 
an unlimited number of candidates, political parties, political actions committees, and 
state parties, unlike other donors, who are subject to limits.384 
There are many examples of gambling money influencing the public policy and 
regulatory process, legally through substantial campaign contributions to elected officials 
and at times illegally. In British Columbia, a scandal involving charity gambling was 
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called "Bingogate," and a second scandal involving the approval of casino locations led 
to the resignation ofthe provincial premier.385 
In California, two cases involving non-disclosure of otherwise legal tribal campaign 
contributions are moving through the courts. The National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission recommended that states adopt tight restrictions on contributions to state 
and local campaigns by corporate, private or tribal entities that have applied for or been 
granted the privilege of operating gambling facilities. 
Financial Crimes 
The large amount of money that circulates in casinos offers occasions for money 
laundering and other financial crimes. For this reason, the United Nations' Law on 
Prevention of Money Laundering lists "gaming establishments, automated casino clubs, 
organizers of lottery games, special event raffles, lotteries and other games of chance" as 
obligated to implement measures to detect and prevent money laundering.386 U.S. federal 
and state laws require similar precautions. 
According to one literature review, "The connection between gambling and crime has 
been well-documented, with adult gambling-related criminal offenses typically including 
fraud, theft, fencing stolen goods, embezzlement, tax fraud and evasion, forgery, selling 
drugs and counterfeiting."387 
Victim Crimes 
Research suggests that crime rises as casinos attract visitors who either commit or are the 
victims of crime. This phenomenon may also occur in other venues that attract cash-
bearing participants.388 Unique to gambling enterprises, problem and pathological 
gambling increases among local residents and is associated with crimes that generate 
money to gamble or pay off gambling debts. 
A study using data from every U.S. County between 1977 and 1996, found that casinos 
(including Indian casinos and riverboat casinos) increased crime (defined as FBI Index 1 
Offenses: aggravated assault, rape, murder, robbery, larceny, burglary, and auto theft) 
after a lag of three or four years. Prior to the opening of a casino, casino and noncasino 
counties had similar crime rates, but after six years, casino counties had eight percent 
more property crimes and ten percent more violent crimes than noncasino counties. 
Border counties experienced about half the rate of increase as casino counties. The 
study's authors conclude that, " ... casinos create crime, rather than attract it from 
elsewhere. "389 
• The aggravated assault rate was 112 incidents per 100,000 population higher five 
years after a casino opened in a county. 
• The rape rate was higher by eight to twelve incidents per 100,000 population in 
the fourth and fifth years after a casino opened. 
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• Increases in robberies began almost immediately after a casino opened; after five 
years the rate per 100,000 population was about 70 incidents higher. 
• Property crimes increased dramatically after a casino opened: the rate of larceny 
per 100,000 population increased from about 300 to 1,400 over seven years; 
burglary increased from about 80 to over 500; and, auto theft increased from 
about 200 to nearly 500 incidents per 100,000 population. 
The authors of this study speculate that violent crime increases more rapidly after a 
casino opens because it is committed by criminals drawn to the gambling operation, 
while the impact of property crime is delayed as local residents, who may become 
problem or pathological gamblers, exhaust their resources. The most significant crime 
effects were for property crimes such a larceny and burglary, where obtaining resources 
was the primary motivation for the crime. 
A 2002 national study, using county-level data, found that four years after a Native 
American casino opened, property crimes (primarily auto theft and larceny) and violent 
crimes increased by about ten percent.390 
Similar findings were found in a study of casino gambling and crime in Wisconsin: 
" ... the emergence of casino gambling significantly increased county crime rates ... " by 
about 8.6 percent in casino counties and by 7.5 percent in counties adjacent to two or 
more counties with casinos.391 At the time of this study, there were 17 casinos in 
Wisconsin owned by 11 Indian tribes, most located in rural areas. Thus these findings 
are especially applicable to California. 
Casinos are associated with increased consumption of alcohol, which also may have an 
impact on crime rates. Many tribal casinos are located in rural areas and reached by 
narrow winding roads, leading to problems with drunken driving. The Wisconsin study 
found that arrests for Driving While Intoxicated, liquor law violations, and disorderly 
conduct comprised 45 percent ofNon-FBI Index arrests. 392 
Crime has substantial social costs. A national study of crime in casino counties found 
total costs in 1995-96 for increased crime associated with the casinos of $65 per adult in 
casino counties, not counting the judicial and regulatory costs, costs related to 
employment and lost productivity, and social service and welfare costs. The 1996 
Wisconsin study found that the cost to the public for increased crime resulting from the 
introduction of Indian casinos was nearly $51 million ($63.8 million in 2005 dollars).393 
Other studies have found that problem and pathological gamblers impose high costs on 
society. A 1990 Maryland study found that 62 percent of the members of a Gamblers 
Anonymous group had committed illegal acts as a result of their gambling: 80 percent 
had committed civil offenses* and 29 percent had committed criminal offenses. A study 
• A civil oflense is an infraction of a lnw that is not a crime. This may be something like a routine traffic 
of1ense such as speeding. The only penalty for a civil offense is a fine. 
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of 400 members of Gamblers Anonymous found that 57 percent admitted to stealing an 
average of$135,000 to finance their gambling; the total stolen was over $30 million.394 
A 1996 study in Plymouth, England found that adolescents who gamble excessively on 
slot machines engage in stealing to fund their habit. In examining police reports over a 
one-year period, the authors found that in 3.9 percent of the juvenile cases the offense 
was gambling-related; of these, 86 percent involved theft or burglary. The offender was 
male in 93 percent of the cases. This was a first time offense for over one third ofthe 
offenders. 395 
Given that casinos create external social costs for the larger society, the policy issue 
arises as to whether they should compensate for those costs. The authors of one study 
estimate that taxes compensating for the casino-induced increase in FBI Index 1 crimes 
would represent about 25-30 percent of casino revenues.396 Policy options for reducing 
this impact would have to effectively and directly address problem and pathological 
gambling. The authors of the Wisconsin study made the following recommendations to 
the state as it renegotiated its tribal-state gaming compacts:397 
• The tribes should fund enhanced law-enforcement activities in casino and 
adjacent counties, including road patrols, especially in areas around bars. 
• The tribes should fund community assistance, such as creating and activating 
neighborhood-watch programs. 
• Tribes should not sell alcoholic beverages in their casinos. 
• Drug-detection units of state police should be enhanced and made available to 
sheriffs and police. 
• Police officer and prosecutors in all counties should include gambling screening 
questions in all arrest reports and crime reports. 
Illegal Games 
Estimates of the amount of illegal gambling in the U.S. range from $80 billion to $360 
billion a year. Sport betting is the largest illegal gaming enterprise in most states. 398 
Sports betting 
A 2002 Gallup Poll survey found that ten percent of American adults had bet on a 
sporting event in the previous year. Sport betting is illegal under federal law in all states 
but Nevada, Oregon, Delaware and Montana. In 2005, $2.25 billion was legally wagered 
in Nevada's sports books.399 
The National Gaming Association estimated in 1999 that illegal wagers on sporting 
events are as much as $380 billion annually. According to one report, the United States 
has the world's largest illegal bookmaking network, principally on sports.400 The FBI 
estimates that more than $2.5 billion is illegally wagered annually on college basketball's 
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March Madness playoffs each year. There is evidence that sports wagering can act as a 
gateway to other forms of gambling, and threaten the integrity of sports and athletes.401 
As previously discussed in the chapter on Internet Gambling, sport betting is one of the 
most popular forms of at-home gambling, accounting for about 35 percent of the Internet 
gambling industry's revenues.402 
Cockfighting 
Cockfighting has been illegal in California since 1905, and is illegal in every state but 
New Mexico and Louisiana. However it is a growing problem in California, along with 
other forms of illegal animal fighting. According to news accounts, a number of large 
cockfighting derbies have been broken up in recent years, resulting in the arrests of 
dozens of people and thousands ofbirds confiscated. A cockfighting bust in Amador 
County resulted in the arrest of 30 people including the ranch owner, who is facing felony 
conspiracy and gambling charges.403 
In 2003, officials estimated that some 50,000 gamecock operations existed in Southern 
California alone. During the containment ofNewcastle disease that year, one third of the 
flocks eradicated were illegal gamecocks.404 
Cockfights offer opportunities for money laundering, drug trafficking, and violence. 
Training or causing a bird to fight or even watching a cockfight is a misdemeanor, with a 
penalty of up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine. Legislation that would make it a 
felony for second and subsequent offenses, with a maximum one year prison sentence 
and $25,000 fine, was proposed but not enacted by the legislature this session (see early 
versions of SB 156, Soto ). 
HEALTH ISSUES 
Smoking 
"Gambling, cigarettes and cigars" is a combination that makes for smoky casinos and 
tribal and charity bingo halls. According to an industry publication, " .. .it is generally 
acknowledged that the prevalence of smokers is higher among gamblers than the general 
population."405 Smoking and exposure to secondhand smoke are serious health hazards in 
California Indian casinos, as discussed in that section of this report. 
The gambling industry has been active in opposing laws restricting smoking in public 
places. A study of revenues at three video lottery terminal gaming facilities located at 
racetracks, and run by the state lottery in Delaware, found a significant decline after the 
implementation of a smoke-free law, depending on whether there were alternative 
gaming venues in the region. Competing gambling venues in nearby states continued to 
allow smoking, drawing customers. 406 
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Alcohol 
Alcohol abuse is a significant contributor to crime in and around gambling enterprises. 
Fifteen California Indian gaming tribes are authorized by the Department of Alcohol 
Beverage Control (ABC) to sell alcohol at their casinos (see list on page 74). Drunken 
driving and violent and disorderly behavior are problems, according to local law 
enforcement. Researchers studying the interaction between crime and Indian casinos in 
Wisconsin recommended that alcohol not be sold at the casinos.407 An alternative is well-
trained servers following clear policies on limited alcohol service. 
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ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF GAMBLING 
BACKGROUND 
Gambling is a product for which there is considerable consumer demand, as the polling 
and financial data presented in Chapter 1 indicate. Some form of commercial gambling 
is legal in every state except for two, and in 1998, gambling accounted for over ten 
percent of leisure expenditures by Americans. The gambling industry has since expanded 
considerably and seems to have considerable potential to grow further in the casino and 
Internet gaming sectors.408 Like many discretionary consumer goods, spending on 
gambling is cyclical. When aggregate income slows, so does gambling revenue. 
In this chapter, we review the economic literature examining gambling through standard 
measures such as job creation and personal income. Many jurisdictions have pursed 
gambling enterprises as economic development opportunities, most famously Atlantic 
City and Las Vegas. The literature generally finds a positive economic development 
benefit when gamblers are drawn from outside an area to a destination resort. 
Destination resorts create jobs in the casinos, but also in hotels, restaurants, casino supply 
firms, outdoor recreation, and retail shopping. They attract a high proportion of their 
visitors from outside the region in which they operate, exporting social costs.409 For 
example, about 85 percent ofNevada's gambling revenues come from out-of-state 
tourists. 
However the calculus for urban casinos is different. They attract people primarily to 
gamble for a few hours, not to experience a destination resort, and so stimulate 
considerably less job creation and economic development. They are also more likely to 
displace other local consumer spending (the "cannibalization effect"). Shifting 
expenditures from one area to another does not represent new income for the local 
economy. The convenience of urban casinos and their proximity to large numbers of 
people means that the negative social impacts caused by excessive gambling are likely to 
be felt locally. Urban casinos are also likely to reduce the demand for rural casinos. One 
analyst recommends that, "It is better to concentrate casinos in one specific area, creating 
competition between them (forcing them to attract outside gamblers) than to establish 
several local monopolies."410 
DIRECT EMPLOYMENT 
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that in 1996, the legal gambling 
industry employed over half a million people, primarily in casinos and in the pari-mutuel 
(horse-racing) industry, with total salaries of more than $15 billion.411 Studies conducted 
for the Commission found decreased unemployment, a slight increase in construction 
employment and earnings, a substantial increase in earnings in the hotel and lodgings and 
recreation and amusement industries, and reduced welfare outlays, but no change in 
overall per capita income in communities near casinos (commercial and tribal). None of 
the tribal casinos were unionized, and paid on average $18,000 in annual salaries, $8,000 
less than the largest, unionized casinos.412 
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A Point of Comparison-Commercial Casinos 
In 1997, Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. conducted a national survey of employees in the 
commercial, non-Indian casino gaming industry for the American Gaming Association. 
Total industry employment at that time was estimated to be 330,000 employees in ten 
states (not including California, where only Indian tribes may operate casinos). Over half 
of those employees were in Nevada, where much of the industry is unionized. The 
sample size was approximately 54 percent of all casino employees. Key results 
include:413 
• Commercial casinos are major employers. Employment had increased by 16 
percent in the previous year and a half, compared to total nonagricultural job 
growth in the U.S. of2.2 percent. 
• Commercial casinos offer benefits. All of the companies participating in the 
survey offered health benefits and a retirement or profit sharing program. 
• Less than half of all employees in the commercial casino gaming industry 
nationwide, and under one third in Nevada, actually worked in the casino. The 
rest worked in hotels, restaurants, and other jobs associated with the casino. 
The types of jobs provided by the gaming industry are predominantly "service workers," 
according to a Price WaterhouseCoopers study for the American Gaming Association, 
which concluded" .. .it appears that the industry is providing 'entry-level' positions to a 
diverse workforce."414 Other studies have found that non-unionized casino jobs are, for 
the most part, low paying and/or part time jobs with no benefits.415 Most Indian casinos 
in California are not unionized. 
Local Impact 
In 1998, the National Opinion Research Center analyzed data from 1980 to 1997, to 
determine the impact of casinos on jobs and other economic indicators. The Center 
sampled 100 communities and reported that communities with a casino within a 50-mile 
radius experienced: 
• A one percent decrease in the unemployment rate. 
• A 17 percent decrease in per capita unemployment insurance payments. 
• A 13 percent decrease in welfare costs.416 
A number of studies find that the major economic benefit a casino can bring to an area is 
if it attracts gamblers from out of the area. If casino revenue comes mainly from local 
residents, displacing other local expenditures, jobs may be merely transferred from other 
sectors of employment.417 
For example, a study of the impact of casinos on the local economy of Greenville, 
Mississippi during 1990-1997, found increased personal income and retail spending 
which the authors' attributed to the opening of two casinos and wages paid to casino 
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employees. However the casinos relied heavily on local residents for their business, 
attracting few tourists, and "Residents are as likely to know someone employed by the 
casinos as they are someone wiped out by a gambling addiction."418 
Casinos in areas attracting tourists fared better in a study by the University of Southern 
Mississippi, which found that non-residents generated 82 percent of all gaming revenues 
in the North Mississippi region (close to Memphis) and 66 percent of gaming revenues on 
the Gulf Coast. 419 
STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES 
"Legalized gaming," said Biloxi's Mayor, A.J. Holloway, "is going to be what 
saves us. "420 
A 1995 gambling industry report found that the commercial casino industry paid $2.9 
billion in federal, state, and local taxes.421 Some jurisdictions, such as Atlantic City, New 
Jersey, and states such as Nevada and Mississippi, are particularly dependent on revenues 
derived from commercial casinos. For example, Mississippi's casinos pay 12 percent of 
their revenues to state and local governments, two-thirds to the state and one-third to 
localities. Mississippi Gulf Coast casinos generated $1.4 billion in profit in 2004, and 
paid $168 million in state and local taxes. 422 
Increasing public revenue has been one of the main motivations for states and localities to 
legalize gambling, particularly state lotteries and expanded casino venues. However in 
California, the public revenues have been comparatively modest: 
• The state lottery provides about one percent of the state's General Fund revenues 
and about three percent of education revenues. 
• Horse racing provided about $4 million to the state General Fund in FY 2004-05, 
around $39 million to the Fair and Exposition Fund, and about $7 million to local 
governments. 
• Card room licensing fees have not kept pace with increasing industry revenues, 
and are less now than they were than seven years ago, adjusting for inflation. 
• Some gaming tribes make payments to the Special Distribution Fund and the 
Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (see Table 8). These fees and payments over a five-
year period represent less than one percent of the gross gaming revenues earned 
by the gaming tribes over a four year period. In addition, five gaming tribes will 
make an estimated $35 million in payments to the state's General Fund in FY 
2005-06 and will support a $1 billion transportation bond issue over a ten year 
period. 
• Since Indian casino revenues are not taxable, their presence may divert funds 
from a taxable activity and thus negatively impact state and local revenues. 
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Casino gambling creates public costs as well as benefits. These include the regulatory 
costs of gaming boards and other regulatory institutions; police, prosecutorial and 
judicial/correctional costs; expenditures for new roads and fire protection; social costs 
due to problem and pathological gambling (lost of productive work time, family welfare 
costs, treatment costs, crime costs); and local environmental and planning costs. These 
have previously been discussed in more detail. 
BANKRUPTCIES 
In 1998, the Congress directed the Department of the Treasury to study the interaction 
between gambling and bankruptcy. The subsequent 1999 report found that: 
On average, frequent high-risk gambling is associated, in our data, with a 6-
percentage point increase in the lifetime probability of declaring bankruptcy. 
Other levels of gambling activity (non-frequent, non-high-risk) are not associated 
with elevated probabilities of declaring bankruptcy. Since only an estimated 2.7 
percent of the population gambles frequently in high-risk venues, the impact of 
these activities on overall bankruptcy rates is relatively small.423 
Contrary to other studies, which have found a localized impact of increased bankruptcies 
associated with casino operations, the Treasury report found " ... no statistically 
significant casino effect (proximity to a casino) with regard to county bankruptcy rates." 
In contrast, a 2002 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that four 
years after a Native American casino opens, bankruptcy rates increase ten percent in 
counties with a casino and seven percent in counties within 50 miles of a casino.424 
The California Council on Problem Gambling reports that 61 percent of the 3,399 callers 
to its problem gambling hotline in 2004 used credit cards to finance their gambling, and 
nearly 49 percent were maxed out. They spent an average of $33,636 a year on 
gambling, and had an average debt of$32,461. The total spent on gambling per year by 
these callers was $45,745,199, and their total debt was reported to be $41,809,983. 
Financial problems are one of the main reasons that gamblers call the California problem 
gambling hotline, according to the Council.425 
A 2005 study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis found "strong evidence" that 
destination casinos export bankruptcy back to visitors' home states, especially in the 
Southern United States.426 A study ofbankruptcy rates from 1990 to 2002 found that 
" ... adding legalized casino gambling to a local economy correlates positively to 
increasing bankruptcy rates over time ... explained in part by the effects of problem 
gamblers." The authors speculate that over time casino patrons are increasingly drawn 
from the local population, causing economic distress in other businesses in the 
community.427 
A 1996 study by SMR Research Corporation found that gambling was one of several 
variables affecting bankruptcy rates, along with easy credit, unemployment, lender 
marketing, and consumer debt loads.428 The study found that counties with gambling 
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facilities had higher bankruptcy filing rates (4.67 per thousand residents) than counties 
with no facilities (3.96 per thousand residents). Bankruptcy rates in Atlantic City were 
71 percent higher than in the rest of the state, and in Las Vegas 50 percent higher than the 
national average, although the reasons for this difference were not identified in the study. 
Based on interviews, SMR found that 20 percent of compulsive gamblers were forced to 
file for bankruptcy protection because of gambling losses. This finding was supported by 
another study of gamblers receiving treatment from compulsive gambling treatment 
centers in Minnesota, which found that 21 percent had declared bankruptcy. A 
subsequent study by Abt Associates, Inc. found that the amount of debt held by 
compulsive gamblers was relatively large, especially for low-income compulsive 
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A 1996 Wisconsin study, also cited in the Treasury report, sought to determine the extent 
of compulsive gambling in the state and found that one fifth of the self-identified "serious 
problem gamblers" had filed for bankruptcy, with an average debt of$39,000. The study 
projected that Wisconsin had 32,000 serious problem gamblers, costing $300 million a 
year in the form ofbankruptcies, treatment, unemployment compensation, lost tax 
revenue and law enforcement. 
The weight of these studies suggests that problem and pathological gamblers have 
relatively high rates of bankruptcies. However when considered in the aggregate, the 
U.S. Treasury concluded that," ... gambling has no measurable effect on statewide 
bankruptcy rates (italics added)."430 The report recommended that, "Public education 
regarding bankruptcy and gambling should be considered as a part of our efforts to 
inform and educate the public on financial security and public health issues."431 
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APPENDIX A 
List of Petitioners by State 
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Groups Petitioning the Bureau of Indian Affairs to be Federally Recognized 
Tribes in California as of February 2005 
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lone Band of Miwok Indians (lone) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1916, status clarified administratively 1994 
Mono Lake Indian Community (Lee Vining) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1976 
Washoe/Paiute of Antelope Valley (Coleville) 
Letter ofintent to Petition 1976 
Antelope Valley Paiute Tribe (Coleville) 
Letter ofintent to Petition 1976 
United Maidu Nation (Susanville) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1977 
Kern Valley Indian Community (Weldon) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1979 
Death Valley Timbi-Sha Shoshone Band (Death Valley) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1979 
Acknowledged 1983 
United Lumbee Nation of North Carolina and America (Exeter, CA) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1980 
Decline to acknowledge 1985 
Coastal Band of Chumash (Buelton) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1982 
Southern Sierra Miwuk Nation (formerly American Indian Council of Mariposa 
County, aka Yosemite) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1982 
Shasta Nation (Yreka) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1982 
Juanefio Band of Mission Indians (also Juanefio Band of Mission Indians, 
Acjachemen Nation) (San Juan Capistrano) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1996 
Totowa Nation (Fort Dick) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1983 
North Fork Band of Mono Indians (Clovis) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1983 
Dunlap Band of Mono Indians (aka Mono Tribal Council of Dunlap) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2002 
Nor-Rel-Muk Nation (formerly Hayfork Band; formerly Nor-EI-Muk Band of 
Wintu Indians) (Hayfork) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1984 
San Luis Rey Band of Mission Indians (Oceanside) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1984 
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Wintu Indians of Central Valley, California (Central Valley) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1984; certified letter returned by P.O. 1997 
Wintoon Indians (Anderson) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1984; certified letter returned by P .0. 1997 
Chukchansi Yokotch Tribe (Raymond) 
Letter oflntent to Petition1985; letter withdrawn 2000 
Yo kayo Tribe of Indians (Ukiah) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1987 
Wukchumni Council (Fresno) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1988 
Choinumni Council (Stockton) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1988 
Coastanoan Band of Carmel Mission Indians (El Monte) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1988 
Muwekma Ohlone Tribe (formerly Ohlone/Costanoan Muwekma Tribe) (San Jose) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1989 
Decline to acknowledge 2002 
Indian Canyon Band of Coastanoan/Mutsun Indians (Hollister) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1989 
Salinan Nation (aka Salinan-Chumash Nation) (San Jose) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1989 
Amah Mutsun Band of Ohlone/Costanoan Indians (formerly Amah Band of 
Ohlone/Cosstanoan Indians) (Woodside) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1990 
Tsnungwe Council (Salyer) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1992 
Esselen/Costanoan Tribe of Monterey County (Monterey) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1992; letter withdrawn 1996 
Ohlone/Costanoan-Esselen Nation (Monterey) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1992 
Chukchansi Yokotch Tribe of Mariposa California (Mariposa) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1993 
Wintu Tribe of Northern California (Project City) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1993 
Salin an Tribe of Monterey & San Luis Obispo Counties (King City) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1993 
Gabrielino/Tongva Nation (San Gabriel) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 1994 
Gabrielino/Tongva Indians of California Tribal Council (Culver City) 
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Letter of Intent to Petition 1997 
Costanoan-Rumsen Carmel Tribe (Chino) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1994 
Costoanoan Ohlone Rumsen-Mutsun Tribe (Watsonville) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1994 
Federated Coast Miwok (Novato) 
Letter ofintent to Petition 1995; restored as Graton Rancheria by Act of Congress 
12/27/2000 
Fernandeno/Tatviam Tribe (Sylmar) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1995 
Wadatkuht Band ofthe Northern Paiutes of the Honey Lake Valley (Susanville) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1995 
San Fernando Band of Mission Indians (formerly Ish Panesh United Band of 
Indians) (Newhall) 
Letter ofintent to Petition 1995 
Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk and Yowlumne Tejon Indians (Covina) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1996 
Ani Yvwi Yuchi (Yucca Valley) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1996 
Coastal Gabrielefio Dieguefio Band of Mission Indians (Santa Ana) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1997 
Calusa-Seminole Nation (Santa Cruz) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1998 
The Displaced Elem Lineage Emancipated Members (aka DELEMA) (Santa Rosa) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1998 
Konkow Valley Band ofMaidu (Oroville) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1998 
Gabrielefio Band of Mission Indians of California (Beaumont) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1998 
T'Si-akim Maidu (Quincy) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1998 
Sierra Foothill Wuksachi Yokuts Tribe (Sanger) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1999 
Costanoan Tribe of Santa Cruz and San Juan Bautista Missions (Madera) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 1999; letter withdrawn 2000 
Traditional Choinuymni Tribe (Sanger) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2000 
Honey Lake Maidu (Susanville) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2000 
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North Valley Yokut Tribe (Stockton) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2000 
Tejon Indian Tribe (Wasco) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2000 
Calaveras Band ofMiwuk Indians (West Point) 
Letter oflntent to Petition 2001 
Xolon Salinan Tribe (Bay Point) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2001 
BarbarefioNenturefio Band of Mission Indians (Thousand Oaks) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2002 
Dumna Wo-Wah Tribal Government (formerly Dumna Tribe of Millerton Lake) 
(Fresno) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2002 
The Chiricahua Tribe of California (EI Cajon) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2003 
Diguefio Band of San Diego Mission Indians (Colton) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2003 
Choctaw Allen Tribe (Willows) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2003 
Callattakapa-Choctaw Tribe (San Diego) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2004 
Monachi Indian Tribe (Exeter) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2004 
Nashville-Eldorado Miwok Tribe (Elk Grove) 
Letter of Intent to Petition 2004 
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